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In 1994, almost a million Tutsi and some Hutu were massacred in Rwanda during 
the 100 day genocide. Between 1995 and 1998, nearly the same number of Hutu 
and some Tutsi died, while in flight, primarily in the former Zaire. In the years 
following genocide, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans have been accused of 
genocide related crimes. There is not a person in Rwanda who is not directly 
affected by past violence and the country is in a process of healing and 
reconciliation.  
 
Much of the violence in Rwanda can be traced to perceptions of history and 
identity. This thesis seeks to unearth narratives of history and identity as a way of 
exploring possibilities for healing and reconciliation. Through an in-depth 
examination of four life stories, interviews with leaders in the field of reconciliation 
in Rwanda and informal interviews with a broad spectrum of Rwandans, this 
research sheds light on the challenges and opportunities in terms of healing. It 
finds that through critical engagement with our own and broader socio-political 
narratives we can expand the possibilities of our own narratives, allowing scope 
for personal healing as well as leading to a deeper understanding of the other. 






This thesis is primarily about hope. The question predominant on my mind from 
the moment I started was, is there hope for Rwanda? And perhaps the question 
behind that was, is there hope for the world? Perhaps this is the central theme of 
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies. It is the unwavering hope that the world 
can be a better place, a different place, if we but make it so.  
 
In the beginning I was shocked to the core of my being as I immersed myself in 
the horror of the violence in Rwanda, described by many as the worst since the 
holocaust. I knew I would be shocked, yet there is no way to prepare oneself for 
the experience. At this stage I grappled deeply with what one might call the horror 
of the human condition. But amidst this I felt very confident of a different Rwanda, 
because I was interacting with Rwandans who seemed to represent to me the 
possibility of a different Rwanda. These Rwandans were, after all, good, kind, 
people who valued human life and were kind to their neighbours.  
 
But as I explored the Rwandan situation more deeply, and unearthed not only 
complex political intrigue and manipulation within Rwandan but within much 
higher levels of governance, including powerful first world states, I began to feel 
increasingly more overwhelmed and hopeless. If something like the Rwandan 
violence found its roots in such complex things as thousands of years of human 
history, colonialism, political manipulation, the involvement of greedy, self-
interested super powers and the continued hidden agendas of so many players, 
what hope was there for the ordinary Rwandan, or planet dweller, to ever begin to 
create that better world? And yet. And yet amidst all the chaos over our heads 
there are so many individuals and small groups of people saying, “we don't care 
what happens over our heads, we are going to carry on the good work here on the 
ground”. It is those individuals that restored my hope; NGO leaders who worked 
day and night to bring reconciliation between one peasant widow and another, 
young Rwandans prepared to put their lives at risk for the truth, families deciding 
to make a life for themselves in a country that seemed hardly to welcome them, 
and a wide diversity of Rwandan friends who spoke with passion about a Rwanda 





Through the process of this thesis my hope was shattered and then restored. The 
hope I hold within me now is deep and cannot be shaken. It keeps believing even 
when everything around us is screaming something different. It says, quietly and 
unendingly, the world would be a better place were we only to make it so. 
 
My thanks go to all those many friends – Burundian, Rwandan and South African 
– who have participated in this project and have helped me to see hope in so 
many ways. My thanks also to my supervisor, Geoff Harris, not only for all his 
input to this thesis but also for believing so absolutely in a better world and 
reminding us of the role we have to play in making that a reality. To my good 
friends, Kevin Parry and Jacomien van Niekerk, endless gratitude for your 
constant, steady support and presence over the five years it has taken me to 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1994, almost a million Tutsi and some Hutu were massacred in Rwanda during 
the 100 day genocide. Between 1995 and 1998, nearly the same number of Hutu 
and some Tutsi died, while in flight, primarily in the former Zaire1. For the fifteen 
years following genocide hundreds of thousands of Rwandans have been 
accused of genocide related crimes. There is not a person in Rwanda who is not 
directly affected by past violence. How is it possible for this country to reconcile 
after such unimaginable horror?  
 
Although the Western press in 1994 described the Rwandan conflict as one of 
‘ancient tribal warfare’, the truth of the matter is somewhat more complex. In fact, 
a cursory glance at the context reveals that there are no distinct tribes in Rwanda 
but rather nine million people who speak the same language and seem to share 
the same culture. The situation has been more accurately described as one of 
ethnic conflict between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi. A less cursory glance 
further reveals a struggle not only around ethnicity and identity but of history, how 
it is represented and how it is perceived.   
 
It is for this reason that this thesis addresses perceptions of history and identity. It 
is matters of history and identity that lie at the heart of the Rwandan conflict and 
are also central to its solution. History and identity are accessible to us through 
the narratives people tell or those they have recorded. Thus this thesis plans to 
unearth narratives of history and identity as a way of exploring possibilities for 
healing and reconciliation. 
 
1.1. Understanding narrative 
 
Why do we use narratives as a way of explaining our history and identity? George 
Rosenwald and Richard Ochberg argue that it is because narratives help us bring 
coherence to our lives (1992, 2). Through narratives we can make sense of and 
organize the events and people that affect our lives. How are narratives formed? 
                                               
1
 The Democratic Republic of Congo, at that time named Zaire, will be referred to in this thesis as The 




They are formed in constant dialogue with those events and people (Cobely, 
2001, 2). What do these narratives tell us? They tell us how we perceive the 
events and people around us and ourselves in relationship to these.  
 
Together with Rosenwald and Ochberg, this thesis holds that the way we perceive 
our history and identity, as is revealed in our narratives, can be either 
emancipatory or stunting (1992, 8). Our narratives can either prevent us from 
growing or assist us in our growth. Likewise, in a country, the presiding narratives 
can either assist reconciliation or constrain it.  
 
In order to make sense of the layers of events that occur in our lives and our 
interactions with multiple groups of people, we draw everything that happens to us 
together in a coherent narrative. These events may include things that happened 
to us or things that happened to people that we know about. They may have 
happened within our family, generations before, but have become part of our own 
narrative through their retelling. They may include events that have happened on 
a national or even international level that become integrated into our personal 
stories. Similarly, the people that become part of our narrative may include figures 
of authority, national heroes or villains, people we interact with daily and even 
imagined people. We draw all of this together in a coherent narrative that helps us 
make sense of it all. Rosenwald and Ochberg write that “life histories have 
coherence that realists assumed was ’out there’ but is now seen as something 
imposed by the story teller … coherence derives from the tacit assumptions of 
plausibility that shape the way each story maker weaves the fragmentary 
episodes of experience into a history” (1992, 5).  
 
This coherence or structure is brought about by the use of certain narrative 
techniques including the use of key recurring themes. Within these themes, we 
place ourselves as playing a specific role: a role that is either active or passive, 
depicts ourselves as victim or perpetrator, hero or villain, as self determining or as 
one swept along by external events and people. Further, structure and coherence 
are created through the use of stereotyping and the use of binary oppositions. 
Certain symbols, metaphors and myths emerge in our narrative. As Rosenwald 
and Ochberg say: “The stories people tell about themselves are not only 




the construction of the stories themselves. How individuals recount their histories 
– what they emphasize or omit, their stance as protagonist or victims, the 
relationship the story establishes between teller and audience – all shape what 
individuals can claim of their own lives” (1992, 7). This process of bringing 
coherence is largely unconscious but is highly influential in determining the way 
we respond to events and people around us, and is also influential in determining 
who we are and are becoming. 
 
1.2. Narrative and dialogue 
 
No narrative exists independently of other narratives. Paul Cobley writes that 
“even the most ‘simplest’ of narratives is embedded in a network of relations that 
are sometimes astounding in their complexity” (2001, 2). The narratives of those 
around us, of our family and extended family, of our community, our country and 
our world all interact with our own narrative. “Subjectivity is not the romantic fiction 
of a self prior to and safe from socialisation. On the contrary, it is what bears the 
marks of the person’s interaction with the world and seeks yet to erase them,” 
write Rosenwald and Ochberg (1992, 8). 
 
Personal life stories are not only embedded into the narratives of other people, but 
also in the contending narratives of the past, and current social, cultural and 
political narratives. As Rosenwald and Ochberg say: “Explanations individuals 
offer of their lives are inevitably shaped by the prevailing norms of discourse 
within which they operate … Social influence shapes not only public action but 
also private self-understanding” (1992, 5).  
 
Rosenwald and Ochberg argue that the narratives we have created form a social 
framework that limits the choices that we see as being possible or moral (1992, 
5). There is a trend in narrative research to engage with narratives uncritically so 
as not to impose an ‘ideal’ onto these narratives. A hermeneutical, non-canonical 
perspective might insist that no one has the right to judge one narrative as better 




and Ochberg argue that critically engaging our narratives is imperative for 
emancipation (1992, 6).  
 
Narrators impose coherence on their life events in order to make sense of them. 
But these narratives are often developed in struggle with or against other 
narratives. Rosenwald and Ochberg write that every narrative is an area of 
contention or struggle ‘between the individual and the society in which they are 
immersed, between consciousness and repression, between desire and 
adaptation’ (1992, 6).  They further state that they are interested in critically 
interpreting ‘the reasons and costs of stories’ disfigurement’ (1992, 6). With this 
critical interpretation comes the belief that one story can be said to be better than 
another in terms of its potential for growth, and a story can be said to improve on 
its predecessor (1992, 6).  
 
As people are able to enlarge the ‘range’ of personal narratives, “individuals and 
communities may become aware of the political-cultural conditions that have led 
to the circumscription of discourse. If a critique of these conditions occurs widely, 
it may alter not only how individuals construe their own identity but also how they 
talk to one another, and indirectly the social order itself” (1992, 8). Thus critically 
engaging narratives has the potential of actually changing the way people 
perceive the world around them. Being able to perceive reality in new and more 
varied ways, and understanding better the complex dynamic between self and 
others, and one’s own reality and the effect of political and cultural conditions is 
critical to any process of personal healing and reconciliation with the other. In 
critically engaging our narratives we are moving from the limitations of violent 
conflict towards the possibilities of hope. 
 
1.3. Narrative and history 
 
Following along the theme of narratives being the way people bring coherence to 
their lives, and that this coherence is thrashed out in dialogue with others, it will be 
argued that there is no one version of history, but rather multiple narratives that 




contention with other narratives. Pamela Stewart and Andrew Strathern call 
history the ‘narrative of the interaction of narratives’ (2002, 16). They say that 
when researching the past, there are generally two ways to go about this. One is 
the ‘internalist perspective’ which attempts to ‘represent the histories that the 
people we study make for themselves’ (2002, 15). The other is the ‘externalist 
perspective’, which describes and explains the past from the perspective of the 
outside observer. Stewart and Strathern see pitfalls in both of these when there 
are competing narratives about the past. Thus they suggest a third perspective, 
that of seeing history as existing in ‘the interplay between people based on [the 
interaction of narratives] and in the changes of narrative over time’ (2002, 17). 
They thus argue for a ‘dialectical history’ and further, they argue that “since such 
narratives [the stories people tell about the past] are also often statements about 
identity, history becomes a story of how such identities emerge dialectically and 
are subject to change” (2002, 17). 
 
Donald Breneiss, in a chapter titled ‘Telling troubles: narrative, conflict and 
experience’, suggests that “over the course of a dispute, one narrative often 
assumes an authoritative role” and that “other contending stories are 
subsequently shaped and evaluated in terms of these valorised versions” (1996, 
43). This has certainly been the case throughout Rwandan history, where one 
narrative has taken an authoritative role over others often resulting in skewed and 
false histories that have been used to support political agendas.  
 
1.4. Narrative and identity 
 
Rosenwald and Ochberg write that the very way we express our narrative speaks 
of our identity (1992, 7). Hungarian researcher Erzsébet Barát, for example, in an 
analysis on the oral life-narratives of Hungarian women, found that the narrators 
used the “auto/biographical interview situation strategically, in order to resolve a 
dilemma of identity” (2000, 166). Rosenwald and Ochberg elaborate on this, 
saying, “Personal stories are not merely ways of telling someone (or oneself) 






In The Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor argues that identity formation (like 
our narratives) is always dialogical: “We become full human agents, capable of 
understanding ourselves, and hence defining our identity, through our acquisition 
of rich human languages of expression” (1995, 253). And further, he states, “We 
define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the 
things our significant others want to see in us. Thus my discovering my own 
identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation , but that I negotiate it through 
dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others … my own identity crucially 
depends on my dialogical relation with others” (1995, 254). 
 
Social anthropologist Richard Jenkins has developed a model specifically 
concerning ethnic identity. His model emphasises the fact that identity is not static 
or inherent but rather dynamic and changing (2003, 13). He argues that it 
changes in the process of interacting with others and events around us. Identity is 
thus “collective and individual, externalized in social interaction and internalized in 
personal self-identification” (2003, 13, 14).   The premise of his model is that 
differences between groups become significant “only if they are significant to the 
actors themselves”. In other words, differences between groups are not inherently 
problematic. They become problematic when those involved begin to experience 
them as problematic. These differences can thus be described as ‘imagined’. But 
just because they are imagined, Jenkins stresses, this doesn’t mean that they are 
not significant to the actors themselves; significant enough to die for or to kill over 
(Jenkins, 2003, 19). Jenkins makes clear that ethnic identity, although not 
primordial, is nevertheless a primary aspect of self identity through the process of 
socialization.   
 
“An individual’s sense of ethnic membership may – depending upon 
context – be internalized during early childhood socialization, along with 
many of the markers of ethnicity such as language, religion, non-verbal 
behaviour etc. During this period, the primary, deep-rooted social identities 
of selfhood, gender and humanness are entered into. In these senses, 
identity is an aspect of the emotional and psychological constitution of 
individuals; it is, correspondingly, bound up with the maintenance of 
personal integrity and security, and may be extremely resistant to 




primary, although not a primordial, dimension of individual identity” (2003, 
47). 
 
Thus ethnic identity cannot easily be ‘shaken off’. Our very understanding of self 
and other is based not only on our own but also our groups’ immediate and deep 
history. 
 
Another premise of this model is that ethnic identification happens at the 
boundaries between groups. It is in the interactions on the boundary of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ at which groups are defined. Jenkins argues that we define ourselves in 
terms of what we are that the ‘other’ isn’t or in terms of what we are not compared 
to what the ‘other’ is (2003, 20). Sandra Wallman (1978, 1979, 1986) adds to this, 
saying that ‘othering’, or emphasizing ‘their’ difference happens to enhance ‘our’ 
identity ‘for purposes of organizations or identification’ (Jenkins, 2003, 19). 
Ethnicity, she says, happens at the boundary of ‘us’, in contact or confrontation or 
contrast with ‘them’. Boundaries change as actors’ understandings of themselves 
or the other changes (2003, 20). Ethnicity is thus “transactional, shifting and 
essentially impermanent” and ethnic boundaries are always two-sided. What 
becomes significant is how these boundaries are manipulated for various 
purposes (2003, 20). 
 
According to this model, key to group identity is identity boundaries; boundaries 
that are constantly defined and redefined in terms of ‘the other’. These boundaries 
are constantly being defended and protected from ‘the other’. It is in the act of 
defending ones identity boundary that violence can occur. This is especially the 
case when those in power define others against their will. This thesis will argue 
that rather than defending our boundaries we need to learn to share our 
boundaries. Instead of defending our differences, we need to share our 
differences. Instead of defining ourselves and others in order to protect ourselves 
against others, we can begin to let go of definitions in order to embrace shared 
definitions.  
 
In summary, narratives are our way of bringing coherence to our lives. Our 
narratives are inextricably linked with others’ narratives. They are also inextricably 




identity. These narratives can stunt our growth because they limit our social 
framework and the choices we see as possible or moral. But through critically 
engaging our narratives we can enlarge their range, thus seeing the impact that 
political and social conditions have had on us, and help us to begin to see other 
possibilities. This may be a significant part of the process of healing and 
reconciliation. 
 
1.5. Narrative and Rwanda 
 
The conflict in Rwanda, perhaps more significantly than most conflict situations, 
centers around narratives. Gerard Prunier, who has written an extensive account 
of the genocide in the context of Rwandan history writes that Rwanda has been 
built up into a ‘quasi-mythological land’ (1995, xiii). He describes how the creation 
of this mythological land can quite easily be traced in the events and actions that 
occurred in the hundred or so years preceding the genocide. He writes that,  
 
“In the last resort, we can say that Tutsi and Hutu have killed each other more 
to upbraid a certain vision they have of themselves, of the others and of their 
place in this world than because of material interest. This is what makes the 
killing so relentless. Material interests can always be negotiated, ideas cannot 
and they often tend to be pursued to their logical conclusions, however 
terrible” (1995, 40). 
 
It is for this reason that a sustainable model of healing in the Rwandan context 
takes into account the ‘vision’ people have of themselves and others, which is 
directly informed by their narratives of history and identity.  
  
Johan Pottier builds his entire account of the Rwandan situation around the 
concept of narratives, arguing that the manipulation of narratives was a key factor 
in allowing the genocide to happen, and remains a key hindrance to reconciliation 
in Rwanda today (2002). Kenneth Harrow writes that it is the ‘foundational 
fantasies’ of history and ethnicity that turned ‘ordinary people into killers’ (2005, 




narratives, with a Tutsi version and a Hutu version, and that these rigid narratives 
forced people into distinct categories that dehumanized the other.  
 
A sustainable model of healing and reconciliation would need to take into account 
these ‘rigid, divisive’ narratives which are divisive specifically along ethnic lines. It 
would need to look at how these narratives developed, what impact they currently 
have and how we could move towards shared narratives. As long as the 
narratives remain divisive, reconciliation work has the danger of being superficial 
and may be under threat next time leaders decide to manipulate those same 
embedded narratives to their advantage.  
 
1.6. Overall aims and objectives 
 
The overall objective of this thesis is to develop a narrative approach to healing 
and reconciliation based on a thorough exploration of history and identity in the 
Rwandan context. 
 
The specific aims are to: 
• Explore Rwandan identity and the role of narrative in shaping identity 
• Explore the concept of healing and its relationship to reconciliation 
• Develop a narrative approach to healing and reconciliation which takes 
Rwandan identity and history into consideration 
 
1.7. Overview of the chapters 
 
When speaking with Rwandans, one will often hear the terms ‘before’ or ‘after’ as 
time references in their narratives. ‘Before’ implicitly means ‘before the genocide’ 
and ‘after’ means ‘after the genocide’ (Koff, 2004). The next three chapters will be 
built around this same time structure, namely, before the genocide, during the 
genocide, and after the genocide. The content will largely be based on a review of 
the literature, and each chapter will look at narratives of history and identity during 
the above mentioned time frames. These three chapters will give the reader a 




in which the process of reconciliation is unfolding. This will be followed by a 
chapter titled ‘Rwanda Today’ which will examine the years 1999 to 2009. 
 
Chapter six will then describe the research story. This study is based on the 
collection of four life stories of Rwandans of a similar age and background, but 
from varying ethnic groups. The first level of study involved the recording of these 
stories. The second level of study involved the critical reflection of these stories 
with the four Rwandans to see if further engagement with these stories would in 
any way change the way they perceived their own narratives. Apart from these 
formal in-depth interviews, there were also a series of informal and formal 
interviews with key stakeholders in reconciliation work in Rwanda and with a 
broad selection of ordinary Rwandans. Lastly, a Reconciliation Forum was 
observed, which involved training thirty-five community leaders in reconciliation 
and a two hour dialogue between these leaders. Chapters seven and eight will 
analyse the life stories, the critical reflection of the life stories, the other informal 
and formal interviews and the Reconciliation Forum. 
 
Chapter nine will focus specifically on healing and reconciliation, both from the 
perspective of the literature as well as from Rwandans who are involved in 
reconciliation work on the ground. It will look at the relationship between healing 
and reconciliation and introduce narrative approaches to healing in other contexts, 
such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Chapter ten 
will describe what a narrative approach to healing and reconciliation in the 














CHAPTER 2:  BEFORE THE GENOCIDE 
 
“Gentille is Hutu, Raphaël. You talk, you denounce, but like all those guys 
who want to kill you, you decide her origin and her future. By the colour of 
her skin and how thin she is. You’re right, the Whites have started a kind of 
Nazism here. You’re indignant about any kind of discrimination but they’ve 
succeeded so well that even you turn Hutus into Tutsis just because of 
narrow noses. When the apocalypse comes, as you rightly say it will, and 
you’re holding a machete only to defend yourself, a short, squat man will 
walk towards you. He’ll tell you he’s lost his papers. And it will be true. But 
you won’t believe him because the man will be short and squat. And 
thinking to defend or avenge your own, with a clear conscience and sure of 
your patriotism and democratic ideals, you’ll kill a Tutsi who’s unfortunately 
been born with the body of a Hutu. Raphaël, Gentille is a Hutu, but that 
same night you kill that Tutsi with a Hutus body, you’ll save Gentille 
because her body looks like yours. It’s a prison, that kind of thinking, and 




As mentioned in chapter one, the Rwandan conflict has escalated around divisive 
narratives of history and identity. There is what the literature commonly calls the 
Tutsi-ideologue narrative and the Hutu-ideologue narrative. The Tutsi-ideologue 
narrative follows the lines that prior to colonialism, Hutu and Tutsi interacted 
peacefully, and that the divide between these two groups was not so much ethnic 
as related to social identity. The term ‘Tutsi’ was used to describe those wealthy 
through the ownership of cattle and ‘Hutu’ was used to describe the vast majority 
of agriculturalists. These groups migrated into Rwanda over time and formed one 
society that was then divided by the colonialists. The Hutu-ideologue narrative is 
that ethnic division existed in Rwandan society well before colonialists ever 
entered the country. This narrative argues that Hutu lived in the area we now call 
Rwanda first, and were then forcefully subjugated by Tutsi who came from the 
north. When the colonialists arrived they only reiterated what already was 
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happening in Rwandan society. The ideological differences between these 
narratives were significant enough to Rwandans to slaughter others in their own 
communities, neighbourhoods and families. This chapter will explore how such 
contradicting, rigid narratives formed. 
 
Prior to the genocide a number of historical events had a major influence on 
identity formation: First, the original migrations that brought various groups to the 
geographical area now called Rwanda and following this, the cultural, economic 
and political integration that occurred between these groups. Second, the 
influence of German, and later Belgian, colonialists. Third, the 1959 Hutu 
revolution. And lastly, the period of so-called democratic rule, first under the 
leadership of Gregoire Kayibanda and then General Juvénal Habyarimana. As 
Richard Jenkins highlights in his ‘social anthropological model of ethnicity’, identity 
formation occurs in dialogue with historical events, with identity categories 
changing and reforming in response to internal and external definitions (2003, 13, 
14). This will be particularly apparent as we examine Rwanda’s history and how 
events of the past shaped and reshaped Rwandan identity.  
 
2.2. The roots of Rwandan identity 
 
Both the influence of outsiders, such as early explorers, missionaries and 
colonialists, and the influence of political and social events within Rwanda and of 
Rwandan leaders, impacted the formation of Hutu and Tutsi identities. Not only 
have Hutu and Tutsi become divisive identities, but during the genocide the 
stereotype pervaded that being Tutsi was somehow superior to being Hutu. Both 
Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language and seem to share the same culture 
and yet for a significant portion of Rwandan history the differences between these 
two groups meant far more than that which they shared. 
 
If Rwanda is not made up of two groups with different cultures and languages, an 
immediate question is what the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ then refer to. Tribe, caste, 
class, occupation, social identity, ethnic group; the discussion with regards to the 
significance of the terms Hutu and Tutsi are endless. Early explorers and 
anthropologists from the 1800s assumed the terms referred to different tribes, and 
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even during the genocide, the horror of the killings was often dismissed by 
Western journalists as ‘ancient tribal warfare’. William Louis (1963) and Jacques 
Maquet (1961), some of the most prominent early anthropologists in Rwanda, 
dispel this idea by showing the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi to be a 
complicated one developed around working the land and owning cattle. They 
would sooner speak of the original meaning of the terms as describing a feudal 
relationship, or a class or caste system. René Lemarchand, however, suggests 
that this may be an attempt at trying to understand the complexity of identity in the 
Great Lakes region according to European theories, thus falling short of the reality 
(1970, 18).  
According to current researchers, historical investigation reveals to us that the 
terms Hutu and Tutsi were relatively fluid terms that referred to wealth rather than 
distinct tribes or races, and became progressively more fixed during the mid-
1800s and with colonialism. Alison Des Forges, a researcher with Human Rights 
Watch, discusses how the majority of Rwandans were agriculturalists, with a small 
number of pastoralists and that “when Rwanda emerged as a major state in the 
eighteenth century, its rulers measured their power in the number of their subjects 
and counted their wealth in the number of their cattle” (1999, 31).  She argues that 
over time the governing elite became more clearly defined and began to think of 
themselves as superior to the many agriculturalists. The word ‘Tutsi’ thus referred 
to one’s wealth and status, which was measured in terms of cattle owned, and 
‘Hutu’ came to refer to the masses of ordinary people (1999, 32). She argues that 
although these categories were becoming more and more used, they were not 
fixed categories at the time of colonialism, and different geographical areas, as 
Lemarchand also confirms, operated under different rules and norms.  Johan 
Pottier argues that the categories became decidedly more fixed before 
colonialism, under one of the kings named Rwabugiri. He argues that from about 
1860, Rwabugiri “began, or consolidated a process of ethnic consolidation” (2002, 
13). This narrative would explain why, when Europeans began exploring Rwanda 
in the late 1860s, they encountered seemingly distinct, fixed categories of people; 
either Hutu or Tutsi.  
Part of the discussion of what the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ stand for has to do with 
whether these groups are of separate origin or not. For those that perceive Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa to be distinctive groups with distinctive origins, there are several 
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disagreements regarding where, in particular, the Tutsi originated. The Twa, being 
pygmoid, are assumed to have been the earliest inhabitants of Rwanda. The 
Hutu, of Bantu origin, are seen to have travelled up from the south perhaps some 
two thousand years ago. Early anthropological accounts suggest that Tutsi were 
possibly a southern Ethiopian tribe who immigrated into Rwanda around the 
fifteenth century or several centuries before this. Some of these early accounts 
support the theory of a peaceful migration with Tutsi winning the Hutu over 
through a complex cattle relationship whereas others argue for a conquest model, 
saying that the relationship between Hutus and the Tutsi invaders differed by 
region.  
 
Interestingly, historical accounts of Rwanda written after 1994 carefully avoid 
stating the origin of the Tutsi. This is largely because early European 
anthropologists, carrying with them their Eurocentric racism, believed that the 
Tutsi were the descendents of the Biblical Ham, a race closer to Europeans than 
the Bantu Hutus. With their stereotypical tall, thin features, as opposed to the 
‘short and stocky’ Hutu, Tutsi were seen by the Europeans as being a superior 
race (Overschelden, 1947, Maquet, 1961, Louis, 1963, Lemarchand, 1970). 
Current writers on the Rwandan situation argue that it is this ‘Hamite myth’, based 
on the origin of the Tutsi, which has played a significant role in influencing ethnic 
division and even genocide. Thus, writers after 1994 have more to say on the 
danger of the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’, as Christopher Taylor terms it, than 
speculating as to the actual origins of the Tutsi (Taylor, 2001). 
 
However, these writers do comment on how the Tutsi integrated themselves into 
Hutu society. Some researchers, such as Helen Hintjens (1999) and Bernard Noel 
Rutikanga (2003), argue that the infiltration of Tutsi into Hutu society was entirely 
peaceful and based on a mutual cattle-based relationship. Others, such as Pottier 
(2002), Taylor (2001), Stewart and Strathern (2002), Des Forges (1999), and 
Reyntjens (1999) suggest that there must have been clashes between Tutsi and 
Hutu. Pottier suggests the Tutsi may have originated from the Hima people, a 
royalty from Uganda (1999, 12). 
 
Rather than viewing the formation of the Rwandan state and people as a one-
sided assimilation, Mahmood Mamdani argues convincingly for a ‘process of two-
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sided integration’ (2001, 61). He suggests that agriculturalists in the area we now 
call Rwanda had already formed into various powerful states under their own 
kingships. These states were not necessarily ‘Hutu’ but rather made up of various 
clans. Mamdani speaks of the Singa clan, the Zigaba clan and the state of 
Gisaka, which remained independent well into colonial times (2001, 61). 
According to Mamdani, the pastoralist Tutsi did not arrive, conquer the 
agriculturalist Hutu through clever trickery and then develop a serf-like system 
which subjugated Hutu. Rather, through various migrations over time, various 
peoples, who were both agriculturalists and pastoralists (Mamdani argues that 
these activities are ‘hardly exclusive’) amalgamated in one geographical area, 
exchanging language, culture and ways of ‘doing things’, such as administration, 
military organization and governance, resulting in the central Rwandan state that 
formed somewhere in the fifteenth century (2001, 61).   
 
Further, Mamdani says that even were the Tutsi a distinctive group that came 
from elsewhere, they are ‘wholly indigenous to Africa’ (2001, 28). Pottier points to 
the large number of movements and migrations within Africa and specifically 
central Africa, right until the arrival of colonialists who introduced borders and 
nation states (2002, 11-15). Movement from one area to another was fluid 
according to economic circumstances, internal wars and so on.  
 
Asked today whether there is a physical difference between Hutu and Tutsi, 
Rwandans I have spoken to have said that there is not. Some might add, “There 
is no such thing as Hutu or Tutsi anymore, we are all Rwandan”. Others might 
say, “We don’t like to look for difference now that we are all united as one”. But in 
more intimate conversations many Rwandans have pointed out to me who is Hutu 
and who is Tutsi. “How do you know?” I ask them. “You can see,” they tell me.  
 
Many writers on Rwanda contradict themselves on this matter, stating that 
physiognomy isn’t a decisive factor and yet attributing certain physical 
characteristics to Hutu and others to Tutsi. Taylor, for example, writes that “many 
Tutsi are taller and thinner than Hutu and have longer and thinner appendages …” 
but then adds, ”physiognomy …is not always reliable. Many people classified in a 
particular ethnic group do not have the group’s typical features” (2001, 40). He 
also writes that Rwandans he has spoken to admit to being wrong about 
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someone’s ethnic identity based on physiognomy about one third of the time, and 
relates several stories of Hutus killed during the genocide for ‘looking’ Tutsi and 
Tutsi escaping the killing for ‘looking’ Hutu.  
 
However, all early European accounts of Rwandans describe Hutu and Tutsi in 
quite distinctive terms. Prunier quotes one such early account as saying, “But the 
Tutsi were something else altogether. Extremely tall and thin, and often displaying 
sharp, angular facial features, these cattle-herders were obviously of a different 
racial stock than the local peasants” (1999, 5). Hutu were seen to be, in contrast 
to Tutsi, as shorter and stockier, with flatter noses. Des Forges suggests the 
theory that people intermarried within the occupational group they had been 
raised (agriculturalist or pastoralist) which created a shared gene pool within each 
group, ensuring that each group developed distinct features (1999, 33). But 
Prunier writes in a footnote that physiological differences were ‘only statistically 
relevant’ as after many years of intermarriage prior to colonialism, many people 
had the ‘wrong’ features.  
 
The other controversy is whether Hutu and Tutsi share the same culture or not. 
Some argue that all Rwandan’s share an identical culture. Des Forges writes how 
“Hutu and Tutsi developed a single and highly sophisticated language, 
Kinyarwanda, crafted a common set of religious and philosophical beliefs, and 
created a culture which valued song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric” (1999, 30). 
However, early historians to Rwanda describe encountering distinct cultural 
identities. These early anthropologists, whose accounts are often dismissed 
because of the racial baggage they bring to the subject, nevertheless need to be 
taken into account as they describe Rwandan society as they found it prior to 
colonialism (as De Heusch, 1995, 3, points out). They go to great lengths to 
differentiate between Hutu and Tutsi dress, diet, work activities and even activities 
of leisure.  
 
Maquet, in his study published in 1961, writes that the “The Hutu wore bark-cloth 
as a sort of skirt from the waist down to the knees … Before the Europeans came, 
important Tutsi had for some time replaced the traditional cow-hide of the 
pastoralists or the bark-cloth borrowed from the agricultural group with large 
cotton cloths, white or light coloured, elegantly draped” (1961, 20). Tutsi men 
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even had their hair styled differently according to Maquet. What is particularly 
distinguished between Hutu and Tutsi is their diet. Maquet writes (and this is 
confirmed by Overschelden, 1947 and Louis, 1963) that Tutsi ate mostly dairy 
products whereas Hutu ate large amounts of ‘less refined’ solid food (1961, 18). 
“The Tutsi had a strictly controlled attitude towards solid food. They behaved as if 
the need for nourishment was, if not shameful, at least beneath their dignity” 
(1961, 19). Maquet interprets this as a conscious strategy by “the conquering 
pastoralists to stress their independence of the foodstuffs produced by and 
characteristic of commoners” (1961, 19). These cultural eating habits were 
present in Rwandan society prior to the genocide and can still be found in 
Rwanda today. Some of those interviewed spoke of how as Tutsi children they 
were not allowed to eat at the same table or use the same crockery as Hutu 
children. Recently I heard a joke by some Tutsi friends regarding the large 
amounts Hutu can eat.  
 
However, on the other side of the debate, Tutsi and Hutu did share an identical 
language and similar idioms, ways of speaking and thus perceiving and 
understanding the world around them, myths and religion. It does not seem as if 
there are two distinct ‘tribes’ with different cultural habits. The idea that all 
Rwandans share one culture fits well with the narrative that Rwanda was 
harmonious prior to colonialism.  
 
Whatever the case may be, Liisa Malkki issues a warning with regards to the use 
of categorization, referring to Burundi, whose social context is near identical to 
Rwanda in this regard. According to Stewart and Strathern, Malkki says that it is 
“problematic, in fact, to narrate ‘the history of Burundi as having fixed category 
actors’ [Hutu and Tutsi] (1995, 21). She recognizes nevertheless that this is how 
the history has in fact been narrated, and that this narration has in turn influenced 
the historical consciousness of the people she studies” (2002, 20). Thus, the 
history of Rwanda depicts a complicated and complex relationship between Hutu 
and Tutsi, disallowing fixed categories of any kind, but history has been narrated 
with ‘fixed category actors’ which has influenced historical consciousness and 
identity and this has profound effects on reconciliation and healing. As Prunier 
writes, “The result of this heavy bombardment with highly value-laden stereotypes 
for some sixty years ended by inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and 
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crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful 
inferiority complex” (1995, 9). 
 
It may be helpful at this stage to introduce Mamdani’s distinctions between 
cultural, economic and political identities. Mamdani discusses how the literature 
speaks about economic identities that developed through the clientele system 
discussed in section 2.2. He also makes mention of the cultural identity that 
developed so that there is now a common cultural Banyarwandan identity, which 
he points out, does not only exist within the boundaries of what we now call 
Rwanda, but spills over into Burundi, the DRC and Tanzania (2001, 59). But 
beyond these cultural and economic identities, which aren’t themselves divisive, is 
Hutu and Tutsi as political identities (2001, 59). Mamdani argues that it is these 
political identities which lie at the crux of the Rwandan problem: “There has not 
been one single and constant definition of Hutu and Tutsi through Rwandan 
history. Rather, the definitions have shifted as a consequence of every major 
change in the institutional framework of the Rwandan state” (2001, 59). This ties 
in well with Jenkins’ model, mentioned in chapter one, which would argue that 
ethnic identities transform all the time, due to their interactions with historical and 
political forces and with other groups. 
 
Mamdani argues that the way we understand Rwandan history is largely 
influenced by scholars who recorded that history according to their own political 
agendas or, perhaps less consciously, according to their own political-social 
contexts. For example, prior to the 1959 revolution (which is described by 
Mamdani to be almost as significant an event in Rwandan history as the 
genocide) Macquet (1961) was the central scholar on Rwandan history and 
culture (2001, 60). Macquet worked closely with the Royal Court and his views 
were strongly influenced by this connection, as well as by European race theories. 
Only after 1959 did other scholars, such as Catherine Newbury (1988) and Jan 
Vasina (2004), begin to review Macquet’s work. 
 
Macquet and others, such as Louise (1956) and Overschelden (1947), painted a 
clear picture of Tutsi superiority and Hutu subservience prior to 1959.  
Overschelden, an early Dutch missionary to Rwanda recorded the following about 




“How many Whites have not gazed in awe at this group and honestly 
acknowledged that they had never expected to find such beautiful people 
amongst the negroes! … The Tutsi cannot be classified as normal black 
people. In their posture and gestures, and in their entirety, they express 
such importance, that one can’t help asking oneself if one is standing 
before a royalty that has sprouted from the negro-grass, or before 
sculptured Whites ... That the Tutsi are not Bantu is evidently clear; they 
are strangers that have entered Rwanda in the last few centuries, and have 
subjugated the Hutu through their spiritual superiority, their cunning 
aptitudes, and inborn talent for domination” (1947, 55, own translation).  
 
Such racial stereotyping had profound influence on early Rwandan identity 
formation.  
 
But how far back did this ethnic stereotyping begin? Influential to the formation of 
the Rwandan state was the expansion (through warfare) of one of Rwanda’s 
many clans called the Abanyiginya clan, somewhere in the fifteenth century 
(Mamdani, 2001, 61). At the head of this clan developed the Rwandan monarchy, 
which borrowed rituals and regalia from the other clans it had conquered. It was 
the expansion of this clan over several centuries that transformed cultural and 
economic identities into political identities, according to Mamdani (2001, 62).  
 
2.3. Rwandan identity before colonialism 
 
Rwanda moved from ‘statelessness’ to kingship, says Lemarchand, through ‘the 
amalgamation of a few autonomous chieftancies’ (1970, 19).  He explains how 
this happened in a region near what is now Kigali, under the reign of a Tutsi king 
(1970, 19). From this time onward, the centre of Rwandan organised society was 
the king, who was seen as having semi-divine power. He ruled from a central 
court with high levels of control and organization. Under the king were three types 
of chiefs; one chief ruled over the cattle, another over agriculture and a third over 
the military (called a ‘chief of men’). Every hill or community had these three 
chiefs, the chief of agriculture usually being a Hutu, and the chiefs of cattle and 
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the military being Tutsi. “Complicatedly,” writes Prunier, “a man could be chief of 
agriculture and pastures on one hill, with a rival chief of men, and at the same 
time be the chief of men for several other hills” (1995, 11). Those under the chiefs 
were able to play these chiefs off each other, complaining to one if another 
mistreated them, thus maintaining a semblance of power within the leadership 
dynamic. This ensured that no one was unduly oppressed or mistreated. 
 
Based on the theory of assimilation and conquest, many researchers have 
assumed the monarchy to have been a Tutsi ‘invention’, but Mamdani argues that 
the aforementioned powerful Hutu states “had institutions of kingship and regalia 
(drums, royal hammers, etc.) and they had developed ‘ritual power over the land 
and over rain’” (2001, 62). Several chieftancies amalgamated to form the 
Rwandan state, under the leadership of the Abanyiginya clan. This clan and the 
early Rwandan state was located in an area that was mostly pastoral (2001, 62). 
Mamdani describes at some length how royal rituals and its supernatural status 
developed, arguing that although military power was said to be held by Tutsis, the 
supernatural powers were in the hands of the Hutus. Through a complicated 
progression of events, this shifted by the late nineteenth century and power 
became increasingly defined as ‘Tutsi’ (2001, 63).  
 
In terms of the contesting narrative between Hutu and Tutsi ideologues the 
monarchy is either seen as benevolent or cruel, the chosen royalty of all 
Rwandans, or a manipulative tool used by one group to ensure power over the 
other. Further, some suggest the monarchy united all Rwandans into one state 
and others argue that the monarchy was in fact responsible for ethnic division. 
Mamdani would argue that the answer is different at different times of history. It 
seems that prior to the mid-1800s, the Kinyarwanda people were organised along 
clans which held both Hutu and Tutsi. Both he and Pottier put forward the idea 
that it was under King Rwabugiri in the 1860s, when things became more 
centralised that identity categories became more solidified and the Tutsi-overlord 
and Hutu-serf relationship may have taken on a reality. 
 
Cyprian Fisiy supports this view, saying that King Rwabugiri “embarked on an 
empire building exercise to centralise his authority” and that this “further gave rise 
to a Tutsi sense of superiority based on economic and martial power” in the 1860s 
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(1998, 19). He suggests that the Tutsi sense of superiority was based on 
‘economic and martial power’ but it resulted in consolidating division between 
Tutsi and Hutu (1998, 20). Mamdani argues that it was only at this time that 
distinct ethnic categories came into play: “Hutu, it appears, were simply those 
from a variety of ethnic backgrounds who came to be subjugated to the power of 
the Rwandan state” (2001, 70).  
 
The relationship between Hutu and Tutsi during this time centred around a few 
complex systems. Lemarchand writes how, in early history, Tutsi “used their cattle 
as a lever of economic power” and a system developed where cattle was 
exchanged for agricultural produce (1970, 19). In other words, Hutu would work 
the land for Tutsi in exchange for Tutsi cows. In this way, Tutsi came to own 
progressively more land, with progressively more Hutu under their rule. This was 
called the ‘clientele’ system (1970, 20). At the same time, there were regions 
which were unaffected by this relationship, where hills were ruled by Hutu chiefs. 
 
The clientele system and that of the chieftans, mentioned earlier, could be 
described as mutually beneficial. This clientele system, which every historical 
account of Rwanda mentions, was called ubuhake. What is mentioned less often 
is uburetwa, which Pottier describes as a ‘hated corveé labour service’ (2002, 13). 
Pottier argues that until the 1860s, indeed, a positive and mutual clientele 
relationship seemed to exist between various lineages and clans. But from 1860 
onwards, he describes a shift as King Rwabugiri began to gain significant power 
and needed to consolidate his power throughout his Rwandan nation. Pottier 
argues that from the 1860s, very few Hutu were allowed into the ubuhake cattle 
contract, but almost all Hutu were forced to fulfil their uburetwa obligations (2002, 
13). This involved working for the central court one day out of every five; however, 
this one day often became as many as three days (2002, 13). It was this system 
of uburetwa which introduced or consolidated a process of ethnic polarization 
(2002, 13).  
 
Mamdani even suggests that it was under the rule of Rwabugiri that the term Hutu 
came more and more to refer to anyone who was ‘subjugated to the power of the 
Rwandan state’ (2001, 70). Those who were conquered at this later stage lost 
much of their cattle to their conquerors (at this stage in Rwandan history known as 
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‘Tutsi’). They often also lost their land to these conquerors and had to work it for 
them. Mamdani would argue that this development of the term Hutu for those who 
were subjugated and Tutsi for those who conquered was gradual but became 
more and more fixed during Rwabugiri’s reign (2001, 78). Thus, when Europeans 
first arrived in Rwanda at the end of the 1800s, they encountered people called 
Tutsi who were wealthy in land and owned cattle and Hutu who were subjugated 
and worked the land.  
 
Prunier describes how to Tutsi ideologues, ubuhake “was a mild practice amicably 
linking different lineages into a kind of friendly mutual help contract” but to Hutu 
ideologues “it was an ironclad form of quasi-slavery enabling the Tutsi masters to 
exploit the poor downtrodden Hutu” (1995, 13). Some argue that it was the 
Belgian colonialists that introduced uburetwa and not King Rwabugiri at all.  To 
the outsider, this difference in narrative may seem minor. However, how one 
perceives the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi prior to colonialism has 
influenced events in Rwanda ever since. If the relationship between Hutu and 
Tutsi prior to colonialism is seen as entirely harmonious and mutual, then it is 
possible to say that we need to ‘return to the Rwanda from before’, which is 
indeed a narrative one hears in Rwanda today. However, if ethnic division and 
tensions existed in Rwanda from the very beginning of Hutu and Tutsi interaction, 
then healing and reconciliation processes need to take this into account. It would 
mean that certain stereotypes and ways of seeing and being have been a part of 
Rwandan society well into history and need to be dealt with in this context.  
 
Pottier argues that it is dangerous to paint a picture that pits poor Hutu against 
rich and powerful Tutsi (2002, 66). He argues that there were also poor Tutsi who 
were oppressed by the Tutsi elite, and that there were Hutu who shared in the 
central court power. Many writers also place great emphasis on the north-south 
divide. They describe how the king controlled central Rwanda, but the north 
remained under the leadership of autonomous Hutu kings (Prunier, 1995, Taylor, 
2001, Pottier, 2002). This north-south divide has played almost as important a role 
in the lead-up to the genocide as has the Hutu-Tutsi divide. The current reality, as 




“The difficulty in Rwanda, as in Burundi, is that there is no space identified 
as the Hutu homeland or the Tutsi homeland: both Hutus and Tutsis lived 
together, mingled on the collines, the hills that formed the identifiable sites 
of home for all. The population of Rwanda was largely divided into eighteen 
clans that encompassed Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, all in the same clans, and it 
was clans that functioned to create the spatial divisions between self and 
other” (2005, 36).  
 
The truth of this matter, as with all of the Rwandan narratives of history, is difficult 
to unravel. But it seems important to acknowledge that ethnic polarization did not 
originate with colonialism alone. It is also important to acknowledge that for 
different role players, or at different points in history, the relationship between 
Hutu and Tutsi is perceived significantly differently. 
 
However, the categories of superior Tutsi and inferior Hutu were solidified by 
colonialists, who misunderstood both the complex development of communities 
and identities in Rwandan history as well as the intricate clientele and leadership 
systems in place. With their simplification of both identity and community 
structures, Hutu and Tutsi were defined as distinctly separate identities. Prior to 
the arrival of the colonialists, identities were continuously shifting in meaning and 
people were able to move between identities. But with the introduction of identity 
cards that stated ethnic identity, this shifting and changing became impossible. 
Mamdani would thus argue that Hutu and Tutsi identities are largely political as 
culturally they do form one Banyarwanda community.    
 
2.4. Rwandan identity during colonialism 
 
The political identities that Mamdani described as being the most divisive were 
formed not so much by conscious political manipulation as by unconscious 
influence of political contexts (such as the expansion of the Abanyiginya clan and 
European race ideology). This is true of both the early Rwandan monarchy and 
early explorers and missionaries to Rwanda. However, the political agenda of first 
the German, and later the Belgian, colonialists, the international community and 
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politicised Hutu and Tutsi groups, from the early 1900s onwards was significantly 
less unconscious. 
 
Due to the writings of various early explorers (who were looking for the source of 
the Nile river) and missionaries, when colonialists arrived in Rwanda, with their 
European race ideologies, the scene was set for creating a misrepresentation of 
Rwandan identity relations which soon became the ‘official’ version of reality 
which informed all German and Belgian colonial decision-making (Prunier, 1995, 
9).  
 
These colonial powers introduced several structural changes that impacted 
significantly on Rwandan identity politics. One was that the corvée exacted from 
Rwandans by the central court was distorted; from being a duty that was imposed 
on a ‘hill’ where people on a hill could decide how they would fulfil this obligation, 
the Belgians formed it into an obligation that everyone was responsible for 
individually (Prunier, 1995). This placed tremendous pressure on the average 
Rwandan, who found themselves without time to work their own lands and thus 
led them towards poverty. Another was the introduction of identity cards by the 
Belgian colonialists in 1933, which explicitly mentioned one’s ethnic identity and 
disallowed further fluidity of movement between Hutu and Tutsi (Pottier, 2002, 
65). Further, the colonisers centralized power with the royal court, making the 
complex system of three chiefs on a hill redundant. They then violently forced all 
the outlying autonomous Hutu kingdoms in the north under the control of the Tutsi 
central court, thereby solidifying the north-south divide (Pottier, 2002). 
 
To understand how the process of solidifying ethnic identities took place, Jenkins 
speaks of the role of boundaries. He argues that there are two ways in which 
boundaries between groups are created; through internal definition and external 
definition, the latter being  imposed by someone in power (2003, 53). Jenkins then 
discusses the question of why external definitions become internalised, arguing 
that this can happen in five ways. The first is that the external category reinforces 
aspects of identity that already exist (for example, physical features). Second, 
certain external categorizations may, through a slow process of cultural change, 
actually form a lived part of group identity. Third, the external category may be 
produced by people who, in the eyes of the defined group, have legitimate 
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authority to categorize them (due to their superior knowledge, ritual status etc). 
Fourth, external categorization is imposed by force (for example, carrying of 
identity cards) and the categorized cannot resist. Lastly, the categorized do resist, 
but this very act of resistance is the direct result of having been categorized 
(2003, 70, 71).  
 
Elements of all of these can be argued to have occurred in Rwanda during the 
colonial period. Colonialists emphasized physical features. Prunier describes the 
obsession of the Germans in measuring the length of people’s noses, hands and 
feet. This external categorization indeed formed a ‘lived part of group identity’. As 
Des Forges noted, intermarriage came to an end in the 1800s and it is likely that 
people married within their ‘group’, thus reinforcing certain genetic features. 
Further it was believed that westerners, with their more advanced technology (and 
military force) had legitimate power to categorise. Apart from having legitimate 
power, this categorization was enforced through violence. Prunier describes how 
people were forcefully subjugated by the Belgians through torture, maiming and 
killing (1995, 11). Lastly, all forms of resistance became part and parcel of the 
categorization process. On this last point, the monarchy attempted to strategically 
use this categorization to their advantage (Taylor, 2001, 41). Seeing that 
westerners categorized them more positively, the Tutsi were automatically given 
an increase in power. Further the Belgians helped the monarchy secure the 
northern parts of the country under their central governance. The most 
disadvantaged were those categorized as Hutu, and with both the monarchy and 
the colonialists against them, they had little chance of successfully resisting.  
 
It was the ‘Hamitic’ hypothesis, though, that created the most lasting and profound 
destruction. This hypothesis, which was reiterated by anthropologists, 
missionaries and colonial leaders during colonial rule, asserted that in the Great 
Chain of Being, Europeans rated first place, followed by the Hamites, the tall, 
elegant Tutsi, and at the bottom of the rung were the ‘slow-witted’ Bantu Hutu 
(Taylor, 2001, 55). The Tutsi were seen as the descendants of Ham the son of 
Noah, ‘who was banished to the south of the Promised Land’ (2001, 39). This 
placed the Tutsi, with their more European-like features and their apparently 
wealthier, higher status in Rwandan society, in a privileged position in the eyes of 
the Germans and Belgians. Until today, Taylor argues, “Tutsi extremists make use 
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of their version of the hypothesis to claim intellectual superiority; Hutu extremists 
employ theirs to insist upon the foreign origins of Tutsi, and the autochthony of 
Hutu” (2001, 57). Taylor argues that they are reproducing a colonial pattern; “one 
that essentializes ethnic difference, justifies political domination by a single group, 
and nurtures a profound thirst for redress and vengeance on the part of the 
defavourized group” (2001, 57).  This is a prime example of how external 
definitions have become internalized and have formed the basis of internal 
definitions and divisions between self and other.  
 
Taylor discusses how John Henning Speke, one of the explorers looking for the 
source of the Nile, was the first to develop the theory of the Hamites as being the 
ones to bring civilization to Africa (2001, 59). According to this theory, black 
Caucasians from the Middle East moved through Ethiopia (where they were called 
the Galla-Hamites), through Uganda (where they were called the Hima) to 
Rwanda where they were called Tutsi. All subsequent historians and 
anthropologists took this as their foundational knowledge. Taylor writes how many 
early anthropologists seemed to agree that, “the Hamites were not Negroes, they 
were more intelligent than other Africans, and they were physically more 
attractive” (2001, 60). Further, Tutsi were described as being “intelligent and 
attractive, but rather frail; they were destined for governance. Hutu were stocky, 
coarser featured, but not overly intelligent; physical strength made them suitable 
for agricultural labour” (2001, 60). Catholic missionaries then taught Rwandans 
these theories as they taught them to read and write   
 
As these categories became enforced, they slowly became lived. Prunier 
describes how the Belgian colonialists worked hand in hand with the Tutsi 
aristocracy to write a ‘beautiful’ fantasy (1995, 36). Highly influential in this fantasy 
was Alexis Kagame, perhaps the best known Rwandan intellectual, who 
represented the Royal Court, during the 20th century. Kagame worked with 
anthropologists such as Macquet to reiterate this same ‘fantastical’ history to the 
outside world. What started off a creation became reality and by the time the 1959 




2.5. Rwandan identity after colonialism 
 
2.5.1. The 1959 Revolution 
 
1959 brought with it the revolution, which Mamdani would describe as almost as 
influential in Rwandan history as the genocide. What brought on the 1959 
revolution was both frustration on the part of the subjugated Hutus as well as a 
shift in European thinking regarding race ideology. Where before, the Western 
world had supported a hierarchical understanding of race and ethnicity, after 
World War II there was a significant shift to promoting equality and democracy. 
The birth of the United Nations, along with an end to colonialism, had a direct 
effect on ethnic relations in Rwanda. Another influential factor from outside was 
the arrival in Rwanda of less elitist Flemish missionaries from Belgium. Prior to the 
1950s, most missionaries to Rwanda were elite Walloon Belgians who only 
educated the Tutsi. During the early 1950s, working class Flemish missionaries 
began to arrive who had sympathy for the situation of the Hutu and worked to 
educate and uplift them. Concepts such as equality and democracy formed part of 
their education. 
 
In 1957, a group of nine Hutu intellectuals developed the Bahutu Manifesto with 
the aim of influencing the UN under whose trusteeship Rwanda now fell. This 
manifesto outlined the systematic oppression the Hutu felt they were suffering 
under the Tutsi and colonialist leaders. By 1958, ethnic tensions were high and 
one of the Hutu leaders, Jospeh Gitera, asked the King to get rid of the Kalinga (a 
sacred royal drum said to be decorated with the testicles of conquered Hutu 
chiefs). The Tutsi nobles protested strongly. Political parties started to form 
around these various issues (Prunier, 1995, 48). It was in this context that 
Gregoire Kayibanda developed a periodical that challenged social relations in 
Rwanda (Prunier, 1995, 44, 45). 
 
From here, political parties began to emerge in Rwanda. Grégoire Kayibanda 
formed the first (Hutu) political party in 1957 called MDR-PARMEHUTU. Joseph 
Gitera formed APROSOMO, which was said to be a class-based party but which 
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only attracted Hutu. These parties became regionally based, with PARMEHUTU 
being based in Gitarama-Ruhengeri (in the north) and APROSOMA being based 
in Butare (in the south). In 1959, the Tutsi formed a party, UNAR, which was 
backed by Communist countries during the Cold War, a relationship that was 
greatly unappreciated by the Belgians. By late 1959, according to Prunier, the 
situation was so tense between these various parties that anything could have 
sparked an explosion (1995, 50). What did spark the explosion was that a 
PARMEHUTU activist, while walking home one evening, was attacked and 
severely beaten by UNAR youth. The (false) news of his death spread and 
resulted in confused fighting: Tutsi houses were burnt regardless if they were the 
elite, political Tutsi or poor, peasant Tutsi. The mwami retaliated and attacked 
Hutu, especially APROSOMA as it was perceived as the greatest threat. Extreme 
confusion developed: some thought the King supported anti-Tutsi attacks because 
he was known for his emphasis on justice and Hutu had been unjustly treated; 
some PARMEHUTU Hutu rallied the King to attack their APROSOMA rivals; the 
Belgians supported the Hutu in burning down Tutsi homes; and amongst all of 
this, mountain tribesmen raided and killed people purely with the intention of 
looting (Prunier, 1995, 50).  
 
By November, 1959, some order was restored, with 300 dead, and over a 
thousand imprisoned. Rather than a fight between rich Tutsi and poor Hutu, the 
fight was now between two political and ethnic groups. Poor and rich from each 
ethnic group stood together because of the overriding acceptance of a 
constructed ethnic ideology. Amidst the chaos, Belgium launched the idea of self-
governance in November that same year. In 1960, the colonial government 
replaced Tutsi chiefs with new Hutu ones, who prosecuted Tutsi on their hills, 
resulting in a mass exodus of Tutsi. In June/July, 1960, colonial authorities 
organised communal elections and the PARMEHUTU won hands down. The 
positions of the chiefs became redundant and new burgomasters were appointed, 
based on the Belgian system. Prunier describes the revolution as Belgian-
sponsored: 
 
“The revolution is over’, declared Colonel Logiest in October 1960. This 
was an appropriate declaration, for inasmuch as the ‘revolution’ had been a 
Belgian-sponsored administratively-controlled phenomenon, its end could 
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be administratively proclaimed as its beginning had administratively been 
made unavoidable” (Prunier, 1995, 52).  
 
Some see the 1959 revolution as a genuine revolution of the people of Rwanda, a 
popular struggle for democracy and freedom, others, like Prunier see it as a 
Belgian-manipulated event that only worked to deepen ethnic division. Where 
Hutu ideologues felt that the revolution resulted in a democratic majority rule, 
Tutsi ideologues saw it as a switch from one oppressive system to another.   
 
Mamdani argues that during this period, relations in Rwanda were not merely 
ethnic, but in fact race-based (2001, 102). He further argues that for Hutu 
ideologues, the position of the Tutsi aristocracy became equated with that of the 
coloniser. This forms the basis of his thesis: that the Tutsi became the coloniser 
and that the 1959 revolution was the overthrow of colonial rule – both Tutsi rule 
and European rule. Unlike in other African countries, where ‘natives’ were 
overthrowing their western colonisers, no violence was meted out towards the 
Belgian colonialists in Rwanda. Through the fantasy that Tutsi were an Ethiopian 
royalty (a fantasy supported and promoted by the Tutsi aristocracy during 
colonialism) they had set themselves up as an outside ‘other’ who had subjugated 
the indigenous, native majority. Thus, as the winds of decolonisation swept over 
Africa, the issue on the agenda of Hutu dissidents was that of Hutus (not 
Rwandans) overthrowing the ‘Hamites’ – foreign Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001, 103).  
 
Because Hutu saw themselves as the subjugated native race, they saw 
democracy as majority rule, and majority rule as Hutu rule. The Hutu manifesto 
developed by nine Hutu intellectuals in 1957 is very telling in terms of how identity 
was experienced and understood prior to the revolution. The manifesto speaks of 
‘the political monopoly of one race, the Mututsi’ which is also an ‘economic and 
social monopoly’ which ‘condemns the desperate Bahutu to be forever subaltern 
workers’ (in Prunier, 1995, 45). From here onwards, political parties formed along 
ethnic/racial lines. Interestingly, in 1960 the Tutsi had become unpopular with the 
Belgians, and the Belgians replaced them with Hutu leaders. The fight was thus 
still not between ‘native Rwandans’ and European colonisers, as the coloniser 
was helping Hutus to come to power. The fight remained between the supposed 
Hutu-native and Tutsi-outsider/coloniser.  When Rwanda gained its independence 
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in 1962, it was independence from the Tutsi monarchy rather than Belgian 
colonialism. Thus it can be seen how, following Jenkins’ model, identity categories 
changed due to external definition, then became internalized, and then became 
lived. By the time of the revolution, Rwandans were fighting a racial battle but they 
were fighting along identity categories or definitions that had, perhaps, not existed 
prior to the 1800s.   
 
2.5.2. The First and Second Republic 
 
In late 1961, Grégoire Kayibanda was elected president. Kayibanda was from 
southern Rwanda. He came into power only two years after the death of the last 
of the Tutsi monarchic lineage that had any power, King Mutare III Rudahigwa. A 
younger brother of Rudahigwa ascended to the throne after his death, but, in the 
atmosphere of the 1959 ‘revolution’ he was forced to flee the country (Prunier, 
1995, 55).  
 
Prunier writes that during Kayibanda’s period of rule, often called the First 
Republic, he ruled Rwanda like a mwami (a Rwandan monarchic royalty): ‘remote, 
authoritarian and secretive’. He demanded absolute, unquestioning obedience to 
authority. The values he upheld were along the lines of the intrinsic worth of being 
a Hutu, the total congruence between demographic majority and democracy, the 
need to follow a moral Christian life, and the uselessness of politics which should 
be replaced by hard work (1995, 58).  
 
Prunier describes Kayibanda’s Rwanda as being “a land of virtue, where 
prostitutes were punished, attendance at mass was high, and hard-working 
peasants toiled on the land without asking too many questions” (1995, 59). Why 
was it then that in 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana, a senior army commander in 
Kayibanda’s army, a fellow Hutu, overthrew Kayibanda in a bloodless coup? 
 
Prunier suggests it was because of ‘sporadic disturbances’ between Hutu and 
Tutsi and the north and the south, that encouraged Habyarimana to take things 
into his own hands (1995, 61). Des Forges gives some more detail into the 
frustration of the Hutu of the north who “saw that all rhetoric about Hutu solidarity 
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notwithstanding, the southerners were monopolizing the benefits of power” (1999, 
60). Attacks on Tutsi in early 1973 were either blamed on the southerners “who 
hoped to minimize differences with northerners by reminding them of the common 
enemy; others laid them to northerners who hoped to create sufficient disorder to 
legitimate a coup d’état by the army” (1999, 61). 
 
When Habyarimana did take power in July 1973, he claimed that it was to ‘restore 
order and national unity’ (Des Forges, 1999, 61). However, Aible Twagilimana 
argues that few researchers give enough attention to the effects of regionalism in 
Rwanda. He even argues that genocide can be as much attributed to ethnic 
tension as to the north-south divide (2003, xx). He argues that for centuries power 
lay in the hands of southerners; first the Tutsi monarchy which was based in the 
south, and then later under Kayibanda. He describes how until the arrival of the 
colonialists, the north, and especially Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, were independent 
from the Rwandan monarchy, and ruled by Hutu chieftans (2003, xx). The desire 
to place power in the hands of northerners was more important to Habyrimana 
and his supporters even than that Hutu power would be maintained.  
 
Prunier stresses that under Habyarimana’s rule, during the Second Republic, 
although everything seemed peaceful and stable, the underlying atmosphere of 
the regime was frightening.  
 
“Tutsi were still ‘foreign invaders’ who had come from afar, but now this 
meant that they could not really be considered as citizens. Their 
government had been grandiose and powerful: in the new version of 
Rwandese ideology, it had been a cruel and homogeneously oppressive 
tyranny. The Hutu had been the ‘native peasants’, enslaved by the 
aristocratic invaders: they were now the only legitimate inhabitants of the 
country. Hutu were the silent demographic majority” (1995, 80).  
 
The group supporting Habyarimana in power was often called the ‘akazu’ or ‘little 
house’, and included Habyarimana’s wife and her relatives, all originating from the 
Ruhengeri-Gisenyi area. But even here, Prunier describes how the president and 
his wife favoured those from Gisenyi over those from Ruhengeri (1995, 86). 
Pottier argues how all these internal conflicts within ‘Hutu power’ groups were 
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disguised by ethnic tensions to ‘buy the loyalty’ of the Hutu majority. He goes 
further in saying those in power were an elite who maintained their power over 
those they oppressed by manipulating ethnic tensions, leading the Hutu on the 
street `to believe they were both fighting a common enemy (2002, 10).    
 
But the political and social conditions prior to the 1990s were not all negative. 
Especially at the start of Habyarimana’s reign in 1973, things looked very hopeful. 
Although Tutsi were politically marginalised on the basis of ‘majority’ rule, there 
was a quota system for education and jobs, and there was also a group of elite, 
highly educated Tutsi who were well-connected with foreigners and worked with 
foreign NGO’s. Habyarimana also brought a semblance of peace and stability to 
Rwanda. This was partly achieved by outlawing not only political parties but the 
entire public political sphere. The government was called the National 
Development Council and Rwanda was seen as a ‘development dictatorship’ 
(Prunier, 1995, 77). Prunier writes, “Rwanda was poor, Rwanda was clean and 
Rwanda was serious; it had no time to lose in the frivolous business of political 
discussion” (1995, 77). If one asks Rwandans today how Rwanda was prior to 
genocide, many share stories of how peaceful and harmonious it was. And for 
many Rwandans who went about their daily lives, didn’t get involved with politics, 
went to church every Sunday and worked hard, their lives, whether Hutu or Tutsi 
were probably just that, peaceful and harmonious, although perhaps poor. 
 
But Prunier points out that under the surface were many shadows. One such 
shadow was umuganda, communal development labour made compulsory by the 
government. It was intended to take two days of the average Rwandans time but 
often cost them four or more. Another shadow was the shift in power, not only 
amongst the elite but also amongst every Hutu. Just as the first Rwandan 
ideology had been a perfect construct to legitimise domination by a high-lineage 
Tutsi over everyone else, the new ideology allowed the new elite legitimate power 
to dominate over everyone. Prior to the 1959 revolution, even the poorest Tutsi 
felt proud to belong to the ethnic aristocracy, even though it didn’t help their 
poverty stricken state. Similarly, after 1959, the Hutu poor somehow felt they 
shared power. Prunier argues how foreign aid workers collaborated in reinforcing 
this new ideology, as Belgians did with the former ideology. And, as was the case 
during the colonial period, the Catholic church played a role in educating all 
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Rwandans in the new ideology. Prunier writes, concerning the Catholic church, “It 
had admired the Tutsi and helped them rule, but now admired the Hutu and 
helped them rule” (1995, 81). So although on the surface things may have looked 
ideal (a peaceful, stable, hard working society, with little crime) “this agreeable 
façade was built on an extremely dangerous ideological foundation” (Prunier, 
1995, 82).  
 
2.5.3. Between peace and genocide 
 
Listening to Rwandans, a common theme is that just prior to genocide there were 
no ethnic tensions and everyone lived together, side by side, in absolute peace 
and harmony. Many Rwandans think back on the genocide with wonder and 
confusion, repeating over and over that Rwandans are gentle and peace loving 
and that they lived in absolute peace with all their neighbours. Some Rwandans I 
have spoken to who were children during the genocide say they were not even 
aware of their ethnic identities or that ethnic identities existed until it was forcefully 
pointed out to them in the course of 1993 and 1994. Rwandan children I have 
spoken to in South Africa also seem to know little or nothing about the terms Hutu 
and Tutsi and were unable to tell me their ethnic status. 
 
Yet, Harrow strongly argues that the propaganda campaign that was implemented 
in the months leading up to genocide could not have been so successful had it not 
been grounded in an already existing historical narrative of ethnic division (2005, 
38). The ‘them-us’ identity that the propaganda campaign was based on, and that 
led thousands of labourers as well as highly educated people to picking up 
machetes and killing their own neighbours and family members, could not have 
emerged out of nothing.  
 
One of the factors to consider is that Rwanda had been under an authoritarian 
leadership continuously, from the time of the mwami’s through to their two 
presidents, and had the repeated message hammered into them that politics was 
a waste of time but high morals and a good work ethic were to be admired. Thus it 
is not surprising that they were caught unawares with the political turmoil of the 
early 1990s. On a superficial level, life for the average Rwandan was peaceful 
 
34 
and stable and it may well have been the case that Hutu and Tutsi lived side by 
side without any apparent tension. 
 
In pre-genocide Rwanda, the president was responsible for all appointments, 
even at low-level administration; he was omniscient, omnipresent, and could not 
be seen. His rule showed monarchic patterns of leadership (a narrow circle of 
leadership recruitment, regionalism, lineage competition, favouritism, corruption 
fused with modern characteristics such as ‘progress’ and moralism) (Prunier, 
1995, 59). The incredible network of authority that ran from the president through 
to every hill throughout the country meant that at the first signal from the 
presidents’ office, thousands of people were effectively mobilised into an 
unstoppable killing machine.  
 
So, as Harrow argues, there must have been something brewing under the 
surface to base the propaganda campaign’s success on. Prunier mentions that 
under both Kayibanda and Habyarimana, a quota system existed, restricting 
access for Tutsi to education and employment. Rwandans still carried identity 
cards stating their ethnicity. The country was still ruled by a Hutu-only government 
with a sole candidate standing for re-election at each new ‘democratic election’ 
and the Tutsi refugees (who had fled in 1959 and the 1970s) in countries 
bordering Rwanda were denied entry to their homeland.   
 
Apart from this, as far as the outside world was concerned, the country was 
turning into an island. Prunier quotes Claudine Vidal as saying that “the 
inhabitants were inward-looking and bore the country’s slow shrinkage in silence” 
(1995, 84). One Rwandan I spoke to admitted that they were aware in the early 
1990s that something terrible was going to happen and the extended family would 
have meetings about what to do (Personal interview, Pretoria, March, 2006). I 
asked her why they did not leave the country. She said that prior to 1994 it was as 
if the rest of the world did not exist. Even though they were a relatively well-off 
and educated family, they knew not a single person who had ever travelled and 
had minimal access to what was happening outside of Rwanda. The country was 
their entire reality and they could not imagine a world outside of its borders. It may 
also be worth mentioning a piece of trivia I have heard Rwandans report, that prior 
to 1994 there were only two people holding doctorate degrees in the country (and 
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these had to have been secured abroad). The truth of this is debatable, but it 
reveals how isolated and uninformed of the world outside Rwanda was. 
 
People were taught not to think for themselves, that politics is bad but hard work 
is good and to be highly moral. Even today, Rwandans are known for being hard 
working and moral people who attend mass. The question on many peoples’ 
minds is how a country that was 80% Christian could commit such an atrocity. A 
high percentage of killers were almost certainly churchgoers. Yet they operated in 
a vacuum, on an island, in a situation so divorced from the rest of the world and 
alternative possibilities. A question that has been raised is why there was not 
more organised resistance. But again, there was such a sense of learned 
helplessness, a resignation to their plight. Donald and Lorna Miller, in a 
comparative study between Armenian and Tutsi survivors, found that “In some 
ways, it seems that the mass media contributed to the fatalism that many Tutsi 
felt, apparently almost resigning themselves to a violent death from the moment 
the news was broadcast that President Habyarimana’s plane had been shot 
down. Child-survivors reported their parents immediately telling them that now 
they would be killed” (2004, 137).  
 
Having said this, as negotiations with the RPF mounted in tension, opposition 
movements within the country were beginning to have a voice. In the early 1990s 
the Rwandan government had committed to a multiparty cabinet, but in January, 
1992 announced a complete MRND cabinet. Some 50 000 people took to the 
street in protest.  
 
“This was the strongest public challenge his [Habyarimana’s] regime had 
ever faced and as it grew he concluded that in order to save himself, he 
would have to accept the protestors’ main demands. In March he 
announced that he would name opposition figures to his cabinet and 






2.5.4. The Diaspora and the RPF 
 
While this was the situation within Rwanda, the Tutsi diaspora were in a very 
different social and political environment which impacted on their identity 
development in quite another way. “As the years passed and memories of the real 
Rwanda began to recede,” writes Prunier, “Rwanda slowly became a mythical 
country in the refugees’ minds … Contrasting an idealised past life with the 
difficulties they were experiencing, their image of Rwanda became that of a land 
of milk and honey. Economic problems linked with their eventual return, such as 
over population, over grazing or soil erosion, were dismissed as Kigali regime 
propaganda” (1995, 66). This diaspora was experiencing increasing 
marginalisation in their host countries, yet were also extremely successful 
economically and educationally on the world arena. Where Rwanda was 
becoming progressively more a closed off island, the diaspora was drawing from 
multiple resources internationally.  
 
While Kayibanda and Habyarimana were ruling Rwanda, large numbers of Tutsis 
fled the country and settled in Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and further abroad. 
Repeated acts of violence in the 1970s resulted in more and more Tutsi fleeing 
across the borders.  An especially large number of refugees escaped to Uganda, 
perhaps because of their supposed historical ties to the Ugandan royalty or rather 
due to an authentic connection to a Ugandan tribe, the Banyamulenge, who live 
close to the Rwandan border and share much of the Banyarwandan culture and 
language.  
 
Prunier describes how these Ugandan-based Tutsi refugees struggled to be 
assimilated in Uganda, and formed an organization to assist refugees suffering 
oppression. This organization started becoming more politically militant in 1980, 
renaming its organization RANU, and started discussing returning to Rwanda. The 
Obote-Museveni conflict ignited in Uganda, at a time when RANU leaders, Fred 
Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, had befriended Museveni (Prunier, 1995, 70).  They 
sided with Musevini to overthrow Obote, in the belief that Musevini would protect 
their rights. He failed on his promises to them and they found themselves once 
again persecuted and oppressed by local Ugandans (Pottier, 2002, 23). General 




“I was reminded of the tale the RPF liaison officer, Commander Karake 
Karenzi, had told to Brent to describe the Tutsi experience in Rwanda. 
Karenzi had said that when the hunter and the dog are after the prey, they 
are equals. But once the prey is caught, the hunter gets the meat and the 
dog the bones. And that is how the Tutsis in Uganda, who had served 
under difficult conditions in combat for the NRA [Ugandan army], felt after 
Museveni came to power. The realization that they would always be the 
dogs in Uganda had been the impetus behind the formation of the RPF. 
They wanted to go home and be treated as equals in their own country” 
(2003, 155). 
 
In 1987, RANU became the RPF, an offensive political party dedicated to the 
return of exiles to Rwanda, by force if necessary (Prunier, 1995, 73). They started 
high-level political negotiations around their return to Rwanda which included 
several violent attacks on the country in the early 1990’s. Initially, the RPF was led 
by Rwigyema but he was killed during the first attack by the RPF on Rwanda on 1 
October, 1990 and Kagame took over command. In Stephen Kinzer’s biography of 
Kagame, he writes how, following the defeat during this first attack, Kagame 
strategically led his troops into the Virunga mountains in northern Rwanda where 
they built their strength unbeknown to the Rwandan government (2008, 79). 
During this time, there was an official cease-fire as mediated negotiations 
between the RPF and the Rwandan government ensued in Tanzania to discuss 
the return of the refugees to Rwanda. 
 
 “On February 8, 1993, the RPF violated the July 1992 cease-fire and launched a 
massive attack all along the northern front and rapidly drove back the government 
troops”, writes Des Forges (1999). Kinzer describes how the RPF leadership was 
certain that the negotiations with the Rwandan government were merely games 
and that there was no real intention of allowing the refugees to return. Apart from 
this, during the many years of planning their return the refugees had decided that 
the only way was to overthrow the Habyarimana regime. “Fighting to go back was 
the only way. If you negotiate with the dictatorship and then go back, they would 
put you in prison or worse. ‘No, we have to remove the dictatorship in Rwanda. 
Only through that can we have peace. It will serve nothing to go back while there 
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is a dictatorship in power that is ethnic and anti-Tutsi”, Kinzer quotes an early 
leader of RANU as saying (2008, 49). Not only did the RPF want the right to 
return to a free Rwanda, they also believed that conditions in Rwanda needed to 
change. Kinzer quotes Kagame as saying that the level of oppression and 
injustice in Rwanda ‘was simply unacceptable’ but that many Tutsi in Rwanda had 
learnt just to ‘bow their heads, keep their opinions to themselves and do whatever 
was necessary to placate their Hutu masters’ (2008, 99). 
 
The RPF was described as the best-educated guerilla army in history (Prunier, 
1995, 117). Behind the army fighting in Rwanda was a far larger ‘army’ of civilians 
who were raising awareness and support for the cause throughout the world. As 
the Tutsi diaspora, some six hundred thousand people living in exile, began to 
hear of the RPF in the Virunga mountains, they started to come in their thousands 
to join the cause. Many of these were educated in East Africa, Europe, North 
America and even Australia (Kinzer, 2008, 35). Apart from being well-educated, 
the RPF was highly politicized. Kinzer says this is something Kagame learnt from 
his years of experience fighting in the Ugandan bush; people who know what they 
are fighting for are motivated and committed, prepared to suffer harrowing 
circumstances for what they believe in and are less likely to dessert when the 
going gets tough (2008, 84). The RPF troops were constantly being educated by 
their Political Department with regards to the situation in Rwanda and why they 
were fighting.  
 
Behind the RPF’s offensive in northern Rwanda in the early 1990s lay decades of 
talking, debating, organizing, planning and strategizing. Kinzer follows the story 
from the 1980s, where Tito Rutaremara, a revolutionary theoretician living in 
Paris, took leadership of RANU. He immediately began to train and educate 
others in the belief that an ‘educated army committed to a cause has an innate 
advantage over a nonpolitical enemy’ (2008, 49). ‘Political cadres’ were trained in 
RPF ideology and then educated the refugee communities in Uganda (2008, 50). 
This political ideology was, according to Kinzer, founded in “Anglophone 
traditions, revolutionary passion and African socialism” (2008. 103). The emphasis 
on political education continues to be part of the Rwandan governments’ strategy 
of leadership today. Understanding the formation of the RPF and its particular 
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political ideology gives significant insight into the thinking of the current 
government, and its approach to leadership. 
 
Together with a high level of education and political education in particular, the 
RPF was called on to be highly disciplined. “In the way we fight, in the way we 
conduct ourselves, we must always be different from those we are fighting 
against”, Kinzer quotes Kagame as saying (2008, 84). The RPF disciplinary code 
held eleven capital offenses, including murder, rape, violent robbery and 
desertion. And it listed twenty-four other crimes that would result in corporal 
punishment, such as the use of alcohol and drugs, being idle and disorderly, not 
paying for goods in villages, having sex with anyone other than a lawful spouse 
and spreading harmful propaganda (Kinzer, 2008, 83). This ensured that all the 
actions by the RPF remained focused on the carefully worked out strategic plan 
by Kagame to take over power in Rwanda. 
 
However, Beatrice Umutesi, a Hutu who became a refugee after the genocide, 
writes that the RPF committed unmentionable atrocities in Byumba. Although 
Umutesi initially doubted it was the RPF, her doubts were overcome by countless 
stories from family members who themselves were the survivors of terrible acts of 
violence. The wife of her cousin shared the story of finding her dead husband “tied 
up by his own entrails to a post in his store. The rebels had disemboweled him, 
pulled out his guts and used them for a rope” (2004, 24). She further describes 
the systematic way people (including women and children) were “herded into 
houses, locked them from the outside, and then attacked them with grenades. 
The survivors were finished off with knives” (2004, 26). Counter to these claims is 
the theory that the RPF committed no such crimes but that these crimes were 
staged by the Habyarimana government to turn the Rwandan population against 
the RPF. Lee Anne Fujii describes these attacks as ‘staged’ by the former 
government to incite fear in the population (2004, 99).  
 
On the one hand, one reads of the RPF as a well-disciplined army where any 
person stepping out of line, or committing what would be termed as a crime 
against humanity, was immediately punished (Prunier, 1995; Dallaire, 2003). On 
the other hand, evidence is surfacing of many atrocious crimes having been 
committed by the RPF between 1990 and 1994, having been well hidden from 
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outside observers. These instances of violence, whether stemming from the RPF 
or staged by the Rwandan government, brought fear amongst many Rwandans 
that the RPF were a cruel and bloodthirsty military movement that was seeking 
control of the country.  Kinzer describes how even Tutsi living in Rwanda would 
flee before the RPF (2008, 98). “’You want power?’ a Tutsi who lived in Ruhengeri 
asked one of the inkotanyi who raided the town in 1991. ‘You will get it. But here 
we will all die. Is it worth it to you?’” (Kinzer, 2008, 99). It was this violence taking 
place in certain parts of Rwanda, particularly between the border of Uganda and 
northern Rwanda that, amongst other things, has been said to have precipitated 
the genocide. 
 
2.6. Identities internalized 
 
Jenkins' model suggests that identity is constructed and negotiated on a daily 
basis. Rather than identifying key factors that differentiate Hutu from Tutsi 
genetically or biologically, this model would suggest that that which differentiates 
one ethnicity from another would depend on how Hutu and Tutsi themselves 
define and describe those differences. Furthermore, this model suggests that 
those factors that actors might emphasise as differentiating themselves today may 
not be the same as they used in the past or will use in the future. This is very 
helpful in understanding the shifting relationship between Hutu and Tutsi.  
 
Jenkins' model also stresses the influence of those in power and of historical and 
political events. Applying this to the Rwandan situation, we can see how the racial 
identities imposed by the colonialists became internalized so that during that 
period of history to be Hutu did mean to be inferior and to be Tutsi did mean to be 
superior for all those involved (2003, 58). However, that does not mean that to be 
Tutsi always meant being superior prior to the arrival of the colonialists. Ethnic 
identity is thus not set in stone but is shifting and dynamic and what is more 
relevant is not to define ethnic identity absolutely but to understand what it means 
to the actors themselves. As we begin to understand how the actors themselves 
experience and negotiate their identity we can begin to think about how we might 




Jenkins speaks of internal and external identification and that these two are in 
dialogue with one another. This distinction highlights the internal-external dialectic 
of identification (2003, 58). Our sense of who we are is developed through habits, 
routines, and the normal, everyday life we are socialized into.  This sense of self 
develops as external significant others tell us who we are and what we must and 
must not do. There is a dialogue between ‘the demands of self’ and the 
‘expectations of others’; the internal-external dialectic. This primary socialization 
includes an ethnic component (2003, 58). Jenkins writes that “She will learn not 
only that she is an ‘X’, ‘but also what this means in terms of her esteem and worth 
in her own eyes and in the eyes of others; in terms of appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour; and in terms of what it means not to be an ‘X’, what it 
means to be a ‘Y’ or a ‘Z’ perhaps” (2003, 59). 
 
When speaking with Rwandans, this dialectic is quickly apparent. During 
childhood, although not always aware of ethnic identities or what they signified, 
there was nevertheless an awareness of ‘the other’ and who they were and who I 
am not. This other was either seen as weaker in some way and less than, or 
privileged and more than. Into an early developing sense of identity was being 
built a sense of superiority and pride or inferiority and shame. Even though Hutus 
were in power and in the majority, in terms of the internal-external dialectic the 
message was still clearly one of inferiority. 
 
According to Jenkins, our self image is constantly being reassessed in 
accordance with public image (and public/external feedback). Jenkins gives a 
lengthy illustration of this describing how our education and employment systems 
lead people to adjust their identities in line with what opportunities are or are not 
available to them (for example, someone who cannot meet the educational 
demands required for a high level occupation begins to adjust their identity and 
their expectations to a lower level job). He also speaks of how (often negative) 
external labeling can begin to shape identity. The effects of this latter point can be 
devastating in the case of ethnic minorities, or ethnically stigmatized groups who 
then fail to secure certain niches in society or occupational mobility, and this may 
result in exclusion and a vicious downward spiral (2003, 60). The Hamitic 
hypothesis is an example of external labeling affecting behaviour, attitudes and 




Who has the power to exclude and include? Ethnic groups become institutions; 
they become part of patterns of social practice, part of the ‘way things are done’ 
(Jenkins, 2003, 61). The colonial racial identities became part of the social order, 
and decided for people who could be educated, who could be in leadership, and 
who could not. It has been argued that many stereotypes have become reality 
through this ‘institutionalization’. For example, during the colonial period, Tutsi 
were educated and Hutu were not. After the revolution, many of the Tutsi who fled 
went to other countries where they received an education far more advanced than 
that available to the average person living in Rwanda. Even those Tutsi who 
remained in the country, especially in Kigali, could often more easily secure 
employment with international NGOs and organizations (as access to government 
controlled employment was limited for them) and through the interaction with 
internationals, again, their educational level and knowledge of the greater world 
out there was perhaps more advanced than the average Rwandan. After the 
genocide, with the return of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi from the diaspora, one 
of the comments to be heard was that Tutsi were more intelligent because they 
were all more educated and more capable than the average Hutu. Yet it was 
political and sociological circumstances that allowed Tutsi greater educational 
exposure than the average Hutu. Thus these external factors influence internal 
and external definitions of self and other, reaffirming stereotypes2.  
 
A clear example of the internalization of external definition is the Hamitic 
hypothesis, which strongly influenced the atmosphere and ideology that 
contributed to the instability and extreme violence that erupted in the 1990s. The 
tremendous inferiority-superiority complex was reiterated again and again in pre-
genocide propaganda, as will be explored in section 3.4.1  
 
The affects of the Hamitic hypothesis were felt in every home, from the youngest 
to the oldest Rwandan. Although on the one hand Rwandans may well have been 
living in harmony, on another level the inferiority-superiority complex remained, as 
the following two stories, one from a Hutu and the other from a Tutsi, illustrate. 
Jean Paul, a Hutu student, recalled an incident from his youth that made him 
                                               
2
 Of course, even this stereotype is no more than that. Statistically, it is most likely that as many Hutu are 




aware of his ethnic identity, although at that stage it still wasn’t a clear concept 
(Personal interview, Durban, December, 2007). His sister was sitting at the table 
with other children who later became their friends. The older brother of these 
children, on seeing Jean Paul’s sister at the table, said, “I don’t want to share food 
with this ikipingo.” He flatly refused to eat with the others and went to eat his food 
elsewhere. Later, Jean Paul and this boy became good friends and they would 
often share food at each others’ homes. At one meal, when some strangers came 
to eat with them, Jean Paul’s sister suddenly said, thinking that the term meant 
‘stranger’, that she was going to eat elsewhere because she didn’t want to eat 
with these ikipingo’s. The older brother was there and was terribly ashamed for 
ever having said something like that. Apparently, ikipingo did not refer to a 
stranger, as Jean Paul’s sister had assumed it did, but was rather a derogatory 
term for a Hutu. 
 
Later, in a conversation with Terese, a Tutsi, I asked her about the meaning of 
ikipingo and she said it meant ‘disagreeable’, in that it was disagreeable for Hutu 
to be there; for Tutsi to have to share their space with Hutu (Personal interview, 
Pietermaritzburg, December, 2007). She also describes how when growing up, 
adults around her would often speak derogatively of Hutu. If one of the children 
were greedy, unpleasant or dirty the adults would say, “Stop acting like a Hutu.” 
But as a child, Terese says she didn’t know that there were actually people that 
were Hutus. She thought it was just a word. In her community in Tanzania, most 
Rwandan refugees were Tutsi and were very proud of being Tutsi. In the vicinity 
were also Burundian Hutu, who, according to her, were quite unpleasant, stealing 
and behaving badly. At this point she didn’t know there were Rwandan Hutus. She 
thought Hutus were only these unpleasant Burundians. 
 
So although Hutu and Tutsi may have been living inside Rwanda relatively 
harmoniously, nevertheless, in language usage, stories shared around the dinner 
table, in the stereotyping and deeply internalised understandings of identity, the 
Hamitic hypothesis continued to have life. It was relatively easy for political 
leaders with political agendas to use this deeply entrenched identity complex in 






2.7. Concluding thoughts 
 
The narratives circulating Rwanda today are remarkably politically correct, writes 
Pottier (2002, 7). My own experience is that many Rwandans seem to regurgitate 
a seemingly learnt transcript when asked questions of a remotely political nature. 
The answers are always along the lines of ‘we are all Rwandan, there is no Hutu 
and Tutsi anymore, and ethnic division started with the colonialists’. Pottier’s 
entire book is devoted to dispelling these narratives in Rwanda which he sees as 
giving simplistic and easy answers to the significantly complex issues of 
Rwanda’s history and social identity. He further argues that the international 
community, especially directly after the genocide, in a fit of guilt, uncritically 
accepted these simplified narratives which are often fed to them by Tutsi 
ideologues.  
 
Pottier argues that although we are correct in not accepting the narratives 
circulating Rwanda prior to 1994 (those narratives that supported Hutu ideology), 
we cannot correct that mistake by approaching Rwanda after 1994 with a blank 
slate. Rather, he argues, all histories are coloured and we need to approach them 
critically (2002, 8).  
 
“The power of shamelessly twisting ethnic argument for the sake of class 
privilege was demonstrated most shockingly in the blatant imaginings 
about history that galvanised Rwanda’s ‘Hutu Power’ extremists. These 
extremists killed Rwanda’s Tutsi and sent their bodies ‘back to Ethiopia’ via 
the Nyabarongo and Akagera rivers. The imagined origins of ‘the Tutsi’, 
along with their (poorly understood) migrations and conquest of Rwanda, 
were evoked by power-crazed politicians to instil ‘ethnic hatred’ in the very 
people they themselves oppressed: the victims of class oppression were 
spurred on to kill the minority group which the oppressors had labelled ‘the 
real enemy’” (2002, 9).  
 
On the other hand, in order to justify minority rule: “Post-genocide leaders regard 
Rwanda’s pre-colonial past as something of a golden era, a state of social 
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harmony later corrupted by Europeans” (2002, 9). They do this through 
simplifying; screening out complexity and context. 
 
Questions regarding Rwanda’s past, and the origins of its people  
 
“are at the core of the continuous reinterpretation of reality which sustains 
the potential for conflict … Distortion, or the screening out of complexity 
and context, are techniques that work best in situations where confusion – 
about people’s past, their identities, their rights – has been institutionalised 
and built into the fabric of everyday life” (Pottier, 2002, 10)  
 
Indeed today many Rwandans I have spoken to either don’t know their past, give 
a vague account of it or repeat a version that sounds rote-learned and barely 
internalized.  
 
It is for this reason that we have examined the many narratives of Rwandan 
history. I have not argued for a ‘true’ account of history but neither have I argued 
for an account that is untruthful or does not scrutinise the truth. The truth 
concerning any narrative of history is that there are multiple accounts of what 
really happened, and that these multiple accounts can stand together in tension, 
giving the only clear picture of history we can ever have – fragmented and yet 
crowded with the voices of those whose story it is.  
 
And the story of Rwanda is an infinitely complex one that does not allow for the 
simple answers of placing blame on one group or another, on colonialists, on 
propagandists, on the international community, on Hutu, on Tutsi or on any other 
actor alone. Instead, it implicates everyone. This is the starting point of healing; a 
narrative in which everyone’s voice is heard and everyone has a degree of 
responsibility in that narrative. Pottier writes that “Without a broadly agreed 
account, or (better perhaps) without a vision of the past which acknowledges that 
different interpretations of history will exist, Rwanda … will remain entrapped in an 
official discourse which legitimates the use of violence and makes some, leaders 




The following chapter will look at how these stereotypes and inferiority-superiority 
complex, through a well planned propaganda campaign and political manipulation 
resulted in one of the most violent and horrific bloodbaths of the twentieth century.  
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CHAPTER 3: DURING THE GENOCIDE 
 
“We can all turn into killers, Valcourt had often maintained, even the most 
peaceful and generous of us. All it takes is certain circumstances, a failing, 
a patient conditioning, rage, disappointment … For several seconds a 
killer’s genes rose up in Valcourt’s blood and a flood of protein’s jangled his 
brain. Only a firm ‘No, Bernard!’ from Gentille prevented Valcourt from 
becoming a killer. He had seized the machete from the militiaman’s hands 
and brandished it over his head as the young man woke and with haggard 
eyes perceived his own imminent death. Flinging the weapon into the ditch, 
Valcourt returned to the car, appalled to think that if it had not been for 
Gentille he would have butchered the fellow remorselessly, the way 
Cyprien and Georgina has been butchered” (Courtemanche, 2003, 105).   
 
The previous chapter discussed the historical role of narratives in creating 
identities and a context that allowed for genocide. This chapter will examine how 
these divisive narratives helped make the genocide possible. It will be seen that 
those planning the genocide made use of these historical narratives to plant a 
deep fear within a mass of people which led them to become violent in ways 
beyond imagining. This chapter will begin by exploring some of the many reasons 
given for why the genocide might have happened. It will then show how 
something so atrocious was made to seem acceptable and even necessary 
through the use of narrative. We will then examine the ‘anatomy’ of the genocide 
through the insights of Christopher Taylor (2001) and Liisa Malkki (1995), who 
examine genocide in relation to cultural and historical narratives. Lastly, we will 
look at the role played by some key factors in the Rwandan narrative during the 
genocide, including the role of regionalism, the church, gender politics, class 
politics, the international community and the RPF.  
 
3.1. Reasons for the genocide 
 
From the previous chapter, the narrative unfolded of a country built on 
progressively intensifying ethnic division in an atmosphere of dictatorial control, 
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where obedience, working hard and keeping quiet in political matters was upheld 
as one’s moral duty. Further, prior to genocide there was a militant group on the 
border of the country, threatening violence and in some instances instigating 
violence in parts of the country, feeding fear and instability. Prunier describes the 
early 1990s in Rwanda as a situation waiting to explode (1995, 85).  
 
Various researchers add the falling world prices for the major export crops, coffee 
and tea, famine, widespread unemployment, a drop in government revenue, and a 
population increase resulting in increased competition for land (Prunier, 1995; 
Pottier, 2001; Fujii, 2004). Fujii makes mention of Western states attaching the 
strings of political reform to their aid packages at a time when President 
Habyarimana was “fighting a war on four fronts: a military war against the RPF, a 
political war against Hutu opponents, a public relations war against the West, and 
a social war against his own people, who, not surprisingly, bore the worst effects 
of all four” (2004, 101). Prunier describes how amidst these tensions, the 
government’s response was to ‘crack down harder on small crime and moral 
issues’ while eliminating all opposition and critique (for example, people were 
killed in staged traffic accidents, journalists imprisoned, etc) (1995, 85).  
 
Prunier shows how the French started putting pressure on Habyarimana to reform 
his single-party ‘democracy’ and his policy regarding refugees. Under the United 
Nations, dialogue was entered into between the RPF and the Habyarimana-
government, with the goal of getting both parties to sign the Arusha Accords, an 
agreement that would allow refugees to return to Rwanda, and the establishment 
of power sharing to take place. From a public relations point of view, however, 
Prunier argues that it was better for the RPF to present itself as fighting a 
totalitarian, single-party dictatorship than becoming part of a power sharing 
agreement (1995, 90). Or as Kinzer was quoted as saying in section 2.5.4, the 
RPF felt they could not return to Rwanda while an ethnic dictatorship maintined 
power. Thus, in 1990, the RPF unsuccessfully invaded Rwanda from Uganda and 
then more successfully attacked northern Rwanda from the Virunga mountains in 
1993. 
 
But more than any of these reasons, most researchers agree that what made 
genocide possible was the narratives of history and identity which reinforced 
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ethnic identities and ethnic tensions. Fujii writes that in the face of all these 
challenges, Habyarimana “responded to these threats as his predecessors had 
done: by exploiting Hutu–Tutsi relations. But this time, any effort to exploit an 
ethnic division had to be powerful enough to overcome the political divisions that 
constituted the real threat to Habyarimana’s circle” (2004, 101). She continues,  
 
“What was needed was a vision of the world that would drown out all 
others, a hegemonic tale that would reign supreme. This story needed to 
be self-contained and all-consuming— powerful enough to withstand the 
distraction of peace talks and the noise of opposition—powerful enough to 
make the very idea of what it meant to be Hutu and what it meant to be 
Tutsi an effective weapon for mass mobilization and elite consolidation. 
The tale, in short, would have to evoke an image so compelling and so 
immediate that no one could escape its consequences. This tale was a 
story of genocide” (2004, 101,2). 
 
3.2. The genocide strategy 
 
The genocide was sparked by the shooting down of the aeroplane which was 
carrying President Habyarimana and the president of Burundi on 7 April, 1994. 
Who was responsible for this remains under debate, with some accusing the 
genocidaires who felt Habyarimana was too soft, others accusing the RPF as they 
wanted to side step the Arusha negotiations and take over power in the country, 
and some accusing the French government. Within hours of this event, Des 
Forges describes how the military went into action, killing Tutsi and Hutu political 
leaders. Colonel Theoneste Bagosora was behind the execution of the plans, with 
most of those involved in the first few weeks being the military, with its young 
militia called the interehamwe, administrative officials, politicians and 
businessmen who had prior knowledge of the plans (1999, 70). By the 20th of 
April, Bagosora and his inner circle had almost complete control of the country 
and used the complex structures of authority in Rwanda to mobilise the 
population. Prefects passed the message to burgomasters (mayors), and mayors 
called meetings throughout the communes to pass on the instructions to the local 
population (Des Forges, 1999, 71). Where before, Rwandans were used to days 
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of community work, spent in service of the country, they were now called to ‘work’ 
with machetes and firearms.     
 
Commune leaders were instructed to make lists of Tutsi in their areas. In areas 
where leaders or villagers were not willing to cooperate, militia were sent in to do 
the work. In the beginning, specific people were targeted and killed, but in time, 
Tutsi were herded to public places and killed enmasse. Some Tutsi would gather 
in stadiums, having been told it would be safe there, only to have the stadiums 
showered with hand grenades as soon as they were full. Many Tutsi escaped to 
churches, as these had been sacred and safe spaces in previous violence, but 
now they too became sites of violence and mass killing. Another strategy that was 
used were the roadblocks, thousands of which were set up all over the country, 
blocking every road and every possible escape. These roadblocks were central to 
the effectiveness of the genocide, not only in preventing people from escaping but 
also as a meeting place for those involved with the killing. Often manned by 
interehamwe, these young militias could ensure the participation of all local 
people in the killings and keep an eye on any movements. In terms of 
encouraging popular participation, Des Forges writes, 
  
“In some places, authorities apparently deliberately drew hesitant Hutu into 
increasingly more violent behavior, first encouraging them to pillage, then 
to destroy homes, then to kill the occupants of the homes. Soldiers and 
police sometimes threatened to punish Hutu who wanted only to pillage 
and not to harm Tutsi. Authorities first incited attacks on the most obvious 
targets—men who had acknowledged or could be easily supposed to have 
ties with the RPF—and only later insisted on the slaughter of women, 
children, the elderly, and others generally regarded as apolitical (1999, 74). 
 
In the next section we will explore at some length the propaganda campaign 
which normalised the idea of genocide, explaining why so many people so easily 






3.3. Normalizing genocide 
 
Fujii argues that the logic of genocide had to be taught in order for a large 
proportion of the civilian population to participate (2004, 99). Many Rwandans 
today say that prior to the early 1990s they were largely unaware of overt ethnic 
tension or worrying about ethnic identity. But in the years preceding genocide, 
latent fears and stereotypes were reawakened and politicians played on the 
divisive historical narratives described in chapter two to bring a new awareness to 
people of their ethnic identity. Not only did ethnic categories have to be ‘taught’, 
argues Fujii, but violence and killing needed to be normalized (2004, 99). She 
describes four ways that the genocidal government succeeded in doing this; 
through repetition, through having a far reach of the general population, through 
having a monopoly of the discursive space, and through skillful use of evidence 
that lent credibility to their story (2004, 102). The following section will unpack 
these methods. 
 
Des Forges suggests that the amount of repetition across different forms of media 
and by various politicians indicates that this propaganda campaign was deliberate 
and planned, although this remains a controversial point to some Hutu ideologues 
(1999, 80). Evidence shows that use was made of radio and newspapers, both 
widely accessed forms of media in Rwanda. The extremists’ radio station, Radio 
Te´le´vision des Mille Collines (RTLM) “turned the genocidal message into 
popular entertainment. Through a mixture of music, banter, jokes, and editorials, 
the station reinforced the genocidal message over and over again” (Fujii, 2004, 
102). Similarly, extremist newspapers such as Kangura depicted obscene 
cartoons of opposition politicians in a way that was both humourous and hateful 
(Taylor, 2001, 48).  
 
RTLM became the primary tool of communication throughout the genocide, with 
every roadblock barrier playing its music and announcements throughout the day. 
Des Forges describes the radio station as being “like a conversation among 
Rwandans who knew each other well and were relaxing over some banana beer 
or a bottle of Primus [the local beer] in a bar. It was a conversation without a 
moderator and without any requirements as to the truth of what was said” (1999, 
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70). RTLM turned talk of genocide into everyday, normal, acceptable conversation 
(Fujii, 2004, 104).  
 
Once the genocide had started, travel became difficult and many other forms of 
communication were completely cut off, making RTLM the only source of news 
and, as Des Forges stresses, “the sole authority for interpreting its meaning” 
(1999,  71). Fujii highlights the fact that during times of instability or crises people 
tend to become more dependent on media for information and guidance, thus 
giving it more power than it normally would have (2004, 105). During the crises in 
Rwanda, as people tried to access information through RTLM, the message they 
were receiving was ‘kill or be killed’ (2004, 105).  
 
Apart from creating a ‘genocidal norm’ through repetition, reach and monopoly of 
the media, the propaganda campaign also made use of real and staged events as 
‘evidence’ for their message. The campaign’s most effective message was that 
the RPF were advancing, that they were cruel and dangerous and that they 
wanted to take over Rwanda and rule it as they once did.  
 
“As one perpetrator confessed to journalist Bill Berkeley in June 1994: “I 
did not believe the Tutsis were coming to kill us and take our land, but 
when the government continued to broadcast that the RPF is coming to 
take our land, is coming to kill the Hutu—when this was repeated over and 
over, I began to feel some kind of fear” (Berkeley, 2002, p 74) (Fujii, 2004, 
106). 
 
The RPF’s attack across the Rwandan border in October, 1990, although 
unsuccesful, nevertheless became ammunition for the propaganda campaign to 
instill fear in the population. This occurred again when the RPF attacked in 1993, 
and on both occasions thousands of Tutsi within the country, usually the educated 
and those in power, were thrown into prison (Prunier, 1995, 93). Alongside these 
actual attacks, Fujii makes mention of ‘staged’ attacks or rumours of attacks, at 
which time the general population could ‘practice’ killing and violence could 
become ‘routine’. Prunier even speaks of ‘settling into a war culture’ (1995, 94). 
“These massacres,” writes Fujii, “were a crucial element of the text—the genocidal 




In this propaganda campaign, genocidaires were constantly drawing from 
embedded stereotypes in the historical narratives. In section 2.4, it was mentioned 
that although Rwandans may have lived side by side relatively harmoniously prior 
to genocide, stereotyping was occurring repeatedly. At no time was this stronger 
than during the propaganda campaign run by the genocidaires in the months 
running up to the genocide. The use of stereotyping and language specifically 
used to create an image of Tutsi as ‘other’, alien and less than human played a 
significant role in influencing ordinary people to become killers.  
 
Johan Pottier describes how propagandists constantly fell back on crucial aspects 
of the Hamitic hypothesis:  
 
“The most explicit threat had come from Léon Mugesera, vice-president of 
the country’s former sole political party, the MRND, who in November, 
1992, incited the Hutu majority to eliminate all Tutsi and everyone opposed 
to Habyarimana. ‘Your country is Ethiopia,’ Mugesera told Tutsi, ‘and we 
shall soon send you back via the Nyabarongo [river] on an express journey. 
There you are. And I repeat, we are quickly getting organised to begin this 
work” (original quotation in Reyntjens, 1994: 119) (2001, 22).  
 
Harrow describes how what he calls a ‘foundational fantasy’ turned ordinary 
people into killers. This fantasy included the core idea that:  
 
“Tutsis were no longer ‘us,’ no longer ‘subjects,’ but were inyenzi 
(cockroaches) that had to be stamped out. The foundational fantasy is built 
on the historical narrative of the oppressive Tutsi kingdom, the corvées, 
and with it the identification of Tutsis as ‘Hamites,’ as people from the north 
(Ethiopia being the favored site); they were depicted as foreigners, as 
others, with different blood and evil natures, even as evil satanic beings; 





Harrow argues how shared historical narratives became rigid, divisive narratives, 
with a Tutsi version and a Hutu version, and that these rigid narratives forced 
people into distinct categories, categories that dehumanized: 
 
“The scenes of young interahamwe butchering Tutsi women and children 
at various checkpoints have been often narrated so as to arouse our horror 
at the killers: they are drunk, stoned, inhuman. Indeed, they might have 
been all of the above, but instead of stopping with the simplistic notion that 
a man who drinks or smokes marijuana becomes a killer, we would do 
better to consider that what made possible the suppression of feelings that 
would normally inhibit such acts required the reinforcement of fantasies 
that functioned to turn other people into something other than humans, 
making them radically other, like the interahamwe themselves. The people 
who killed became, themselves, immune to the propositions of 
intersubjectivity and shared histories, and were able to channel their 
fantasies into rigid channels that ended any other possibilities of energic 
relations with others” (2005, 17).  
 
In fact, during the genocide there was an entire discourse developed to describe 
the act of killing that assisted killers in objectifying the horrific acts they were 
partaking in. Darryl Li's analysis of radio propaganda shows how the RTLM 
repeatedly described the killing with work euphemisms, relating the killings to 
community service, which normally involved cleaning the vegetation alongside 
roads (2004, 11). Taylor describes how the killers would speak of clearing away 
the ‘tall trees’, which played on the stereotype of Tutsi height. The nation-state 
was referred to as a garden and people were to clear the ‘weeds’, and not just the 
‘tall weeds’ but also the ‘shoots’, which referred to the children (Taylor, 2001, 
142). 
 
 Apart from objectifying the ‘work’ of killing, there was a different kind of identity 
game going on in unifying all Hutu for this ‘work’. Li describes how the RTLM 
continuously made reference to Hutu as rubanda nyamwinshi which referred to 
their ethnic majority status in the country, and how all Hutu needed to stand 
together against the common enemy. Alison des Forges describes how the 
propaganda campaign depicted a picture of Tutsi ‘clannishness’, saying that Tutsi 
 
55 
within the country were linked to those outside (1999, 93). She quotes from the 
extremist magazine, Kangura:  
 
“We began by saying that a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. It is 
true. A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach...The history of Rwanda 
shows us clearly that a Tutsi stays always exactly the same; that he has 
never changed. The malice, the evil are just as we knew them in the history 
of our country. We are not wrong in saying that a cockroach gives birth to 
another cockroach. Who could tell the difference between the Inyenzi who 
attacked in October 1990 and those of the 1960s? They are all linked...their 
evilness is the same. The unspeakable crimes of the Inyenzi of 
today...recall those of their elders: killing, pillaging, raping girls and women, 
etc.” (1999, 83).  
 
3.4. Narratives underlying genocide 
 
But what was underlying the propaganda campaign that made its message result 
in a people normally described as ‘peaceful’ to become violent mass murderers? 
In the following section we will examine the underlying narratives embedded in the 
Rwandan consciousness that were recalled by the propaganda campaign. These 
narratives include the ‘Hamitic hypthesis’ with its narrative of inferiority and 
superiority, the idea of Tutsi as foreign invader, the ‘revolution’ narrative of the 
democratic majority, and  deeply embedded cultural narratives that Taylor (2001) 
describes, around the themes of ‘flow and blockage’. 
 
3.4.1. The Hamitic hypothesis and foreign invasion 
 
The Hamitic hypothesis, as mentioned in section 2.4, was a European 
construction used to explain advanced technologies or complex states outside of 
their own sphere. Finding in Rwanda a well-advanced, complex state structure, 
Europeans concluded that the reigning Tutsi monarchy were not Bantu, like the 
Hutu, but descendants of Ham, the cursed son of the Biblical Noah (Noah, of 
course, being of European origin). From this came the further conclusion that in 
the hierarchy of superiority, Tutsi would rank just under the Europeans 
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themselves, followed by the Hutu and under them the Twa. Along with this 
hypothesis was the implied racial separateness of Hutu and Tutsi. Although Hutu 
and Tutsi shared the same culture, language and religion, it was concluded that 
Tutsi must have infiltrated Rwanda from the north and subjugated the Hutu.  
 
Echoes of this hypothesis were constantly heard during the genocide. An early 
obvious reference to this was by the ruling party’s vice-president, Dr Leon 
Mugesera, in 1992, when he said, “They [the accomplices of the RPF] belong to 
Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get there by throwing them in 
the Nyabarongo river. I must insist on this point. We have to act. Wipe them all 
out!” (Taylor, 2001, 80). The two strong messages here – that the Tutsi are other, 
and that they are from somewhere else – form a central theme of the propaganda 
campaign. Coupled with this idea is the one of Hutus as being the original 
inhabitants of Rwanda, who were cruelly subjugated by Tutsi invaders.  In the 
early 1990s MRND (the ruling party) supporters were often heard putting forward 
the following version of history:  
 
“We Hutu are Bantus. Although the Twa were here first, when we arrived 
we lived in peace with them. We cleared the land and farmed it. They made 
pots or hunted in the forests. The first kings in Rwanda were Hutu but the 
Tutsi say they were Tutsi. The Tutsi used their cattle to trick Hutu into doing 
their work for them. Then the Tutsi managed to conquer one Hutu kingdom. 
When the Europeans came, they helped the Tutsi conquer the rest of our 
lands” (Taylor, 2001, 83).  
 
The Hamitic hypothesis influenced the other side as well. Prior to the genocide an 
RPF supporter said to Taylor, “We Tutsi were once the nobles in this land and the 
Hutu were our slaves. Hutu do not have the intelligence to govern. Look at what 
they have done to this country in the last thirty years” (2001, 85) 
 
Central to this Hamitic hypothesis was the idea of the alluring Tutsi woman, 
looking to trap Hutu men through their beauty. The Hutu revolution was not able to 
overthrow the Hamitic hypothesis and the idea of the superior beauty of Tutsi 
women. The fact that Europeans tended to have very public relationships with 
Tutsi women didn’t help. Hutu extremist literature prior to the genocide depicted 
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cartoons of Tutsi women luring westerners into supporting the RPF through their 
beauty (Taylor, 2001, 171). During genocide, (and prior to genocide, in their 
cartoon depictions) Taylor suggests that “Hutu extremists appear to be attempting 
to purge their ambivalence toward Tutsi women via symbolic violence, even as 
they project their own erotic fantasies upon them.  At one level they were certainly 
aware that to preserve the racial purity of Hutu, they had to categorically renounce 
Tutsi women as objects of desire. At the same time they also knew that they 
themselves were not free of the forbidden desire” (2001, 174).  
 
3.4.2. The ‘revolution’ narrative 
 
This narrative insisted that Rwanda would no longer be ruled by a foreign minority 
but by the democratic majority, in other words, Hutu Power. Where other African 
countries were throwing off their colonial past by anger and violence directed at 
the colonialist, in Rwanda, the Belgians were welcomed as friends of democracy, 
and the Tutsi were seen as the true oppressors (Mamdani, 1999; Taylor, 2001). 
From this time onwards, a clear and unambiguous narrative was woven that 
painted the Tutsi as the cruel and sly oppressor and the Hutu as the hard working 
masses who had been tricked into subjugation. But the revolution brought this to 
an end, freed the Hutu from oppression and allowed them to rule a country 
rightfully theirs. This rewritten history became the official history. Taylor describes 
how after the Hutu revolution, nationalist rituals were held, such as ‘animation’: 
people would be excused from work to gather together to sing or chant, 
rehearsing litanies about the country’s development or the accomplishments of 
the president and leading party. On national holidays these would be publicly 
performed with competitions between groups. During these rituals: “the values of 
democracy and equality would be extolled and the overthrow of the Tutsi 
monarchy and rejection of ubuhake would be evoked” (2001, 108). 
 
It was from this foundation that the propaganda campaign could easily tap into 
Rwandans fears and unexpressed beliefs. If the Tutsi were to come into power 
again, they would yet again subjugate the Hutu masses. In Mugusera’s speech, 
he warns his listeners: “Know that the person whose throat you do not cut now will 
be the one who will cut yours” (Des Forges, 1999, 86). As Fujii writes, “With this 
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warning, Mugusera brought the story of Hutu and Tutsi full circle. If Tutsi rule 
depended on Hutu subjugation, then Hutu survival depended on Tutsi 
extermination” (2004, 106).  Mugusera refers to the fatal mistake Hutu made in 
allowing Tutsi to escape the country before; that fatal mistake, he urges his 
listeners, should not be made again (Fujii, 2004, 106). 
 
3.4.3. Cultural narratives 
 
Taylor suggests that specific forms of violence were used repeatedly during the 
genocide because certain deeply embedded narratives were written onto the 
bodies of victims by perpetrators. He suggests that within this cultural narrative, 
the genocide of Tutsi was a ‘massive ritual of purification’ whose roots lie in pre-
colonial sacred kingship practices (2001, 101). These include impaling, 
evisceration of pregnant woman, forced incest, forced cannibalism of family 
members, widespread killing of victims at roadblocks, the severing of Achilles’ 
tendons, emasculation of men, and breast oblation of women (2001, 105).  
 
These violent practices, Taylor argues, relate to Rwandan cognitive models of 
illness which he studied in the 1980s which are based on the idea of blockage and 
flow. “Popular healing aims at restoring bodily flows that have been perturbed by 
human negligence and malevolence. Bodily fluids such as blood, semen, breast 
milk, and menstrual blood, are a recurrent concern as is the passage of ailments 
through the digestive tract” (Taylor, 2001, 112). He recounts a story that illustrates 
how the flow/blockage symbolism starts at birth: Mother and child are secluded for 
a period of nine days (today it is shorter), during which time the child is examined 
for anal malformations. Then the child is presented to the family, and given a 
name. Children are present at this occasion, are given their favourite food, and 
bestow a nick-name on the baby. The meal given to the children is called kurya 
ubunyano which means ‘to eat the baby’s excrement’ ‘for Rwandans say that a 
tiny quantity of the baby’s faecal matter is mixed with the food’ (2001, 114).  
 
“This appellation celebrates the fact that the baby’s body has been found to 
be an ‘open conduit’, an adequate vessel for perpetuating the process of 
‘flow’. In a sense, that baby’s faeces are its first gift and the members of his 
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age class are its first recipients. The children at the ceremony incorporate 
the child into their group by symbolically ingesting one of his bodily 
products. Their bestowal of a name upon the infant manifests their 
acceptance of the child as a social being” (2001, 114).  
 
He goes on to describe how if the baby’s anal passage was blocked, it could 
receive but not give, and therefore be unable to socially participate in reciprocity. 
A moral person would be one who could reciprocate – to receive and to give or 
pass on; to ingest and to excrete. This makes the mouth and the anus important 
(2001, 114). 
 
That which prevents flow is seen to be malevolent. According to Hutu extremist 
ideology, Tutsi were seen as  ‘eaters of our sweat’, ‘weight upon our backs’, 
‘invaders from Ethiopia’, and so Taylor argues that Tutsi were perceived as 
‘blocking beings’, blocking the nation from its pure, unified Hutu-ness (2001, 140). 
During the genocide, Taylor describes how these metaphors of blockage and flow 
characterized the entire genocide, from the way violent torture was focused on the 
digestive and reproductive system, to the severing of tendons, to the thousands of 
roadblocks, to the throwing of bodies into rivers.    
 
On this latter point, he makes reference to the aforementioned speech by 
Mugesera, for the Tutsi to return to Ethiopia through being thrown into the 
Nyabarongo river. Taylor describes how the river played an important ‘restorative 
and purifying role’, where the ‘blocking agents’ could be excreted into and washed 
away. He uses the term ‘excreted’ in the belief that the ‘blocking’ Tutsi were seen 
as excrement, supported by the fact that victims were regularly thrown, either 
dead or alive, into latrines (2001, 130).  
 
Roadblocks formed an integral part of preventing people from escaping. At 
roadblocks, Hutus were forced to do their civic ‘duty’, of torturing and murdering 
Tutsi trying to escape. However, Taylor points out that these roadblocks were so 
closely placed together as to become redundant and argues that their purpose 
was again rooted in cultural symbolism – blocking the path. This links with the 
cutting of tendons, which Medicins Sans Frontiers described as the most common 
wound they encountered. Not only those who would run away, but even those too 
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young or old to run, were wounded in this way. “As with barriers on paths and 
roadways, there is a deeper generative scheme that subtends both the killers’ 
intentionality and the message inscribed on the bodies of their victims … Power, 
in this instance, in symbolic terms, derives from the capacity to obstruct” (Tayor, 
2001, 135). 
 
The effectiveness of ethnic ‘purification’ lay with these roadblocks, which 
prevented Tutsi, or even Hutu that looked like Tutsi, from escaping the country. 
These roadblocks were erected by the interehamwe, police, neighbourhood 
protection groups, the Rwandan government army (FAR) and even by the RPF, in 
the areas they controlled (Taylor, 2001, 130). Taylor describes the barriers as 
“ritual and liminal spaces where ‘obstructing beings’ were to be obstructed in their 
turn and cast out of the nation … They were scenes of inordinate cruelty” (2001, 
131). He speaks of people paying to be killed quickly, and how many were 
intentionally mortally wounded but not killed, left to slowly die amongst the 
corpses.  All Hutu civilians were expected to fulfill their civic ‘duty’ at the 
roadblock. In her autobiography, Beatrice Umutesi describes how her brother’s 
lapse in this civic duty almost resulted in the death of the entire family and that he 
eventually gave in to spending the nights there to save the people under his care. 
It was in this way that every Hutu civilian was implicated in the killings, even if 
they had no desire to participate (2004, 56). 
 
Other forms of violence included impalement, which obstructs the bodily conduit, 
and emasculation and breast oblation, which were both practiced during earlier 
periods of Rwandan history and point towards a preoccupation with the 
reproductive system and parts of the body that produce fertility fluids (Taylor, 
2001, 140). Repeated rape, and forced incest bring about the image of 
misdirected flows. “Not only were the victimized brutalised and dehumanized by 
this treatment – their bodies were transformed into icons of asociality, for incest 
constitutes the pre-emption of any possible alliance or exchange relation that 
might have resulted from the union of one’s son or daughter with the son or 
daughter of another family” (Taylor, 2001, 141). 
 
Thus, Taylor argues, Hutu extremists blocked flows as a sign of power through 
roadblocks and cutting of tendons, and further inscribed on the bodies of their 
 
61 
victims their identity as ‘blocking agents’ through impalement, emasculation, 
breast oblation, forced incest and rape. As would have been the case in pre-
colonial Rwandan society, obstructers were sacrificed to purify the nation.  
“Sacrifice took the form of interdicting the flight of Tutsi, obstructing the conduits of 
their bodies, impeding their bodies’ capacity for movement, subverting the ability 
of Tutsi to socially or biologically reproduce, and in many instances, turning their 
bodies into icons of their imagined moral flaws – obstruction” (Taylor, 2001. 145). 
 
It can thus be seen that much of what happened during the genocide was 
grounded in the historical narratives described in chapter two and in this section. 
The Hamitic hypothesis brought by the colonials and internalized by Rwandans 
allowed for the dehumanization of the other. The ‘revolution’ narrative fed both 
fears of renewed subjugation and a sense of entitlement to hold onto power by 
whatever means. The cultural narratives described by Taylor shed some light on 
the way in which genocide was executed, and again draws from hundreds of 
years of Rwandan history. These deeply embedded narratives were used by 
politicians to manipulate and destroy people for their own political agendas.  
 
3.5. By-narratives during genocide 
 
Apart from these historical and cultural narratives, there were also other narratives 
that assisted in creating a context for genocide. These include narratives of 
gender, class, and region. Further, within these narratives, some key actors have 
included the Church, the international community and the RPF. These narratives 
and actors will be explored in the following section. 
 
3.5.1. The role of class 
 
Several researchers point to the fact that a large number of genocidaires were in 
fact unemployed, landless, disillusioned youth who, by joining young militia groups 
not only had their basic needs met but were also given a new sense of status 





“Of the nearly 60 percent of Rwandans under the age of twenty, tens of 
thousands had little hope of obtaining the land needed to establish their 
own households or the jobs necessary to provide for a family. Such young 
men, including many displaced by the war and living in camps near the 
capital provided many of the early recruits to the Interahamwe, trained in 
the months before and in the days immediately after the genocide began. 
Refugees from Burundi, in flight from the Tutsi-dominated army of Burundi, 
had also received military training in their camps and readily attacked 
Rwandan Tutsi after April 6” (1999, 90). 
 
Beatrice Umutesi calls these young militias ‘delinquents’ and says that the war 
belonged to these young boys who loved to watch the ‘wealthy tremble before 
them’ (2004, 53). Pottier further reiterates that where social inequality was high, 
massacres occurred between neighbours; where it was low, peasants were less 
likely to participate (2002, 33). “The authorities redirected the hatred and potential 
violence of the poor – especially of angry, desperate young Hutu men – away 
from the rich and onto ‘the Tutsi’, the latter wrongly portrayed as invariably 
aristocratic and privileged” (2002, 34). The propaganda machine told the poor that 
they were allowed to take ownership over the land and possessions of those they 
killed, making the incentive to kill higher for the very poor. For many of the 
uneducated, unemployed Hutu youth it seemed as if the war was between the 
impoverished majority and a Tutsi aristocracy that still, somehow, had a monopoly 
on resources and wealth (Pottier, 2002, 34). 
 
3.5.2. The role of region 
 
The north-south divide can be traced to before colonialism, where the south was 
the heart of the Rwandan kingdom, ruled by a Tutsi monarchy, whereas the north 
remained divided into autonomous Hutu chiefdoms. It was only with the arrival of 
the colonialists that northern Rwanda came under the central Rwandan rule. This 
division was reiterated by the Kayibanda-Habyarimana conflict, with Kayibanda 
being a southerner who favoured southerners during his rule, until he was 
overthrown by Habyarimana, a northerner who then favoured northerners (Pottier, 




Both before and during the genocide the north-south divide was strongly evident, 
even to the point where Umutesi writes that many southerners saw the war as an 
affair between the northerners and the Tutsi and felt it had nothing to do with them 
(2004, 64). In fact, in the southern positioned university town of Butare, ethnic 
tensions were minimal and thus the genocide impetus less effective, until 
genocidaires were sent in from other regions. Des Forges writes that in the north, 
where Habyarimana’s support was strongest, the general population was quick to 
participate in genocide, but in the southern areas “many Hutu initially refused to 
attack Tutsi and joined with them in fighting off assailants” (1999, 101).  
 
This divide was made even greater when France implemented Operation 
Turquoise, a United Nations operation which was based in the north-west. Its 
explicit purpose was to stop genocide, but coming at a stage when the genocide 
was almost over and millions of Hutu refugees were fleeing Rwanda, it instead 
became a refuge for genocidaires in the north (Prunier, 2000, 294).     
 
3.5.3. The role of gender 
 
During the genocide, women were both agents of violence and symbols of 
violence. Taylor describes how women participated in killing but also how Tutsi 
women were raped and even kept as sex slaves (2001, 150). This was unusual in 
a society where, prior to genocide, rape was not common at all. Added to this, 
prior to genocide, men were far more often affected by violence than women; 
during genocide, men and women were equally targeted (2001, 156). 
 
Interestingly, Rwandan society was also characterized by strong woman leaders, 
for example, the prime minister, Agathe Uwiringiyimana, who “threatened the 
regime as an anti-ethnicist, a southerner, and as a highly educated and articulate 
person, but the fact that she was also a woman potentiated all these factors” 
(Taylor, 2001, 164). Within days of Habyarimana’s death, Uwiringiyimana and the 




A characteristic of Hutu extremism was its male dominance, which Taylor argues 
had probably never existed in Rwanda’s previous history (2001, 155). Taylor 
suggests that the reason Hutu extremists were especially against Tutsi women 
was that they created ‘liminal spaces’. More Hutu men were married to Tutsi 
women than the other way around, and marriages between Tutsi women and 
foreigners were also common, with these Tutsi women then producing ‘impure’ 
children (2001, 156).  
 
Already prior to genocide, the government had undertaken a ‘morality campaign’ 
against self-sufficient single women, women traditionally holding male positions 
and women who were becoming too European, especially in their style of dress 
(2001, 157). It was felt that Tutsi women undermined high Rwandan morality, 
especially when they took over western sexual practices (2001,172, 3). It is ironic 
that many extremist Hutus had either Tutsi wives or mistresses. Even amongst 
Hutu refugees from Burundi, Liisa Malkii recorded Burundian men as saying that 
Tutsi women used their beauty to entrap innocent Hutu into marriage where then 
they would be under control of the sly Tutsi (2001, 170). Taylor describes how 
Tutsi women were denounced by Hutu extremists as objects of desire, while being 
objects of forbidden desire for the denouncers (2001, 170). He writes:  
 
“Hutu extremists appear to be attempting to purge their ambivalence 
toward Tutsi women via symbolic violence, even as they project their own 
erotic fantasies upon them.  At one level they were certainly aware that to 
preserve the racial purity of Hutu, they had to categorically renounce Tutsi 
women as objects of desire. At the same time they also knew that they 
themselves were not free of the forbidden desire” (2001, 174). 
 
A most fascinating insight into the way Hutu extremists perceived Tutsi women is 
evident in the Hutu manifesto released in December, 1990, which states: 
 
• “Every Muhutu  (Hutu man) should know that wherever he finds 
Umututsikazi (a Tutsi woman) she is working for her Tutsi group”, thus 
making a Hutu who marries or employs such a Tutsi a traitor. 
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• “Every Muhutu should know that our Bahutukazi (Hutu women) are 
more worthy or, and more conscious of their roles as women, spouse 
and mother. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest!” 
• “Bhutukazi (Hutu woman), be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers 
and sons back to the path of reason” (Taylor, 2001,175). 
 
Taylor asks why Hutu women needed to draw their menfolk back if the allure of 
Tutsi women wasn’t very strong (2001, 175). Interestingly, when the French set up 
Operation Turquoise, the extremist propaganda, seeing the French as their 
friends, broadcast the following over the radio station: “You Hutu girls wash 
yourselves and put on a good dress to welcome our French allies. The Tutsi girls 
are all dead now, so you have your chance” (quote from Prunier, 1995, 292). This 
kind of inferiority complex, Prunier mentions in a footnote, accounts for the degree 
of sadism unleashed by Hutu death squads against Tutsi. Taylor says that ‘special 
measures of terrorism were reserved for Tutsi women by the extremists’ (2001, 
176).  
 
3.5.4. The role of the Church 
 
A worrying aspect of the genocide was that an enormous amount of mass killings 
happened at churches, where people were seeking refuge. Where in the past, 
churches were seen as sacred places, they became integral parts of the killing 
strategy (Prunier, 1995; Mbanda, 1997; Des Forges, 1999). Not only were 
churches sites of massacres, church goers and even leaders, were participants in 
genocide. In an article about the role of the churches, Ian Linden describes how 
bishops and Archbishops were identified as key players in the killing machine 
(1997, 50). Why was the church, which is commonly perceived as being neutral in 
times of crises, so highly implicated in genocide? 
 
One reason was that the Church, and the Roman Catholic Church in particular, 
has been part and parcel of Rwandan society and governance since colonial 
times. Des Forges describes how the Catholic Church was a staunch supporter of 
Habyarimana and his government and that some 60 percent of Rwandans were 
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members of the Catholic Church. She adds that the Anglican and Baptist 
hierarchies also tended to lean towards support of the government (1999, 111). 
 
Another reason may be that Rwandans were taught to follow religious leaders 
unquestioningly, and when their religious leaders participated in the killing, this 
was a sign that they were morally free to do the same (Mbanda, 1997, 86). Meg 
Guillebaud, an Anglican missionary in Rwanda, describes at some length in her 
book how ethnic division was part of church culture in Rwanda for decades prior 
to genocide and that similarly, the leadership was riddled with complicated power 
plays and political intrigue that made participation in genocide more 
understandable (2002, 300). However, having said this, Laurent Mbanda stresses 
the point that for every church and church leader that participated there was one 
that acted heroically, saving lives or choosing to be a martyr rather than a killer 
(1997, 89). 
 
3.5.5. The role of the international community 
 
A repeated theme in the literature is the horrifying indifference of the international 
community. The delayed action on the part of the United Nations has left many 
Rwanda bitter and angry. General Romeo Dallaire, military leader of the UN 
intervention to Rwanda, describes how with a troop force of five thousand, and the 
correct mandate, the genocide could either have been stopped in its early days, or 
prevented altogether (2001, 110). Instead, the United Nations in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) had a force of only five hundred, and a mandate which disallowed 
them to act other than in self-defense.   
 
Reasons for international indifference abound, from conspiracy theories that 
implicate the French government to measuring the international worth of a small, 
poor nation. Apart from Médecins Sans Frontières, not a single humanitarian aid 
organization and hardly a single European remained in Rwanda during the 
genocide (Prunier, 1995, 273). Sadly, Linda Melvern suggests one of the reasons 
for the lack of interest was the far more exciting news of South Africa’s new 




Indifference on the part of the UN is often attributed to the crises that occurred 
only a year earlier in Somalia, which resulted in the death of several Americans 
(Prunier, 1995, 274; Des Forges, 1999). Further, some fingers have been pointed 
at Secretary-General Boutros Ghali for stalling on calling the massacres 
‘genocide’ (with its related implications in terms of international law) and not 
reacting sufficiently to General Dallaire’s appeal for more resources and troops 
(Prunier, 1995, 275; Dallaire, 2001). There have been some indications that 
Bourtros Ghali had support for the genocidal government due to their shared 
Francophone links and that the presence of a member of the genocidal 
government on the UN Security Council’s board further delayed UN reaction 
(Dallaire, 2001; Khan, 2000). 
 
As Des Forges writes, 
 
“During the first weeks, when firm opposition to the genocide would have 
saved hundreds of thousands of lives, international leaders refused even 
simple actions which would have required no military force and no 
expense. Complicit in the refusal to speak the word “genocide,” they failed 
to denounce the evil, either jointly—which would have been most 
effective—or even singly, in outraged voices” (1999, 256). 
 
3.5.6. The role of the RPF 
 
Prunier describes the RPF, under the leadership of General Paul Kagame, as 
probably the best educated guerilla force in the world, being made up of a 
worldwide Tutsi diaspora who took with them the education and experience they 
had gained in Europe, the US and elsewhere (1995, 116). This well-trained, well-
organized, disciplined military force has become the centre of much controversy. 
On the one hand, researchers laud its high discipline and its heroic ending of the 
genocide in the face of international indifference. On the other, it has been 
accused of committing crimes against humanity, large scale massacres, and even 




Dallaire, military leader of the United Nations intervention in Rwanda, is one who 
both praises and criticizes the RPF. He makes mention of the high level of 
discipline: “So far [Kagame’s] troops had handled themselves quite well. There 
had been a case of rape that was dealt with summarily – the guilty soldier was 
shot. We had witnessed no looting per se” (2001, 344). However, throughout his 
account of his dealings with Kagame, Dallaire describes an uneasiness, an 
uncertainty about what was really going on behind the scenes.  
 
This was especially apparent as the RPF gained more ground and life started to 
return to normal in Kigali. Dallaire writes that the UN could not “ignore the reports 
we received of revenge murders, looting and raping, as undisciplined rear 
elements of the RPF and returnees sought their own retribution. Rumours of 
secret interrogations at checkpoints for returnees were making people nervous. 
We investigated and publicly denounced these atrocities just as we had 
condemned the genocide” (2001, 479). Dallaire was also uncomfortable with the 
coldness of Kagame and other high RPF leaders to the suffering and death of so 
many people. Dallaire records Kagame as saying, “There will be many sacrifices 
in this war. If the refugees have to be killed for this cause they will be considered 
as having been part of the sacrifice’” (2001, 358).  
 
Des Forges describes how the RPF stopped the genocide by destroying the 
interim government and its armies. However, she and other researchers imply that 
the RPF’s priority was not to stop the genocide per se but to take absolute control 
of the country (1999, 258). Kagame insisted that where for the genocidal 
government, the war was an ethnic one, for the RPF the war was about returning 
democracy to Rwanda (Dallaire, 2001, 357). The idea of genocide being used by 
the RPF as a military excuse to overrun Rwanda is hinted at even more strongly 
by Dallaire who says that ‘had he been a suspicious soul’ he would wonder 
whether there wasn’t a direct link between the United States’ constant delaying 
(through the UN) in reacting to the crises and the RPF’s refusal for UNAMIRII to 
be implemented, nearing the end of the genocide (2001, 364). Dallaire suggests 
the UN’s role was to play as scapegoat so that the world out there could seem 




As the genocide was coming to an end and the RPF was starting to bring order to 
the country, the international community began to want to play a part in the crises. 
Kagame’s response to this, in terms of Dalaire’s suggestion of a United Nations 
intervention force was: “Those that were to die are already dead. If an intervention 
force is sent to Rwanda we will fight it. Let us solve the problems of Rwandans. 
The international community cannot even condemn the massacres of poor, 
innocent people … All my soldiers that I command have individually lost family, 
starting with myself. My idea is not to divide the country but to hunt the criminals 
everywhere they might be” (2001, 342).  
 
Pottier brings to attention what he calls a strategic ploy on the part of the RPF, to 
use the international community’s apathy during genocide as giving them no right 
to be critical of the RPF or of the new government under Kagame after genocide.  
Because of international guilt, ignorance and moral sympathy with Tutsi survivors, 
the international community praised everything the RPF did and were prepared to 
accept whatever version of the Rwandan narrative the RPF wanted to sell to them 
(2002, 4). It was only some years later that the international community 
(journalists, human rights organizations, humanitarians, diplomats) began to 
realize that the RPF had an almost dictatorial control over the country, and reports 
of human rights abuses and massacres began to filter through. Until today, 
however, these are rarely acknowledged or spoken about in Rwanda.   
 
Yet without the RPF’s intervention, the extermination of the Tutsi may well have 
become a reality. Kinzer emphasizes in his biography that the intention of the RPF 
was not to restore Tutsi power but rather to restore democracy and equality to 
Rwanda. With most of the RPF having relatives in Rwanda it is difficult to believe 
they would allow their family to be killed unnecessary. More likely would be that 
Kagame had a carefully laid out strategy that would ensure a complete overthrow 
of a regime that he saw as essentially harmful to the progress and development of 
a country that he loved. Kinzer records an anecdote in 1993, when the RPF 
attacked Rwanda and almost took Kigali until Kagame called his troops back. 
Kagame’s officers were shocked and asked him why he didn’t allow them to then 




“Why did the RPF start the war? Was it for ourselves or for Rwanda? If, as 
the French say, we are fighting for the Tutsi, we can fight, win and then say 
we won our right to take over. But our philosophy is that we were thrown 
out of the country and want every Rwandan to be able to live here 
peacefully” (2008, 105). 
 
3.5.7. The role of heroes 
 
Again and again, the literature reiterates how not all Hutu were guilty, and for 
every Hutu who was a killer there was a Hutu who saved a Tutsi life. Many times, 
the genocide is described as having been against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu. 
Alongside this, there was a small minority of Tutsi who acted in bad faith towards 
fellow Tutsi in an effort to save their own lives, or to take advantage of 
circumstances. Bernard Rutikanga describes the long list of possible perpetrators: 
high ranking military and civilian officials and big business men afraid of losing 
their position and keen to get a piece of power-pie; middle-level leaders wanting 
to advance their careers; grassroots leaders and masses blindly following orders 
from the top; people coerced or intimidated to participate; people wanting to settle 
an old score; poor people wanting to loot or take over victim’s land, property, or 
animals; people intoxicated by drugs and alcohol distributed by leaders; and Hutu 
refugees from Burundi (2003, 140).  
 
Prunier describes the complexity of the situation during genocide, where someone 
might be killed by a long-time friend and neighbour and someone else saved by a 
kind-hearted interehamwe (1995, 257). The situation was especially difficult for 
those of mixed marriage. Although in Rwanda, a child takes on the ethnic identity 
of the father, some Rwandans of mixed parentage had consciously taken on the 
term ‘Hutsi’. The heroes of genocide have often been overlooked, especially as 
post-genocide discourse has had it that those who were still alive after genocide 
must have been complicit in it. But Prunier describes how people moved by faith 
or human decency would risk their own lives to save those of others (1995, 259). 
It is these heroic stories that play a significant role in later reconciliation work as 
they form at least a tendril of hope that we can be human before being from one 




3.6. Concluding thoughts 
 
Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman and Vachel Miller write: “Understanding 
genocide helps people move beyond the belief held by many people in Rwanda 
that what they experienced was incomprehensible evil. It helps them to see 
genocide, however horrible, as a human process. It helps them to see their 
common humanity with others who have suffered mass violence” (2003, 290). For 
many Rwandans the horror of genocide makes it unimaginable and 
incomprehensible. Yet, when dissected step by step, as was done in this chapter, 
one begins to see how ordinary people can be manipulated through their fears to 
do things they would normally never consider. Understanding genocide and its 
underlying narratives becomes an important factor in the healing and 
reconciliation process as we can begin to see how deeply embedded stereotypes, 
inferiority-superiority complexes and ideologies are and begin to work on 
transforming this level of our shared consciousness so that these narratives might 
not be so easily manipulated in the future. 
 
The following chapter will look at Rwanda after genocide, when the country had 
been destroyed and most of its population displaced. Some of the extreme 
challenges to healing and reconciliation will become evident as the story of 
Rwanda after genocide unfolds.
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CHAPTER 4:  AFTER THE GENOCIDE: 1994-1999 
 
“He was moving in a strange universe here, composed entirely of women, old 
men and children. Their gaze was not empty but chillingly absent, turned 
inward, or quite simply dead. Like people who can see but will not. Only a few 
women would speak, in hushed voices, their eyes fixed on the ground, where 
they kept them long after they had finished their almost clinical descriptions (for 
they had only concrete words) of the murders of their husbands and sons. The 
rapes these shy, prudish women described with a wealth of blood-curdling 
detail, as if they were dictating the reports of their own autopsies” (in 
Courtemanch, 2003,233). 
 
4.1. Tensions in the ‘after’-narrative 
 
In the previous two chapters, we have seen the role that certain divisive narratives 
have played in inciting and sustaining violence in Rwanda. These narratives have 
been described as being rooted in history and developing along ethnic lines. In 
the Rwanda after genocide, much of these divisive narratives continued to play a 
significant role amidst the difficult task of rebuilding a destroyed country and 
people. The following chapter will look at how the Rwandan government managed 
to develop the country beyond all expectations. It will also unpack how age-old 
divisive narratives continued to undermine reconciliation by looking at two streams 
of narratives: the narrative of the ‘new’ Rwanda, embraced by the government 
and (mostly Tutsi) Rwandans returning to their country from the diaspora, and the 
less heard narrative of the Hutu refugees who fled to the DRC and those who 
remained in the country.  
 
When the RPF liberated Rwanda in May, 1994, there was great relief, both within 
Rwanda and without. Their victory brought with it the end of the horror of genocide 
as well as hero status to the victorious party. The expectation of many, within and 
without was that order, good governance, democracy, stability, equality and peace 
would come to Rwanda. Some others, however, feared revenge and retribution 
and a reversal of everything that had just happened. Instead of a Hutu-dominated 
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society, it would now be Tutsi-dominated. Instead of Hutus being favoured for 
jobs, education and positions, now Tutsi would be. Instead of Tutsi fearing for 
their lives, Hutu would fear for theirs. 
 
The following section will examine how some of these fears became a reality 
while others were dispelled.  Further, it will explore how the new government was 
able to rebuild a country able to sustain itself in the light of enormous obstacles 
and challenges.  And it will unpack how the new Rwanda continued, and 
continues, not surprisingly, to be riddled with ethnic division and tension. 
 
4.2. The narrative of the ‘new’ Rwanda 
 
Immediately after genocide, Special Representative of UNAMIR Shahrya Khan, 
described Rwanda’s capital as being ‘macabre, surrealistic and utterly gruesome’ 
(2000, 14). After a hundred days in which over 800 000 people had been killed 
and some two million fled to neighbouring countries, it is not surprising that he 
describes Kigali after genocide as seeming to have been hit by a ‘neutron bomb’ 
(2000, 297).  
 
“There was no sign of life. The buildings were mostly wrecked, pock-
marked by mortar and machine gun fire. Every shop, every house, had 
been looted … The market place was destroyed and deserted. There was 
not a kiosk in the entire ghost city that sold a Coke or a box of matches … 
There were corpses and skeletons lying about picked bare by dogs and 
vultures” (Khan, 2000, 14). 
 
Prunier describes Rwandans as being like the ‘living dead’.  
 
“Psychologically, many people were in various states of shock and many 
women who had been raped were now pregnant with unwanted children. 
Most of the infrastructure had been brutally looted, as though a horde of 
human locusts had fallen on the country. Door and window frames had 
been removed, electric switches had been pried off from the walls and 
there were practically no vehicles left in running order except RPF military 
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ones. There was no running water and electricity in the towns, and on the 
hills there was no one to harvest the ripe crops” (2000, 297). 
 
It was this that the RPF army was left with in July, 1994; a country devastated of 
people and resources. Khan describes that within only a few months, Kigali 
started to take steps towards revival, as people began to trickle out of their hiding 
places and large numbers of Burundian Tutsi  “could be seen driving around in 
their swanky cars” (2000, 29). While the press and humanitarian aid organizations 
concentrated their attention and resources on the millions of refugees outside of 
the country, little aid or assistance was being offered to those within.  
 
Khan describes month by month, the development of Rwanda from a horrific 
country of the dead, to a living, active, and fast-growing nation. Markets, shops 
and cafes started to open, farmhouses were reoccupied and ambassadors 
returned to their posts (2000, 47). By November, a mere six months after the end 
of the genocide, towns and communes were alive again, with houses being rebuilt 
and schools reopened (2000, 81).  
 
However, it was near impossible for the government to make much headway. 
When the RPF took over governance, almost all offices, communications, 
electricity, water and roads had been damaged and destroyed. The previous 
government had walked out with all state money, resources and administrative 
systems (Khan, 2000, 55). Apart from this, the entire judicial system had been 
destroyed. “There were no judges, prosecutors, magistrates, court officials, 
gendarmes or police. There were no prison officials to guard the growing number 
of prisoners. Nor were there buildings that could serve as courts” (Khan, 2000, 
56). 
 
Under these circumstances, the international community placed enormous 
demands on the new government to fulfill certain standards in order to receive 
funding, including certain political conditions. Yet, there was no funding in order to 
satisfy these demands (Prunier, 1995; Khan, 2000). Tensions increased between 
the new government and the international community. Apart from this, the RPF 
now in power saw the international community as partially responsible for what 




From the start, the new government was presented as a return to the Arusha 
Accords of 1993, which included shared governance. They called this the 
Government of National Unity. But they veered from these Accords by giving the 
seats that were appointed for the former reigning party, the MRND, to the RPF. 
Further, they created the post of vice-president, giving this position to the RPF 
leader, Paul Kagame. Pasteur Bizimungu, both a Hutu and a member of the RPF, 
was appointed president (Prunier, 1995, 328, 9). The new government, according 
to Khan, saw themselves as holding the moral high ground for having stopped 
genocide and, when in power, sticking to the Arusha Accords. Further, they saw 
themselves as standing alone in rebuilding a devastated country, and wanting to 
do it their way, not the way of the international community, understandably, after 
having been largely abandoned by the international community during the 
genocide. 
 
From the start, the new government adopted an ideology of national unity. This 
ideology insisted on the idea that there was no longer Hutu, Tutsi or Twa but only 
Rwandans (Des Forges, 1999, 851). This was politically necessary in a country 
where the RPF found themselves in the minority, and where hundreds of 
thousands of old case-load refugees were streaming into the country. (The term 
‘old case load’ refugee is commonly used in the literature to refer to Tutsis who 
became refugees prior to 1994 (in 1959, 1972 and 1973, for example). ‘New case-
load’ refugee refers to Hutus who became refugees shortly after the genocide, in 
July, 1994). Further, it was in line with RPF ideology from the early RANU days 
where ‘Rwanda for all Rwandans’ was a foundational philosophy.  
 
Apart from the fact that some 150 000 mostly Tutsi homes had been destroyed, 
hundreds of thousands of old case-load refugees were seeking a place to live in a 
country already over-populated. In this situation, it was not uncommon that the 
homes of either the fleeing Hutu refugees or deceased Tutsi were ‘taken’ by these 
newcomers and survivors (Prunier, 1995, 324, 5). Prunier describes how some 
400 000 old case-load refugees had entered Rwanda by November, 1994, 
entering a country devastated of resources and infrastructure (1995, 325). Each 
group of refugees came from different countries, the vast majority never having 
lived in Rwanda at all, and brought with them their unique cultures and styles 
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(Prunier, 1995, 325). Prunier describes the Zairians as the ones with the least 
money, the Ugandans as the ones who planned their entry to Rwanda the best, 
and the Burundians as the most aggressive and arrogant (Prunier, 1995, 126).  
 
Writes Dallaire,  
 
“Increasingly, we could see the immaculate cars of Burundian returnees or 
the oxcarts of the Ugandan Tutsi refugees in the streets of Kigali, as 
members of the scattered diaspora took up residence throughout the better 
parts of the capital, sometimes even throwing out legitimate owners who 
had survived the war and genocide” (2003, 476). 
 
Thus, added to the tensions between fleeing Hutu refugees who were being 
encouraged to return, survivors of genocide who were desperately trying to piece 
their lives back together, and Hutus who had chosen to remain in Rwanda, there 
were hundreds of thousands of people new to Rwanda, who nevertheless felt they 
had a strong claim to its land and resources.  Yet the new government was 
welcoming people back, inviting all Rwandans to help rebuild their country. The 
message they were sending was one of national unity, of all Rwandans standing 
together for a common cause.  
 
In the new Rwanda, a new history, a new story was needed to counter that of the 
extremist Hutu Power. As Pottier describes, the RPF walked into a country which 
they could reinvent (2002, 109). The primary focus of the new government was to 
reinvent a Rwanda without ethnic categories. The presiding message of the new 
government was and still is, “There is no Hutu and Tutsi, there are only 
Rwandans” (Des Forges, 1999).  This reinvention of Rwandan identity would need 
to be built on a retelling of history. Where Hutu extremists had painted a picture of 
Tutsi masters subjugating the Hutu masses, the new government developed their 
history on the foundations of a harmonic, idyllic pre-colonial Rwanda (Des Forges, 
1999; Pottier, 2002, 111). This picture of Rwanda, as described in chapter two, 
would allow the government to encourage Rwandans to return to the Rwanda of 
before colonialism. It would also allow them to place most of the blame for ethnic 
division squarely on the shoulders of the colonialists and colonial policy (Des 
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Forges, 1999, 855). The following section will examine some of the narratives that 
were silenced to make room for this new dominant narrative. 
 
4.3. The silenced narratives 
 
In this section we will look at some of the marginalized narratives. The first of 
these is that of the mass exodus of refugees into the DRC. This will be followed 
by the narratives of Hutu within and outside Rwanda who began to feel 
increasingly voiceless.  
 
4.3.1. The refugee exodus 
 
That two million refugees streamed over the borders of Rwanda into neighbouring 
countries, and the DRC in particular, is no secret. That refugees suffered and died 
in their thousands from cholera, hunger and fatigue is neither hidden. That ex-
genocidaires intimidated those in the refugee camps is openly known. But what 
happened after the media spotlight found other events to shine its attention on, 
some two years after genocide, remains the unspoken story of a few survivors 
scattered across the globe. 
 
Between April 7 and July 14, 1994, the RPF achieved military victory after military 
victory against former government forces (the FAR), driving them first towards the 
north, and then right out of Rwanda, over the border into the DRC. What no one 
had prepared for was that these genocidal forces would drive with them hundreds 
of thousands of civilians in a mass exodus rarely seen before. Prunier describes 
how, as the interim government disintegrated, thousands of people streamed out 
of Kigali on foot, either to the northwest, ‘which was seen as the last government 
bunker’ or the French ‘safe humanitarian zone’. “Many people now moving had 
fled several times before during RPF offensives in 1992 and 1993. For them, the 
RPF generated enormous fear and visions of devil-like fighters engaged in 
massive killings everywhere. But the fear was such that even some Tutsi were 
running from their ‘saviours’” (1995, 294). He describes the crowd of some 300 
000 being a mixture of ‘dispirited interehamwe who did not even bother to kill the 
few Tutsi who walked alongside them’, FAR troops, civil servants and their 
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families, peasants, businessmen, abandoned children, priests, nuns and even 
madmen (1995, 195). 
 
Khan describes the scene at one of the largest refugee camps these hundreds of 
thousands of people would arrive at. “The road from the airport was full of 
starving, sick and dying refugees. Scores of dead bodies lay strewn about rotting 
in the sun, with people simply stepping over the dead carcasses … Dead children 
lay next to mothers who were also dying of cholera, hunger or simply exhaustion” 
(Khan, 2000, 33). Prunier further describes scenes of corpses falling into the lake, 
spreading the cholera epidemic that had traveled with the fleeing refugees (1995, 
302).  
 
But one of the foremost issues in the camp was that of security.  Apart from 
several hundred thousand civilian, there were several thousand known genocidal 
leaders amongst the refugees. This ‘criminal element’ in the refugee camps would 
result not only in continued suffering for the masses of civilians but in eventual 
war that would spill over into several countries in Central Africa for at least 
another decade. Prunier quotes a former leader during the genocide as saying, 
“Even if the RPF has a won a military victory, it will not have the power. It only has 
the bullets, we have the population” (1995, 314).  Soon after the establishments of 
the camps, it became apparent to humanitarian aid workers that former genocidal 
leaders had taken over control of the camps, organizing the masses of refugees 
into the same commune structures as in Rwanda, guaranteeing that the same 
extremists would hold power and have influence over the civilians (Prunier, 1995, 
315; McCullum, 1995, 43; Khan, 2000, 72). Apart from this, Khan describes a 
Human Rights Watch report that cited clear evidence for the training and 
recruiting of refugees by the former genocidal leaders with the support of the DRC 
government (2000, 141). These trained forces would undertake cross-border raids 
into Rwanda, causing further insecurity within the country.    
 
It was thus strongly to the advantage of former leaders to hold onto the civilian 
refugees, and they did this by continuing the genocide-fear-propaganda 
campaign. Ian McCullum describes how many refugees “believed the propaganda 
that the Tutsi-dominated RPF would exterminate them. Radio Mille Collines, now 
on wheels, pumped out stories of massacres, although few could be confirmed by 
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the UN … Most of all, the people were cowed by the intimidation and terrorism 
practiced by the former government and its army and militias … Those who tried 
to return to Rwanda were beaten, tortured or killed” (McCullum, 1995, 55).  
 
Very soon after the new government was in place, efforts were on the way to 
encourage refugees to return to Rwanda. Many felt that the only way forward in 
terms of reconciliation would be for all Rwandans to be together in one country 
and for justice to be meted out. However, the bulk of the two million refugees in 
the DRC, Tanzania, and Burundi refused to return. Suggested reasons for this 
included that the conditions in the camp were better than what many of the 
refugees had ever experienced back home, that they were guilty and therefore 
afraid to face justice, or that they were genuinely afraid of the revenge of the RPF 
and Tutsi. 
 
Khan describes how in the refugee camps, refugees were guaranteed food for the 
children, medical assistance, schools, and even in some camps, cinemas, night 
clubs, churches and educational and upliftment activities (2000, 146). Both he and 
McCullum write how some two million dollars were poured into the refugee camps 
by international donors every month, ensuring the absolute comfort and ease of 
the refugees (McCullum, 1995, 88; Khan, 2000, 146). However, the stories of 
refugees themselves differ with this somewhat. Umutesi speaks of receiving only 
enough food for one week on a bi-weekly basis, resulting in malnutrition amongst 
children. She describes how many refugees were forced to hire themselves out to 
the locals to supplement their diet, receiving a handful of grain in return for a full 
days labour. Provision of heating wood was also insufficient, resulting in refugees 
scrounging every piece of usable resource in the surrounding area. She mentions 
the humiliation of having to wash her rags during periods in full view of those 
around her, and the rivulets of blood that ran with water between their temporary 
shacks (2000, 85).  
 
Apart from the physical challenges, she speaks of the suffering of the refugees at 
their own uselessness. She describes the frustration of someone else deciding 
how much you will eat and when, and having to beg for extra when the little you 
are given is not enough. “To forget their uselessness, refugees threw themselves 
headlong into drink and debauchery” (2000, 83). Pottier also counters the idea of 
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well-fed refugees in describing how the food distributed was not culturally 
appropriate – maize grain, which is costly and difficult to ground – was the staple 
diet, whereas Rwandans were accustomed to cassava (2002, 80). The reason 
why refugees may have given the impression of being well-fed, argues Prunier, is 
that the top leadership was well-fed, having taken over food distribution from 
humanitarian aid workers, ensuring that most of it would be channelled to 
themselves at the expense of the greater civilian population (1995, 315). 
 
As small numbers of refugees trickled back and time passed, the growing feeling 
was that the refugees remaining were guilty of genocide.  Pottier writes, “After 
some 700 000 refugees returned to Rwanda in November 1996, and the US 
military declared only ‘warring parties remained’, Rwandan officials declared the 
crises was over” (2002, 148). Those who remained were described as extremists 
and their camp followers. Pottier describes how the refugees were regarded by 
the Rwandan leadership and the international community as “one mass who 
spoke with one (extremist) voice. They were collectively guilty, collectively 
disposable” (2002, 149). There was even the sense that the cholera, death and 
suffering of the millions of Hutu in the refugee camps were their ‘just punishment’ 
for their supposed collective participation during the genocide (Prunier, 1995, 
303).  
 
By making the refugee mass out to be a collectivity, a guilty Hutu mass, Pottier 
argues that aid agencies did not take into consideration the north-south divide, the 
difference between respected leaders and self-appointed leaders, and that there 
were skilled and able people amongst the refugees who wanted to take an active 
part in their plight rather than just be dependencies (2002, 131,2). Even if not all 
refugees were seen as guilty, they were all seen as ‘hostages, collectively trapped 
under the claw of the unrelenting extremists’ (2002, 132). 
 
Refugee accounts communicate a deep sense of fear amongst refugees about 
what would happen to them were they to return to Rwanda which impacted their 
choice to remain in refugee camps. McCullum writes,  
 
“There is no doubt that the calamity was of apocalyptic proportions and that 
people were petrified by the advancing RPF army, which had by then taken 
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about half the country. ‘If Tutsis catch you, they slit your skin from head to 
foot and skin you alive,’ said one refugee. In fact, aid workers fishing 
bodies from the swollen Kagera River reported that the corpses bore the 
same brutal wounds as those inflicted on people slashed to death in 
churches inside Rwanda” (1994, 43).  
 
He recounts stories of Anglican bishops not wanting to return, saying that they 
knew of and had spoken to people who had gone to Rwanda only to return to the 
refugee camps wounded, and with stories of revenge killings and danger 
(McCullum, 1994, 83). 
 
Khan further describes the continual mixed messages regarding whether it was 
safe to return to Rwanda or not. The UNHCR was reporting that the ‘new 
government is enough in charge to reasonably guarantee [the refugees] safety’ 
(2001, 132). Other reports were saying that security in Rwanda had deteriorated, 
and there were arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment. There was a doubling back of 
returning refugees back into the DRC. Also, many would-be returnees knew that 
their homes and businesses had been occupied by the ‘old case-load’ refugees, 
Tutsis who had come to Rwanda from abroad after the genocide, perceiving it as 
now being ‘their’ country.  
 
The fear the refugees experienced was largely seen as either the result of the 
genocidal leaders propaganda campaign, or else the refugees own distortions of 
the truth. More and more, the mass of refugees was painted to be collectively 
guilty. Pottier argues that this story of ‘the guilty refugees’ was one fabricated and 
sold by the RPF to the international community to give the RPF a free hand in 
dealing with the refugees as they saw fit (2002,130).  
 
Whether the international community bought the story as much as Pottier claims 
they did, they remained largely inactive in doing anything about the refugee 
problem, apart from doling out enormous amounts of money for humanitarian aid 
in the first couple of years, and then forgetting about the plight of these refugees 
after that. In the light of this inactivity, Khan mentions how the Rwandan 
government made continued noises that they “might be obliged to reach across 
the border and ‘sort out the killers themselves’” (2000, 141). He refers to a speech 
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Kagame made to the effect that it would take them only a couple of days to ‘clean-
up’ the intimidators in the camps (2000, 142).  
  
After 1996, Umutesi describes how the refugee camps in the DRC were forcibly 
closed down, while at the same time the country was swept into a confusion of 
uprisings and civil war. She describes her harrowing trek across the DRC, while 
being pursued, she claims, by the RPF who wanted to eliminate every surviving 
refugee. At this point, Umutesi describes herself as being forgotten by the 
international community, labeled a genocidaire, and deserving of the hell she 
found herself in (2000, 102).  Some tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of 
refugees were killed either in stampedes, from hunger and disease or as a result 
of direct violence meted out upon them by the RPF and various factions within the 
DRC who wanted the camps closed and perceived the refugees as a threat 
(Umutesi, 2000; Pottier, 2001).  
 
The narrative of the ‘cleaning-up’ of the camps remains a largely silent one. 
Further, the many stories of suffering of what are referred to as ‘new case-load’ 
refugees are also silent as they are said to be incomparable, even unimportant, in 
the light of genocide. But the implications of these stories, and the suffering and 
agony they hold, remaining unspoken, unheard, and unacknowledged may 
become a block in the process of healing and reconciliation. 
 
4.3.2. Counter narratives 
 
While on the one hand the government was working hard to rebuild Rwanda, 
amidst the chaos in the DRC, on the other, critics of the government were starting 
to voice concern. In a report on Rwanda over the period of 1998 and 1999, Filip 
Reyntjens describes the growing critique against a government that was starting 
to look more and more like a dictatorship (1999, 6). He speaks of the 
‘Tutsification’ of the state machinery and he writes that, “One does not have to 
suffer from ethnic fundamentalism in order to see that a regime claiming to fight 




By August, 1995, the Government of National Unity started to disintegrate when 
Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu left the cabinet along with the Interior 
Minister, Seth Sendashonga and three other ministers, four Hutu and one Tutsi. 
Sendashonga claimed having been threatened for criticizing RPF measures: 
“accusing [the RPA] of creating an atmosphere of tension and insecurity in the 
country. He quoted arbitrary arrests, the prison system and an oppressive attitude 
towards the majority community that, in his view, were reversing the process of 
reconciliation in the country” (Khan, 2000, 148). Twagiramungu claimed there was 
‘a government within a government’ that made all the crucial decisions.  
 
Amidst this political critique there was a growing concern with regard to possible 
human rights abuses committed by the RPF and the new Rwandan Patriotic 
Army. The RPF was heralded the savior of Rwanda for bringing an end to 
genocide, something the international community and United Nations failed to do. 
But along with this heroic act also came less praiseworthy reports. The massacres 
of former government agents and employees, along with their families, at Byumba 
and Ngarama are perhaps the best known (Prunier, 1995, 359; Des Forges, 1999; 
Dallaire, 2001, 378). Des Forges describes how many of those Hutu who did not 
flee with the former government to the DRC, were rounded up in stadiums and 
murdered (1999, 801). A commonly known massacre event is that of the three 
bishops and ten priests who were killed by RPF soldiers in Kabgayi (Des Forges, 
1999; Dallaire, 2001, 414). Des Forges reports how people were told that they 
would receive essential foods if they would assemble at a public place. Once 
there, the killing sprees would start (Des Forges, 1999, 802).  
 
Apart from massacres, summary and arbitrary executions and assassinations 
were also common. People seen as a threat to the RPF were often killed at their 
homes, with former government leaders and officials particularly targeted (Des 
Forges, 1999, 806). Some people mysteriously ‘disappeared’.  Dallaire makes 
mention of rumours of secret interrogations at checkpoints for returnees. And 
when UN personnel saw a truckload of returnees being waved to one side, over a 
hill, at an RPF roadblock and then were prevented from observing what was going 
on behind the hill, Dallaire saw this as “personal proof that Kagame was allowing 
the security checks of returnees to go beyond what had been discussed with me 




Prunier describes the high level of confusion in Rwanda after the genocide, where 
fresh corpses were dumped with old corpses, making evidence for RPF violence 
difficult to ascertain (1995, 360). In fact he describes a scenario where there were 
‘so many unburied corpses lying around’ that ‘a fair amount of killing could easily 
be passed off as part of the general mayhem’ (1995, 361).  
 
Further, humanitarians as well as the UN were systematically denied entrance to 
certain parts of the country. International Red Cross staff, refusing to close down 
their hospital in Nyanza, were repeatedly threatened until they gave in. In this 
way, access and information were controlled by the RPF, compromising the ability 
of human rights observers to do their job, and bringing to question what the RPF 
was up to in these closed areas (Des Forges, 1999, 810).   
 
The RPF leadership maintained that all these acts of violence were random acts 
by undisciplined soldiers, particularly new recruits from within Rwanda who had 
survived genocide, and would be dealt with internally. Dallaire makes mention of 
how this was indeed the case, with guilty soldiers often being summarily shot 
(1999, 344). However, the RPF denied and still deny the growing evidence that 
seems to point to possible systematic, planned killing from higher levels of 
leadership.  
 
A damning report in terms of human rights abuses came from Robert Gersony 
and a team of two others, who were undertaking research for the UNHCR into 
speeding up the repatriation of refugees.  Their report stated that the RPF had 
engaged in “clearly systematic murders and persecution of the Hutu population in 
certain parts of the country” (Des Forges, 1999, 705). “They reported massacres 
following meetings convoked by the authorities, murders committed by assailants 
who went from house to house, and the hunting down and murder of people in 
hiding” (Des Forges, 1999, 705).The Gersony report estimated that between April 
and August of 1994, between 25 000 and 45 000 people had been killed (Prunier, 
1995, 360; Des Forges, 1999, 706). 
 
This report was made available to the United Nations leadership, who immediately 
briefed the Rwandan government on the findings.  Khan describes in his book 
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how Gersony’s report was taken very seriously, and that an independent UN 
research team found his claims unfounded. Khan revealed these further 
investigations to Gersony, who apparently “expressed his complete satisfaction at 
the way his report had been received by UNAMIR and the Rwandan government” 
(Khan, 2000, 54). From here on, the Gersony report was suppressed. Des Forges 
writes that when attempting to gain access to the report the reply was: “We wish 
to inform you that the ‘Gersony Report does not exist” (Des Forges, 1999, 707). 
Khan diplomatically suggests that rather than RPF arranged massacres there was 
an increase of violence from Burundian Tutsi towards returning Rwandan Hutu 
refugees; he even suggests that some higher leader in the RPA could have 
played a role in this, but he refuses to give any sway to the idea that it could have 
been preplanned from the top levels of the RPA (2000, 55). 
 
4.4. Some concluding thoughts on Rwanda after genocide 
 
The greatest challenge in the new Rwanda has been and still is the question of 
ethnicity. Mahmood Mamdani points out that Rwanda can either become a divided 
state with a Hutuland and a Tutsiland, or a union with bipolar political identities, or 
it could “forge a political identity that transcends Hutu and Tutsi” (2002, 265). It is 
this latter option which the new government has attempted.  
 
However, the way they have done this includes rewriting history in such a way 
that it favours a particular perspective. Further, they have discouraged any 
dialogue or debate that would counter or question their ideology. Through 
developing specific laws, they have quieted dissidents and disallowed ulterior 
voices in their quest for national unity. As one government official commented to 
me, “It will take time to get used to the fact that we are no longer Hutu and Tutsi 
but all Rwandan. It will take time, but people will get used to it” (Personal 
interview, Kigali, June, 2005). 
 
Filip Reytjens points out the conflict between the new governments’ rewritten 
history and that of opposition parties. He describes a document put forward by 
one opposition party that insisted that even before the colonial period, there was 
no unity in Rwanda, that the events of 1959 truly were a revolution that kindled the 
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idea of democracy, that the monarchy rather than external factors undermined the 
country, and that the allegation considering all Hutu to be genocidaires 
contributed to the insecurity in Rwanda (1999, 6). Reyntjens describes how these 
claims were very politically incorrect in the eyes of the new government, who 
advocated the exact opposite and that the opposition parties were compelled to 
rethink their position (1999, 6).  
 
This chapter has described how the new government has embraced unity and 
reconciliation and has tried to instill this in all Rwandans through writing a new 
narrative. The following chapter will explore Rwanda between 1999 and 2009, to 
see if Rwandans are indeed ‘getting used to’ a united identity and how the 
process of healing and reconciliation is unfolding after the devastation and 




CHAPTER 5: RWANDA TODAY: 1999-2009 
 
As was described in the previous chapter, the divisive narratives of Rwanda’s 
history continue to play a significant role in Rwandan society today. The inferiority-
superiority identity complex, competing versions of history, competing versions of 
how to understand the genocide and a continued sense of inequality and injustice 
pose challenges to the possibility of sustainable reconciliation. As the Rwandan 
government has continued its amazing spate of development and has had to meet 
the challenge of bringing justice and reconciliation to an almost destroyed nation, 
we will see both stories of hope and despair.  
 
This chapter will look at some of the national narratives in Rwanda in the past ten 
years. It will examine the government’s vision, its National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission, laws and policies and the judicial process for dealing 
with the vast numbers of genocide related crimes, called gacaca. It will then 
consider some alternative narratives from genocide survivors, perpetrators, Hutus 
in the country, Hutus abroad and human rights organizations, some of who are 
critical of developments in the country. Lastly, it will explore some of the efforts on 
the ground, by churches, organizations and communities to bring about 
reconciliation on a grassroots level. Along with the previous three chapters, this 
chapter will shed light on the specific issues that need to be considered in terms 
of developing a framework for sustainable healing and reconciliation in the 
Rwandan context. 
 
5.1. National narratives 
 
From the outset the Rwandan government called itself the Government of 
National Unity and Reconciliation, declaring its intent to move beyond ethnic 
division towards inclusivity. In a research report for the African Studies Centre, 
Arthur Molenaar comments on the ‘profound influence of central authority’ in 
Rwandan society and that positive policy can have a far reaching impact on all 
levels of society (2005, 48). He then describes the official national discourse 
which has a strong emphasis on ‘abandoning ethnicity’. This is done through 
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rewriting history and educating citizens in the governments’ vision at public 
gatherings and through the media (2005, 52). The following section will unpack 
this national strategy, describing the efforts of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission, gacaca and the process of democracy and 
development between 1999 and 2009. 
 
5.1.1. National unity and reconciliation  
 
In section 4.2, some of the challenges to the new government were described. In 
1999, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was launched 
by the government to assist in the process of reconciliation in Rwanda.  NURC 
represents the government’s policy and action in terms of reconciliation and 
national unity. 
 
At its inception, NURC ran a country-wide survey which asked the following two 
questions: what do you think is the cause of genocide and what do you think are 
the strategies to meet the challenge of unity and reconciliation? The main causes 
of genocide were listed to be bad leadership, a distorted history, poverty and a 
culture of impunity. NURC then developed the following strategies in response to 
this: civic education, the writing of an objective history, supporting community 
initiatives, and conflict management and peace building activities (Personal 
interview, Kigali, January, 2007). NURC’s official aim is “organizing and 
supporting national round tables on the promotion of unity and reconciliation 
amongst Rwandans” (IJR, 2004).  
Apart from countless activities related to the above-mentioned around the country, 
NURC has published various papers on reconciliation, the position of women and 
land reform in Rwanda. They have also established ingando, which are solidarity 
camps initially for the purpose of reeducating ex-prisoners and reintegrating them 
into society. Today, every Rwandan is encouraged to attend ingando, and they 
are mandatory for anyone wanting to enter tertiary education.  
 
Public debates, workshops and conferences as well as research papers and 
educational syllabuses have been developed to educate people in principles of 
good governance, human rights and responsibilities, citizenship, democracy and 
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the like. During the civic education activities, a representative from NURC 
described how they teach things like: “You are not from Chad, Hutu; you are not 
from Ethiopia, Tutsi; you are not from the forest, Twa. Even taking into 
consideration migrations, for each one of you your heritage is Rwanda” (Personal 
interview, Kigali, January, 2007). The primary goal, however, according to the 
NURC representative, is to take Rwandans to the place where they share the 
same understanding of Rwanda’s past, the reasons for conflict and the way 
forward in the future. The NURC representative strongly emphasized the 
importance of a same understanding and a same thinking, arguing that when 
everyone is thinking in the same way, there will be no more division, and there will 
be unity and reconciliation. 
 
Similarly, Arthur Molenaar quotes a government official who was responsible for a 
public gathering in his province as saying,  
 
“The goal is to make people have the same opinions. It is very important 
that people in Rwanda think the same way because we need unity in this 
country. What we hope to achieve is that after a meeting, 75% of the 
people leave with the same mindset. Those people will also talk with other 
people so that we reach almost the entire population” (2005, 59),  
 
This is in line with the official government position which says that ethnic identity 
was the result of colonial constructionism and that it is time for Rwanda to return 
to how it was prior to colonialism, when there was unity, peace and harmony 
between all Rwandans.  As described by the NURC representative, the 
government would like to see all Rwandans accepting a united identity and a 
common understanding of history, the reasons for genocide and the way forward.  
 
5.1.2. Gacaca 
Directly after genocide, as was mentioned in chapter four, the entire judiciary 
system had been destroyed and the jails were filled with some 800 000 people (or 
one in four of the adult Rwandan population) awaiting trial. According to Molenaar, 
it may have taken up to 200 years to prosecute all prisoners using a classic 
system of justice (2005, 2). The government thus came up with an alternative, 
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gacaca. This Kinyarwandan word is said to mean ‘on the grass’ and is a grass-
roots form of justice that was used in Rwanda prior to colonialism. It is described 
as a community-based, restorative model of justice that involved communities 
sitting together, with both victim and perpetrator, to come up with possible 
solutions to the satisfaction of all parties. The result was normally along the lines 
of symbolic restitution and the restoring of the perpetrator into the community. The 
government adapted this model to address a modern day Rwanda with its unique 
challenges. 
The gacaca process started with the election of judges, normally respected 
members of a community, who were trained by, amongst others, the international 
legal NGO Avocaats Sans Frontiers (ASF). Community members then had to 
bring all the information they had to these judges who organized them into one of 
four categories. The Act on the Organization and Pursuits of Crimes of Genocide 
or Crimes Against Humanity of August 1996 created four categories of alleged 
criminals: Category 1 are planners, organizers and leaders of genocide, those 
who have acted in positions of authority, presumed infamous assassins and those 
alleged to have committed sexual crimes involving torture or rape; category 2 are 
co-perpetrators, or accomplices of voluntary homicide or violence with the 
intention to cause death or serious bodily harm leading to death; category 3 are 
perpetrators of serious bodily injury to others without intention to murder; category 
4 are perpetrators of crimes resulting in property damage. Gacaca courts have 
jurisdiction over the last two categories; those in higher categories are prosecuted 
before the national criminal courts. In 2005, weekly gacaca trials began to be held 
within communities across the country, with people coming together at a central 
point, carrying with them their benches or blankets and settling around the 
appointed judges.  
In many respects, though, it is far from the original model. Perhaps the key 
difference is that the model has shifted from a restorative one, where the 
perpetrators and their family would face the victim with their family and they 
together would discuss restitution, to a retributive one, where judges mete out 
punishment to the perpetrator. Perpetrators are promised a reduced sentence if 
they admit guilt and show remorse.  
 
91 
Gacaca remains a controversial issue within Rwanda although there is a sense 
that it has achieved what it set out to achieve in that the vast majority of cases 
have been recorded and tried. Communities have had the opportunity to give 
voice to what happened, survivors now know how friends and family died and 
where their dead are so that they can be buried and the details of how the 




The Ingando solidarity camps were established in 1996 to help Tutsi returnees 
reintegrate into Rwandan society. But with the establishment of NURC, Ingando 
became its responsibility and has targeted a far wider range of people, including 
ex-combatants, released perpetrators, teachers, students and leaders of a variety 
of backgrounds. The purpose of Ingando is to foster reconciliation through 
education in Rwandan history, why the genocide happened and Rwandan identity. 
Following NURC ideology, the central message is that ‘we are all Rwandan’ and 
need to accept the centralized understanding of Rwandan history. In addition, 
depending on the group targeted, there may also be education on HIV/Aids, basic 
military training and practical assistance in terms of reintegrating into civilian 
society. 
 
Most pertinent to the case studies considered in this thesis, is the Ingando camps 
for students entering tertiary education. Chi Mgbako describes three phases of 
these camps. The first two weeks are spent in activities encouraging critical 
thinking, followed by activities helping the students identify political, social and 
economic issues facing the nation. In the third phase, the students break up into 
small groups to debate and discuss solutions to the identified problems (2005, 
217). A strong emphasis during these student camps is ‘erasing the myth of ethnic 
difference’ and helping students see ‘there is no Hutu or Tutsi, we are all 
Rwandan’.  
 
Mgbako is critical of Ingando camps, describing them as political indoctrination 
camps in a context where such indoctrination has had dangerous consequences 
in the past (2005, 202). Although the students were encouraged to engage in 
 
92 
dialogue and asked for suggestions on how Ingando could be improved, Mgbako 
describes how students seemed reluctant to say anything critical or contrary to 
what they had been told by government officials presenting the lectures (2005, 
217). He suggests that Ingando would be more successful were the government 
to allow a greater degree of open dialogue about history and a higher degree of 
political pluralism (2005, 203). On the other hand, Ingando forms an important 
channel between released perpetrators and ex-combatants into daily life. It also 
provides a necessary opportunity for public debate around critical issues in 
Rwanda 
 
5.1.4. Democracy and development 
 
In an interview that can be found on the Rwandan governments’ official website, 
President Paul Kagame describes democracy as a process that needs to be 
carefully guided. In 2000, he argued that political parties needed to be suspended 
during the transitional period so as to avoid politics along ethnic lines. He 
describes how the government has been “been moving systematically and 
deliberately, making sure we lay a firm foundation”. 
 
Proponents of the government appreciate the government’s clear position and 
decisiveness in bringing about their vision. Opponents believe this vision to be 
close to brainwashing, enforcing all Rwandans to hold ‘the same’ view regardless 
of what the truth or the diversity of opinions might be.  However, in a country 
where literacy is around 69%, with only 53% of children enrolled in schools, a high 
HIV/Aids rate and few resources, some would say the country needs to be run 
tightly (USAID, 2005). USAID reports that there has been an increase in citizen 
participation in government affairs over the past few years due to government 
encouragement (2005, 2). 
 
Alongside the national narrative of reconciliation is the narrative of development. 
Countless newspaper and magazine articles within Rwanda and internationally 
speak of the Rwandan governments focus on development, particularly in the 
area of IT. In an interview with President Kagame in the Rwandan magazine 
Enterprise, he speaks of the necessity to develop human capacity and physical 
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infrastructure. 16.5% of total public expenditure is channeled towards education 
(2009, 8). The June, 2009, edition of Rwanda Dispatch describes Rwanda’s ‘e-
Dream’ of development through IT. In this magazine, Kagame writes an article in 
which he encourages the country to develop itself. “We appreciate support from 
the outside, but it should be support for what we intend to achieve ourselves. No 
one should pretend that they care about our nation more than we do, or assume 
they know what is good for us better than we do ourselves” (2009, 10). Alongside 
this strong rhetoric is tangible action in the form of policy decisions that encourage 
development. This includes supporting entrepreneurship and innovation, the 
adoption of English as the national language, installing fibre optic cables across 
the country for wireless internet access, and brokering deals that allow Rwanda’s 
greatest exports such as coffee to be sold to the ‘world’s most demanding 
customer’s’ at a high price (2009, 10).  
 
These national narratives of reconciliation, justice, democracy and development 
are countered, however, by narratives of fear, voicelessness and dictatorial 
control. The following section will explore some of these less heard narratives as 
this will bring to light some of the factors that need to be considered in developing 
a model for sustainable healing and reconciliation. 
 
5.2. Alternative narratives 
 
The alternative narratives come from a range of sources. Survivors of genocide 
have become a distinct and organized group in Rwanda over the past ten years, 
feeling they need to protect their rights in a country which has been overrun by 
Rwandans from the diaspora. Many survivors feel the country has moved on 
without compensating them for their suffering. Further, many have lived in fear as 
there have been reprisal killings, partly triggered by the gacaca process. 
Perpetrators and released prisoners have their own complaints. Some of them 
claim to have been unjustly accused. For those who were guilty, reintegration into 
their communities is a painful process, especially as in their absence, others may 
have moved into their homes and taken their land. Hutus who somehow managed 
to escape involvement in genocide are nonetheless collectively implicated and it is 
difficult for them to reintegrate into a country that has changed so significantly in 
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such a short space of time. Lastly, human rights organizations have followed 
activities in Rwanda closely and point to many human rights violations that have 
taken place over the past ten years. The following section will explore some of 
these narratives. Although they may not all be a full or accurate reflection of 
Rwanda or the government, they give insight into the mindsets of many 
Rwandans today, helping us understand what factors may stand in the way of 
healing and reconciliation processes.  
 
Highlighting the negatives is a risky endeavor as it can lead to cynicism and an 
unbiased dismissal of all the significant and important good that has taken place. 
But as Eduard Jordaan writes in an article around the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) peer review process, being sufficiently critical is important 
for development. Jordaan argues that the Rwandan government is not sufficiently 
self-critical with regards to the state of economic, political, social, and corporate 
governance in the country. In his abstract he states:  
 
“This article examines Rwanda’s evaluation of its political governance 
during this first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version of this 
country’s self-assessment report. After sketching the compromised political 
environment in which the report was written, it is indicated how this rosy 
report inadequately addresses a number of serious political problems in 
Rwanda, such as Rwanda’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the inadequate separation of powers in the Rwandan political 
system, tensions in Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and 
parliamentary elections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extent 
Rwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the final version of its 
self-assessment report, or is censured in the subsequent stages of the peer 
review process, it is concluded that the greater the failure to do either, the 
greater the doubt that will linger over the value of the African peer-review 
exercise” (Jordaan, 2006, 333).  
 




5.2.1. Political opposition 
 
In December 1999, “some forty university students, most or all of them Tutsi, left 
for Uganda in denouncing the "dictatorial" nature of the government” (HRW, 
2000). Human Rights Watch describes people being thrown into jail without trial 
for criticizing government, and especially for holding ‘inappropriate political ideas’ 
around returning to the monarchy. While this was going on inside the country, the 
governments’ army was fighting in the DRC, “where its troops committed 
numerous violations of international humanitarian law” (HRW, 2000). Numerous 
people in Rwanda were killed for being ‘insurgents’, others were jailed without trial 
and tortured in military facilities. In mid-2000, “several bodies were sighted floating 
down the Akagera River, and other persons were said to have ‘disappeared’” 
(HRW, 2000). Masses of Hutu fled Rwanda in fear of their lives, including local 
and international journalists who felt themselves to be in danger for criticizing the 
government.  
 
In 2000, “The speaker of the national assembly, the prime minister, and the 
president all quit their posts under pressure within the first three months of the 
year, leaving a shrinking circle of power holders in control of the Rwandan 
government” the HRW report states (1999, 21). At this point Kagame took over 
the presidency, a post HRW alleges he had held from behind the scenes from the 
beginning. Due to a reshuffle of cabinet, in violation of the Arusha Accords, the 
RPF now held ten of eighteen seats. In a report on Rwanda five years after 
genocide, Filip Reyntjens writes, “The regime, faced with its internal contradictions 
and political impasse, however, remained closed to all proposals for debate. On 
the contrary, the regime’s key word remains ‘control’ and its way of governing the 
political space is still very military in nature” (1999, 21).    
 
Most of the human rights organizations active in Rwanda are critical of the level of 
control the Rwandan government, and particularly its president, maintains over all 
the affairs of the country. In an article critiquing international criminal tribunals, 
Helena Cobban says the following about the situation in post-genocide Rwanda: 
 
“Post-genocide Rwanda has been dedicated in its pursuit of war crimes 
prosecutions. But it has borne that country little fruit. At one point when 
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Rwanda was still trying to prosecute all those accused of participating in 
the 1994 genocide, more than 130,000 of its 8 million citizens were 
detained. Yet President Paul Kagame has also kept all major elements of 
society, including the judiciary, the government, and the media, completely 
under his thumb. That undermines the rule of law in Rwanda, no matter 
how dedicated the regime is to seeking justice. In 1994, Freedom House 
gave Rwanda a “Not Free” rating for its political rights and civil liberties— 
basic components of the rule of law anywhere. In 2004, Rwanda received 
the same rating” (2006, 27). 
 
A report from the international NGO, Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 
describes how in 2002 a criminal law was passed that barred "any propaganda of 
ethnic, regional, racial or divisive character or based on any other form of 
divisionism." Public incitement to discrimination or divisionism is punishable by up 
to five years in prison, heavy fines, or both (2004, 2). Because the boundaries of 
this law remain unclear it has easily been used in response to a variety of 
scenarios, particularly against anyone who might be seen to be critical of the 
government. HRW describes how political opponents of the RPF and 
nongovernmental organizations have been accused of divisionism (2005, 2). In 
2005, the Senate apparently commissioned a study to identify 'genocidal ideology' 
amongst NGO's and scholars. At risk was anyone who had expressed any doubt 
as to the gacaca process or the way the government does things. As a result, 
HRW describes how NGO's have tailored their activities to avoid 'confrontation 
with authorities’ (2005, 2). 
 
The result of this law has been to increase the fear on all sides. Those who 
already experienced feeling voiceless under the divisionism law are even more 
afraid to speak out their opinions. Perpetrators that have been released fear being 
falsely accused of genocidal ideology by neighbours who resent their release into 
the community. Survivors experience an increased fear as they hear of more and 
more people being identified by the authorities for apparently spreading 'genocide 
ideology'.  As HRW states, “With repeated official statements that such ideas 
must still be feared, survivors are more afraid, continually reminded that their very 
existence as members of the Tutsi ethnic group may suffice to expose them again 




A problem with the strict law of genocide ideology is that it disallows any group to 
be favoured over any other on the basis of ethnicity. This works in the disfavour of 
the Batwa, a minority ethnic group in Rwanda (some 30 000 people) who have 
been severely marginalised throughout Rwandan history. HRW reports that 
“authorities refused official recognition to the Community of Indigenous Peoples in 
Rwanda (CAURWA), which defends the rights of the Batwa minority, saying its 
ethnic focus violated the constitution” (2007, 3). In a personal interview with a 
representative from NURC, it was stated that this was a problem the government 
acknowledged but that in order to be consistent in terms of insisting that ethnic 
groups do not exist this would need to be true for the Twa as well (Personal 
interview, Kigali, January, 2007). 
 
5.3.2. Survivor fears 
 
HRW reports that in November, 2006, a genocide survivor and nephew of a 
gacaca court judge was killed, followed by reprisal killings of eight other people 
(2007, 1). The report states that “in recent years dozens of genocide survivors 
and others involved in the gacaca process have been killed” (2007, 1). Numbers 
remain vague but one figure suggests 160 survivors having been murdered since 
2000 (2007, 1).  A gacaca judge said that in communities where only one or two 
remaining survivors were left they were sometimes murdered by those accused, 
as they were the only remaining witnesses of what had happened (Personal 
interview, Kigali, January, 2007). This has left survivors in continued fear of 
perpetrators, and of the gacaca process, which will force them to tell the truth of 
what they know. The government response has been to establish an office of 
witness protection but according to HRW their work has been hampered as they 
are based in Kigali whereas most of the incidents occur in rural Rwanda (2007, 
10). Ibuka, an outspoken organization supporting survivor rights, has suggested 
that it will take action where necessary to protect its members (HRW, 2007, 11).   
 
A Penal Reform International (PRI) report says that many survivors not only 
experience fear but a sense of bewilderment that people that they now have to 
live alongside are clearly responsible for genocide related crimes but have not yet 
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been convicted for these crimes. PRI further states that survivor organizations like 
Ibuka have tried to prevent the release of prisoners as they feel they don't 
deserve to be released. The PRI report quotes a survivor as saying:  
 
“Recently one of the persons who were released said that the Government 
should compensate them for having detained them without reason. In 
reality, this person does not even know why he was released! In this 
country there are two categories of people. There are us, the survivors of 
the genocide, and there are those who perpetrated the genocide. Usually, 
everybody who has committed an offense should be punished” (2004, 45).   
 
5.3.3. Released prisoner fears 
 
Fourth category perpetrators prosecuted by gacaca courts are released back into 
their communities on completion of their prison sentence. Apart from this, 
President Kagame has released various groups of prisoners over the past few 
years. In 2003, for example, he released 22 000 sick or elderly prisoners. PRI 
reports that the primary reaction of released prisoners is delight to return home, 
but that this is followed by various fears. In fact, PRI states that “Sometimes there 
is so much fear that some people, because of their crimes or their confessions, 
give up going back home to their hill and run away” (2003, 43). Alongside this, 
prisoners know their return is not always welcome and fear reprisal. Their release 
is provisional so that the possibility of being newly accused by someone who is 
unhappy with their presence in the community seems likely.  Further, PRI states 
that their “fears may be considered justified insofar as some detainees’ family 
members have been killed in suspicious circumstances, particularly in Kibuye and 
Umutara, and these murders have not been solved to this day” (2003, 43). A 
worrying development, according to HRW, is the fact that victims are taking the 
law into their own hands and that, following a killing of a genocide survivor, there 
is a growing response of reprisal killing. Although the murder of a genocide 
survivor (and potential gacaca trial witness) is acted on harshly by authorities, 




Released prisoners also fear those they have denounced as their accomplices 
who are still walking free (PRI, 2004, 44). Denouncing accomplices, or telling the 
whole truth, is a mandatory part of the gacaca trial process which may allow the 
accused a lessened sentence.  PRI describes some prisoners considering suicide 
prior to their release due to these fears (2004, 44). They relate how a group of 
released prisoners was seen leaving the Ingando camp to return to their homes, 
walking very slowly, even sitting at the side of the road, displaying their reluctance 
to a return to a situation that is so uncertain (2004, 30).   
 
5.3.4. Being voiceless 
 
Although many policies have been put in place by the government to support 
reconciliation, there are others that leave people feeling fearful and insecure. 
Some of those I interviewed, Hutus in particular, speak of being afraid to speak 
out and criticize the government or its policies. Some interviewees felt that they 
did not feel at home in their own country, even though they had lived there all their 
lives. They said that it sometimes felt that those who had lived in the country for 
only ten or twelve years had more rights than they did. Further, they did not feel 
they had the freedom to stand up for their rights (Personal interviews, 2005 and 
2007). An illustration concerns one informant who fled the country at the start of 
genocide. On return, a few years later, his home had been taken by someone 
else. He feels he has no place to legally deal with this as he is from the ‘wrong’ 
ethnic group. He fears that the one who took his house might falsely accuse him 
of genocide in order to get him out of the way (Personal interview, Kigali, January, 
2007).   
 
A part of this insecurity is created by the fact that gacaca deals only with the 
crimes of genocide and not with the crimes against humanity on the part of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). A representative from Avocaats Sans Frontiers 
(ASF), the lawyer rights organization that has worked closely with the gacaca 
process, agrees that this creates resentment and a sense of insecurity for a large 
portion of the population. When ASF challenged the government on this matter, 
their response was that accusations against the RPF were to be taken to the 
military court system. But this is not publicly known to the population and the 
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majority of people are too afraid to take this step. The government needs to 
confront these fears and create a space where all Rwandans feel they have equal 
rights, an equal voice, and equal access to justice and legal assistance.  
 
5.3.5. Lack of independent journalism 
 
Perhaps the most prominent critique from the side of human rights organizations 
is that of the lack of independent journalism. In a report released in 2004, CPJ 
describes how journalists live in fear of harassment and imprisonment, and how 
others have been forced to flee after receiving death threats. Although the 2003 
constitution guarantees press freedom, this is only in so far as the law allows and 
the divisionism law limits this freedom significantly. CPJ writes, “The current Tutsi-
led regime, which consolidated power in the 2003 election, has increasingly used 
allegations of ethnic "divisionism" to silence critics. Such allegations have been 
used against Rwanda's only independent newspaper, Umuseso (The Dawn), and 
against the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights 
(LIPRODHOR). Several members of these organizations have fled the country in 
fear for their lives” (2004, 2).  
The accusations of spreading genocidal ideology also reach foreign radio stations 
operating in Rwanda. These are among the few providers of independent news in 
Rwanda, but now may be forced to reveal their sources. Radio stations in eastern 
DRC, which can be heard in western parts of Rwanda have also been accused of 
spreading 'ethnic hatred'. “The report pointed a finger at a number of stations, 
including Radio Okapi, a joint project of the United Nations and Hirondelle, an 
award-winning Swiss organization that promotes peace through media” (CPJ, 
2004, 2). 
 
An Amnesty International 2007 report states that: “Journalists were subjected to 
intimidation, harassment and violence. The authorities failed to conduct 
independent and impartial investigations into attacks or threats against journalists. 
The authorities repeatedly denied that there were restrictions on freedom of 
expression in Rwanda, accusing independent journalists of "unprofessionalism"”. 
They then go on to describe an incident taking place in late 2006, where the news 
editor of Umuco reportedly had his home in Kigali ransacked in January by four 
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men armed with clubs and knives. Before this attack, Umuco had criticized the 
ruling party for ineptitude and for allegedly controlling the judiciary. A second 
incident involved editor of the Umuseso who was given a suspended sentence of 
one year in prison and a fine for "public insult". In 2004, Umuseso had questioned 
the integrity of a parliamentary Deputy Speaker.  
 
5.3.6. Political prisoners 
 
Amnesty International reports that in the run up to the 2003 elections, prominent 
members of civil society mysteriously disappeared.  
 
“Augustin Cyiza, a prominent member of civil society, was reportedly a 
victim of enforced disappearance in 2003 during the run-up to elections. 
Rwandan officials denied knowledge of his whereabouts in 2005, but 
sources claimed he had been abducted and killed ... Léonard Hitimana, a 
member of the Transitional National Assembly, disappeared in April 2003. 
In April 2006, the President of the National Commission for Human Rights 
stated that the investigation into his case was confidential, and that results 
would be released in due course. The fate of Léonard Hitimana remained 
unknown” (2007). 
 
Further, there are the well-publicized cases of former president of Rwanda, 
Pasteur Bizimungu, and Charles Ntakirutinka, who together started a new political 
party and were imprisoned in 2005 on charges of “inciting civil disobedience, 
associating with criminal elements and embezzlement of state funds” (Amnesty 
International, 2007, 2).Many human rights observers would say these men were 
imprisoned to get rid of political opposition. 
 
5.3.7. Condition of prisons 
 
In the previous chapter, conditions of prisons following the genocide were 
described as appalling. Amnesty International suggested that this had hardly 
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changed in their 2007 report. During 2006, 69 000 people were still incarcerated, 
with prisons across the country being significantly overpopulated. Amnesty 
International describes prison conditions as “extremely harsh and amounted to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”. Underground cells were reported to exist 
in some prisons as well as detention centres (2007, 2). Further, they report that 48 
000 detainees still await trial in for genocide related crimes.  
 
In describing the conditions, Khan writes: 
 
“There was no room to sit or lie down, only to stand and doze while leaning 
against another prisoner. Day after day, week after week, month after 
month these prisoners, most of whom were suspected of genocide and 
who had been put into prison without due process of law, would simply 
stand and pass the time. Many became gangrenous in their legs due to 
lack of circulation” (2000, 120). 
 
Khan describes in some detail efforts made by the UN to try to address the 
problem of the prisons, but in defence of both the UN and the new government, 
describes how international donors were more interested in pouring money into 
refugee camps, survivor programs and education than in building new prisons 
(2000, 120). Directly after genocide, the new government was entirely without 
resources or infrastructure to deal with the vast amount of accused.  The death 
sentence was abolished due to international pressure in 1999, but prison 
conditions did not improve.  
 
In a forty-page report regarding prison conditions in Rwanda, HRW bring to 
attention the death of twenty detainees that were killed between November 2006 
and May 2007. Where the official statement says that these prisoners were shot 
by prison guards while trying to escape, HRW suggests they were shot in reprisal 
killings following the 'highly publicized' killings of survivors (2007, 1). Although 
both the United States and United Kingdoms' governments, along with human 
rights organizations have asked for investigation into the matter, HRW expresses 
doubt as to whether this will take place with an independent investigation process 




Detainees on trial for crimes unrelated to genocide also find themselves victims of 
police abuse and killings (2007, 16). HRW describes incidents where police have 
been called to the scene of a crime, arrest suspected criminals then shoot them a 
short distance from the crime scene. The report has a table listing the names of 
detainees killed, either by police or soldiers, the dates on which they were killed 
and where they were killed (2007, 15, 16).  
 
Although national police have announced several ways of lodging a complaint 
against police abuse, HRW cites a case where such a complaint was lodged by 
the family of a murdered detainee, without any response from the police many 
months later. Referring to a report given to HRW by the national police in 
December, 2006, they say: 
 
“All the detainees were killed within days and in some cases within hours of 
their arrests. In no case had trials begun, far less verdicts been reached, 
yet in the opening paragraph of the statement, several of the detainees are 
referred to as “killers,” not suspects. In its final paragraph, the statement 
acknowledges that some of those killed by the police had no involvement 
with genocide but nonetheless it declares that “the suspects involved in 
these cases were of extreme criminal character ready to die for their 
genocide ideology.” It concludes that these detainees were “terroristic in 
nature and don’t care about their own lives leave alone others”” (2007, 25). 
 
Alongside these accusations on the part of HRW, the police statement (which is 
attached to the HRW report) does state that the national police is in need of 
training with regards to firearm use in the case of escaping detainees, could do 
with more handcuffs, and would like to ensure toilet facilities are available inside 
police stations as their being outside provides detainees with an 'advantage to 
escape' (2007, 37).  
  
Filip Reyntjens makes mention in his report of the issue of releasing those without 
files, which was suggested by the Minister of Justice in 1999. However, genocide 
survivors and especially Ibuka, an organization protecting and supporting 
genocide survivors, denounced this, arguing that it consolidated “the culture of 
impunity favouring a general amnesty” (1999, 7). Until today, releasing prisoners 
 
104 
remains a hot topic, with Kagame releasing some tens of thousands of prisoners 
who were either sick or elderly in the past years, in the midst of much protest and 
controversy. 
 
5.3.8. Conflict in the DRC 
 
Making international news on a regular basis is the continued challenge for 
Rwanda of the situation on its border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
In a 90-page report concerning the situation in the DRC, HRW state that in 2006 
and 2007, countless violations of international law took place including attacks on 
civilians (murder, rape and the recruitment of child soldiers) and the displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of people from their homes (2007, 3). Former genocidal 
forces in the DRC have formed the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 
with the explicit aim of overthrowing the current government of Rwanda although 
HRW suggests they have attacked Congolese citizens more than engaging the 
Rwandan military (HRW, 2007, 3).  
 
Further, the Rwandan government has been in support of Laurent Nkunda, the 
former Congolese general who is fighting against Congolese president Jospeh 
Kabila. Rwanda's stake in the DRC is significant; the USAID report states that the 
Rwandan government sees itself as being in a key position, centrally placed on 
the map, and a key strategic point of stability within an instable region full of 
globally sought-after resources (USAID, 2005, 104). According to HRW, the 
Rwandan government allows Nkunda's forces to recruit soldiers, including 
children, from amongst Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda (2007, 7). In their 
report, HRW strongly recommends the UNHCR disallow repatriation of Congolese 
refugees in Rwanda back to the DRC unless they are certain of their safe return, 
implying that at this point UNHCR is becoming an inadvertent partner in the 
recruiting of child soldiers (2007, 8).  
 
The United Nations Human Council for Refugees (UNHCR) report states that 
there are still some 50 000 Rwandan refugees that need repatriation, the majority 
of those in eastern DRC. With the implementation of gacaca trials in 2005, several 
thousand people from Butare and Gikongoro fled Rwanda, seeking asylum in 
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Uganda and Burundi (2006, 102). They argue that the continued stability in 
Rwanda assists refugee repatriation but the situation in the DRC brings further 
uncertainty (2006, 102).  
 
“On 1 January 2005, some 47,800 Rwandan refugees were living in 19 
African countries. This group is mainly of Hutu origin, with only a few Tutsis 
and people in mixed marriages. About 20,000 people belonging to this 
group are expected to have returned by the end of 2005 and another 
20,000 are to return in 2006. Five thousand refugees are expected to opt 
for local integration” (UNHCR, 2006, 103). 
 
The repatriation of refugees continues to be a challenge, especially in the light of 
tensions around gacaca trials and violence between those accused and survivors. 
The UNHCR publishes a bi-monthly newsletter titled 'Rwanda Returnee News' 
which depicts positive stories of returnees to Rwandan refugees to encourage 
them to voluntarily repatriate. Not only are Rwandan refugees a challenge, but 
also refugees from the DRC and Burundi that are in Rwanda. USAID reported in 
2005 that 42 000 refugees were seeking asylum in Rwanda, 95% of those being 
Congolese (2005, 5). Having said this, USAID reports how the Rwandan 
government is a key player in regional peace talks and in returning stability to the 
Great Lakes region through negotiations with the DRC, Tanzania, and Uganda 
(2005). 
 
These were some of the more negative stories from human rights organizations 
reporting on Rwanda. The following section will look at some of the more positive 
stories coming from NGOs working in Rwanda.  
 
5.3. Reconciliation narratives 
 
Stories from local NGO’s working in the field of reconciliation show that amidst the 
many complex issues abounding in Rwandan society today, many Rwandans are 
open to reconciliation and want to move on from the division that caused 
genocide. This section will focus on local NGOs that do a variety of work, from 




Solace Ministries is an NGO to which people widowed by the war can come 
together to support each other emotionally and share resources. The director of 
Solace, Jean Gikwanda said that people want to reconcile and they want to get on 
with life; they don’t want to sit around and talk about reconciliation (Personal 
interview, Kigali, January, 2007). At Solace, both Hutu and Tutsi widows work on 
practical projects like bead work and sewing to supplement their incomes. As they 
work together and share in each others hardships, reconciliation begins to take 
place. 
 
MOUCECORE, on the other hand, runs workshops where people can talk about 
reconciliation. Michel Kayitaba who heads up this organization, says that talking 
about the process of reconciliation is important when it is coupled with action as 
well (Personal interview, Kigali, January, 2007). At MOUCECORE workshops 
people are educated around the terminology of reconciliation and then are invited 
to share their wounds. Workshops include both perpetrators and victims, both 
Tutsi widowed by the genocide and Hutu widowed by the violence of the civil war. 
Kayitaba described how sharing stories has been very powerful for healing, 
especially if it was followed by practical activities, such as perpetrators and victims 
rebuilding their homes together. 
 
Another project that involves sharing stories is in a town called Byumba where 
Dutch researchers implemented a pilot project termed ‘sociotherapy’. Here, 
groups of people living in the same area meet together weekly with a trained 
facilitator and work through a program that allows them to talk about their pain but 
also their futures. This group supports and heals itself through the process of 
working together therapeutically as a group. Currently, 43 groups are meeting on 
a weekly basis, reaching 1300 people (Personal interview, Kigali, January, 2007).  
 
Working from a slightly different angle, the organization PHARP focuses on Hutu 
refugees in the DRC after 1994. Their primary aim is to create open dialogue, 
especially between refugees who may collectively have been labeled ‘genocidaire’ 
and other Rwandans. The director, Reverend Anastase, felt strongly that practical 
activities are good but do not heal the underlying wounds that need to be spoken 
out (Personal interview, Kigali, January, 2007). PHARP creates safe spaces 
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where perpetrators and victims can be together and speak out their pain, 
repentance and forgiveness. As of 1995, they have distributed a newsletter 
related to reconciliation called Umuhuza, which means ‘hope’.   
 
Shalom, Educating for Peace is a small NGO that focuses on educating people in 
conflict resolution and nonviolent communication. It is not working directly in 
response to genocide, but rather wants to foster an understanding of peaceful 
ways of interacting in daily life. Following a period of training with Shalom in 
reconciliation, a church choir in the Rwamagana area developed a repertoire of 
songs celebrating unity and reconciliation which they now perform for local 
communities. Shalom seeks to foster dialogue between people around topics of 
reconciliation and forgiveness, to unpack what these mean when lived out in daily 
life. 
 
African Evangelical Enterprise (AEE), which was already active in Rwanda prior to 
genocide, works not only on the individual and group level but is influencing 
reconciliation narratives on the national level. Members of AEE are involved with 
government initiatives such as NURC. Further, they hold campaigns and events 
across the country that are attended by thousands of people, where victims and 
perpetrators share their stories and take collective responsibility for their role in 
the violence. International speakers are regularly invited to these events where 
they speak around themes of reconciliation and hope for the future.  
 
Bernard Rutikanga highlights the role of the Church in reconciliation efforts (2003, 
159). Although he mentions how the Church has been compromised due to its 
involvement in the genocide, it maintains a significant role in ‘eradicating ethnic 
distrust and discrimination and promoting respect for human rights’ (2003, 160). In 
1996, many church leaders from a variety of church backgrounds came together 
for the Detmold Confession where “Hutu and Tutsi participants confessed and 
apologised for crimes committed by members of their respective groups.  
 
“The Hutu apologised for the crimes committed against the Tutsi between 
1959 and 1994 and especially the heinous nature of the crimes” ‘torturing, 
raping, slitting pregnant women open, hacking humans to pieces, burying 
people alive … forcing people to kill their own relatives, burning people 
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alive’ (Detmold Confession 1996, 51)’. The Tutsi ‘apologised for repression 
and blind vengeance which members of our groups have taken, deposing 
all claims to legitimate self defence’. They also apologised for ‘certain 
arrogance and contemptuous attitudes shown to [Hutu] throughout our 
history in the name of a ridiculous complex of ethnic superiority’ (Detmold 
Confession 1996, 51-52). Western participants apologised for having 
sowed the seeds of Rwandan division and violence, for having aggravated 
violence by delivering arms, and for having neglected the suffering of 
Rwandan refugees” (2003, 161). 
 
This kind of public action by leaders of the church in a country where the vast 
majority of people are church going plays an important part in the reconciliation 
process. 
 
This is a brief overview of some of the more prominent activities towards 
reconciliation in Rwanda that were started and are sustained by Rwandans. More 
of their efforts will be explored at a later stage. Through interaction with these 
organizations it is clear that there is a desire for reconciliation and that 




As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, there are hopeful and positive as 
well as ominous and dark signs as to where Rwanda is today. Some have said 
the country is on the brink of another genocide whereas others sing the praises of 
its stability and progress. Perhaps the most powerful sign of hope is the work that 
ordinary Rwandans are doing on the ground, where communities are being 
transformed by the message of reconciliation.  
 
At the heart of the challenges in Rwanda are the issues of identity and history. 
What is constantly in flux is how to understand one’s identity and one’s personal 
history within the wider scope of the national and international histories. Much of 
the conflict in Rwanda is hinged on defending a particular story over others and a 
particular understanding of identity above others. Where individuals grapple with 
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what it meant and still means to them to be Hutu or Tutsi, the government tries to 
foster a new, united identity. Where individuals struggle to make sense of their 
role in the enormous movements of politics and history, the government tries to 
rewrite history in a way that would bring all Rwandans together. And yet this 
movement to a united Rwandan identity and common understanding of Rwandan 
history remains fraught with difficulties, creating a conflict of its own. In the quest 
for a united identity, some people feel voiceless, helpless and without a 
meaningful identity. In the quest for a common understanding of history, some feel 
their stories are being sidelined, ignored and dismissed.  
 
Unfortunately, the divisive line remains on the basis of ethnicity, with many Tutsi 
publically supporting the government, its policies, its version of history and its new 
identity, but with many Hutu continuing to feel sidelined and marginalized. As one 
Rwandan said, this is leading a to a growing resentment amongst the majority of 
Rwandans who may be kept in line by strict government policies but are not 
participating in the process of reconciliation and national unity willingly or with a 
sense of ownership (Personal interview, Pretoria, September, 2009).  
 
Further chapters will investigate the complex issues of identity and history that 
people in Rwanda grapple with in the face of tumultuous political and societal 








CHAPTER 6: THE RESEARCH STORY 
 
6.1. Understanding narrative research 
 
This study will make use of a narrative research method. Narrative is suggested 
as a way of bringing about reconciliation and healing Rwanda but it is also the 
research methodology used in this study to gather data relevant to better 
understanding issues of history and identity in the Rwandan context. In using this 
methodology, as will become clear in this chapter, there is an element of 
participatory research, where the researcher and the participants in the research 
together attempt to work towards solutions to a particular problem. In the case of 
this research, researcher and participants together grappled with the issue of 
reconciliation and how it can be either hampered or enhanced by narratives of 
identity and history. 
 
 At the centre of this research is the analysis of four Rwandan life stories. These 
life stories are not only analysed and reflected upon by the researcher, but also by 
the four Rwandans themselves, and their reflections form an integral part of the 
research. Supplementing these life stories are a series of five formal interviews 
with leaders of NGOs working in the field of reconciliation and twenty informal 
interviews with ordinary Rwandans inside and outside of Rwanda. All these 
interviews were collected between January 2005 and December 2009. I was also 
able to observe a gacaca trial session in January, 2007 where three people were 
tried and a Reconciliation Forum in June, 2009, where thirty-five community 
leaders discussed reconciliation. In June, 2008, I attended the Amahoro 
Gathering, which is an annual international conference for African Christian 
leaders exploring various topics relevant to the African continent. In 2008, the 
conference was held in Kigali and the theme was reconciliation. 
 
Each of these experiences formed part of the narrative research approach. Amia 
Lieblich, Rivka Tuval-Mashiach, and Tamar Zilber write that narrative research is 
any research that uses or analyses narrative material, either as the object of the 
research or as the means to study another question (1998, 2). They assert that 
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narrative research provides “one of the clearest channels for learning about the 
inner world [of individuals] … Narratives provide us with access to people’s 
identity” (1998, 7). They further say that we “know, or discover ourselves, and 
reveal ourselves to others, by the stories we tell” (1998, 7). This research 
methodology is highly relevant to this research project in its exploring of identity-
related issues.  
 
Like Lieblich et al. (1998, 8) this research  
 
“[does] not advocate total relativism that treats all narratives as texts of 
fiction. On the other hand, we do not take narratives at face value, as 
complete and accurate representations of reality. We believe that 
narratives are usually constructed around a core of facts or life events, yet 
allow a wide periphery for the freedom of individuality and creativity in 
selection, addition to, emphasis on, and interpretation of these 
‘remembered facts’” (1998, 8).  
 
Rosenwald and Ochberg take this point further in referring to the embeddedness 
of our narratives in our social-cultural and political contexts (1992, 8). Our very 
acts of remembering are a result of our contexts and also our identities. Alongside 
this, when recording a life history we capture a frozen photograph, a static 
moment in time and analyse it, looking for insights into identity and meaning. Yet, 
identity is constantly in flux and we never capture ‘the’ ultimate identity. “The 
particular life story is one (or more) instance of the polyphonic versions of the 
possible constructions or presentations of people’s selves and lives which they 
use according to specific momentary influences” (Lieblich et al., 1998, 8). 
 
Lieblich et al. believe that “The use of narrative methodology results in unique and 
rich data that cannot be obtained from experiments, questionnaires or 
observations” (1998, 9). Narrative research is a highly relevant research 
methodology for exploring issues of history, identity and reconciliation.  Smith, in a 
discussion around life story research, speaks of how “The act of constructing a life 
story, whether as actively engaged in by the one constructing the story or as 
secondarily engaged in by an engaged listener, has a powerful, potentially 
transforming, (re)organizational impact” (2000, 13). It is this ‘emancipatory’ role of 
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narrative research, as Rosenwald and Ochberg describe it, that further makes this 
methodology relevant. It is believed that constructing life stories, listening to 
these, analysing them and then reflecting on them again will indeed have a 
‘potentially transforming, (re)organising impact’. However, Smith also warns that 
the exact opposite can happen, and that instead of emancipating, telling the story 
can ‘disempower, degrade or pathologise’. This potential negative effect of 
narrative research will be discussed in section 6.3.2. 
  
6.1.1. Theoretical foundations of narrative research 
 
Narrative research has developed largely out of a criticism for adopting too much 
of the method of the natural sciences in the field of social science. Lazar (1999, 
16) discusses in some depth the journey which research methodology in the 
social sciences has taken, from being purely ‘naturalistic’ (drawing conclusions 
through ‘rigorously repeated observations’) to completely interpretive (interested 
in the interpretation of meaning). On the one hand are those who argue that the 
only ‘true’ knowledge is knowledge gained through objectivity, distancing oneself 
from ones subjects and using the methods of the natural sciences. On the other, 
is the belief that the social sciences are all about intersubjectivity, interaction, 
intercommunication, and language, which demand a less rigid, more 'messy' form 
of research (Lazar, 1999, 16).  
 
Part of the shift from a naturalist methodology (as in, a method adopted from the 
natural sciences) to a more interpretive, and maybe even relativist, approach, 
have been ethical considerations. Johan Galtung, writing from a perspective of 
non-violence, argues that the naturalist method had the danger of being ‘violent’ 
to those being researched. He argues that ‘the researched’ are often exploited 
and are encouraged to bare their souls in order to further the career of the 
researcher (1975, 266). Further, researchers enter the research project with the 
assumption that they have knowledge, insight or understanding about the 
researched that the researched themselves don’t have (1975, 268). Researchers 
are also described by Galtung as fragmenting the researched; individuals are 
researched (interviewed, for example) independently from each other, with the 
assumption that ‘normal society [consists] of fragmented, unconscious people’ 
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and that what happens to one individual can be generalised to communities of 
people (1975, 271). Lastly, Galtung argues that researchers see themselves as 
‘unalterable, unchangeable, fixed points’ and take on a ‘detached, cool, non-
committal’ attitude towards the interviewees, thus marginalising them (1975, 272). 
The fear of doing violence to the researched has influenced me to adopt a 
narrative method over and above a more so-called ‘objective' method, although 
even the narrative method has its own ethical issues to be considered, as will be 
discussed in section 6.3.1.  
 
David Walsh discusses the shift that has happened in society in general, towards 
cultural relativism and a critique of ethnocentricism (1999, 218). A research 
methodology with the researcher as detached and ‘objective’ observer often 
comes with the assumption that the researchers’ cultural values and perceptions 
are more ‘logical’, ‘right’ and superior. Through the influences of postmodernism 
and deconstruction, it is becoming more and more accepted that all cultures have 
an internal logic of their own and are equally important in their own right (Walsh, 
1999, 218). This is a foundation of narrative research. 
 
6.1.2. Characteristics of narrative research 
 
Narrative research works with a small sample and aims at gathering in-depth, rich 
data. It is a time-consuming research methodology that requires a sensitivity on 
the part of the researcher. Narrative research does not pretend to be objective but 
is consciously aware of the researcher influence on the research process. 
Interpretation of the data is always personal, partial and dynamic. Lieblich et al. 
describe it as ‘dialogical listening’ to three voices: the voice of the narrator as 
represented by the transcribed text, the voice of the theoretical framework, which 
provides the tools for interpretations, and a reflexive monitoring voice, namely, 
self awareness in drawing conclusions from the material (1998,10). This research 
has added to that the reflective voice of the research participants. The danger of 
interpretive methodologies is that they may seem 'wildly' subjective, but Lieblich et 
al. argue that they are in fact based on careful analysis of the text, careful 
examination of other related, published material, the theoretical framework and 




Another characteristic of narrative research is that rather than starting with an a 
priori hypothesis, the hypothesis emerges from the material (Lieblich et al., 1998, 
10). Narrative researchers would argue that this is a more 'genuine' approach. 
Rather than the researcher imposing a research direction onto the researched it is 
as if the researcher is discovering what the material itself is demanding. In the 
case of this research project, what emerged was significantly different from what 
was expected beforehand. In particular, it was imagined that identity in the 
Rwandan context was largely a hindrance to reconciliation whereas it emerged 
that it may in fact be an important channel through which reconciliation may take 
place.  
 
A narrative approach does not try to generalize its findings from one individual or 
groups of individuals to the larger society and for this reason does not strictly 
require replication of results as a criterion for evaluation (Lieblich et al., 1998, 10). 
This is a significant point to keep in mind, as this research project never assumes 
that the experiences of the four Rwandans narrating their life histories can allow 
us to draw conclusions about Rwandan society in general. What these life stories 
can do is provide us with material for exploring issues relevant to those four 
individuals as they engage Rwandan society and relate this to aspects brought to 
the fore by the literature. Similarly, the interviews with five NGO leaders cannot be 
generalized to apply to all NGO activity in Rwanda, but is only relevant in its 
limited and immediate context.  
 
6.1.3. The position of the researcher in narrative research 
 
Walsh sees four possible positions for the researcher. Firstly, as a complete 
participant the researcher is thoroughly involved as a participant in the research, 
generating ‘complete’ knowledge but with the ethical compromise of pretending to 
be something s/he is not. Secondly, as a complete observer there is reduced 
reactivity but the possibility of alienation occurs. Thirdly, the position of participant 
observer is an honest approach but has the danger of ‘going native’ and losing 
perspective on what is being studied. Finally, the observer as participant is safer 
but might result in superficial understanding (1999, 222). His suggested best 
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approach is that of 'marginal native', where the researcher is “poised between a 
strangeness which avoids over-rapport and a familiarity which grasps the 
perspectives of people in the situation” (1999, 226). “This position creates 
considerable strain on the researcher as it engenders insecurity, produced by 
living in two worlds simultaneously, that of participation and that of research” 
(1999, 227). This difficult position is the one I have most tried to adopt; that of 
being well aware of myself as outsider, as stranger, and yet at the same time 
being involved in the lives of those I am researching, thus allowing me to more 
deeply understand their perspectives. Further, those being researched have 
become participant researchers, giving direction to and becoming involved in the 
research project.  
 
In terms of the position of the researcher, rather than seeing the relationship 
between researcher and narrator as objective, Ochberg argues that the 
researcher influences the way the narrator tells their story as well as what the 
narrator says. According to him, the narrator is forming a relationship with the 
interviewer, with those interviewed trying to make themselves likeable or even 
keeping the interviewer at bay. “To see what a life story means, we have to see 
what effect the speaker is trying to create” (2000, 119). Narrators, Ochberg 
argues, may not expect or even want their audiences to understand them as they 
understand themselves.  
 
“Our sense of ourselves depends on our experience of how others 
understand us. However, I do not think that our sense of ourselves 
necessarily depends on others seeing us the same way that we see 
ourselves. In fact, just the opposite may be the case. Our sense of who we 
are may depend on feeling that others see us differently than we see 
ourselves. We may, for example, cherish the idea that we are keeping a 
secret or that we are too complicated for any but the most attentive 
audience to comprehend” (2000, 120).  
 
This viewpoint on the position of the researcher and the impact of the researcher 
on the narrator leads to a more complex understanding of the kind of data that is 
allowed to emerge. Not only is a narrative research approach interested in the 
content of the life story but the very way it is related and the relationship that 
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develops between the researcher and narrator, and in this case, also between the 
four Rwandans as they engaged with each others stories. For example, with the 
life histories as well as the formal and informal interviews, there was sometimes 
the sense that the speaker was trying to second guess the direction I was taking, 
trying to answer not what I asked specifically, but what I might need them to say 
to satisfy my research and prevent me from probing any further. I often had the 
sense that I was being directed away from certain topics that seemed unsafe and 
towards others that almost had a rote answer. For example, I had a strong sense 
that certain interviewees wanted me to have a clear impression that they 
supported the government and that I would have no doubt at all of this. There 
were also times when interviewees would emphasise how relaxed and open they 
were to speak to me, but at the same time it seemed as if there were things they 
were uncomfortable to discuss. 
 
Ochberg says we all know of people who want to seem ambivalent about being 
understood, maybe because they are distrustful; they may want to feel connected 
to others but fear it may be dangerous.  
 
“For anyone who doubts the perfect goodwill of their audience, telling a 
transparently open life story may seem foolish: If, instead, the goal is to 
create relationships that are only partially open, one must tell stories that 
are semi-opaque. Such stories must engage an audience yet keep that 
audience at a distance. Telling a story in this manner – and thereby 
creating a contested or guarded relationship with one’s listener – in turn 
confirms a particular sense of self” (2000, 120).  
 
Such vagueness and ambivalence, which included contradictions in accounts and 
changes of subject, were common within the context of this research project.  
 
Ochberg suggests that some people would want this ambiguity to be removed, for 
example, by creating a more trustful relationship. But he argues against this, 
saying,  
 
“We do not become more ourselves in the absence of these (protectively 
constructed) dangers; instead – were such a thing possible – we would no 
 
117 
longer be ourselves. Therefore, not only is it inevitable that our informants 
struggle against us, this struggle may be essential to their self creation … 
To see how narrators struggle with their audiences – pushing them away 
and pulling them closer, inviting understanding and disparaging it – is to 
see more of the complexity in both life stories and lives” (2000, 122).  
 
In addition to this, who the narrator is also has an impact on the researcher and 
the way the life story sharing or interviews unfold. I was aware of asking either 
more or less direct questions depending on the openness or comfortableness of 
the narrator. With some of those interviewed, it was easier to be candid and open 
whereas with others it felt necessary to be sensitive and guarded about the topics 
we engaged in. Rather than this being a hindrance to objectivity, it rather added to 
the richness of the data as my own responses to the interview situation gave 
clues to some of the underlying issues at stake. For example, if it felt that the 
conversation was becoming more guarded and less direct I took note of this to 
consider whether it might indicate uncertainty of what could or could not be 
discussed within the confines of government policy and law.  
 
As mentioned before, engaging with such an understanding of the relationship 
between the narrator and the researcher allows for both more complex data and 
the opportunity for deeper analysis. 
 
6.1.4. Narrative research models 
 
Lieblich et al. have developed a simple measurement which takes into account 
the unit of analysis and hermeneutical approach when developing an appropriate 
narrative research model (1998, 12). The unit of analysis ranges from extracting a 
section from a complete text (categorical analysis) to taking the narrative as a 
whole (holistic analysis).  In categorical analysis, the story is dissected and 
phrases or words are categorized; this is helpful for understanding phenomena 
that affect a group of people. In holistic analysis, the life story of a person is taken 
as a whole and sections of the text are considered in context of the whole text, 





How we read the text can vary from the explicit (what happened, why, who 
participated) to the implicit context of the text (the meaning, motives, symbolism) 
or the form of the text, such as structure, plot, sequence of events, coherence and 
complexity. Lieblich et al. say that a content analysis ‘seems to manifest deeper 
layers of the narrator’s identity’. The table below gives an overview of the unit of 
analysis and hermeneutical approach in relation to one another, outlining four 




Uses the complete life story of 
an individual and focuses on 
the content presented by it. 
Analyzes sections of the 





Looks at the plot and 
structure of a complete 
narrative. Considers climax, 
or a turning point, which 




Content-analysis; categories of 
the studied topic are defined, 
separate utterances in the text 
extracted, classified and 




Stylistic or linguistic 
characteristics of defined 
units of the narrative, eg. 
Metaphors, passive or active 
voice. Instances are counted 
and categorized.  
 
The current research falls largely under the ‘holistic-content’ model of narrative 
research. Within this model, according to Lieblich et al., the entire story and 
content is taken into consideration. Central themes that run through the narrative 
as a whole are significant (1998, 18). Rather than analyzing individual utterances 
or categorizing specific aspects of the narratives, this research project has 
focused on the complete life story as it interacts with the larger narratives in 




6.2. Narrative research as applied to this study 
 
6.2.1. Reasons for the study 
 
What first sparked my interest in the research topic was my introduction to the 
Rwandan community in Pietermariztburg, where I was living and studying at the 
time. Most university centres in South Africa have significant numbers of 
government-sponsored Rwandan students as well as Rwandan refugees. These 
Rwandans, as students in any foreign country may well do, formed a Rwandan 
community. The Rwandan community in Pietermaritzburg was particularly close-
knit at the time I was there (2002-2004) and enjoyed eating Rwandan food and 
celebrating Rwandan culture together. 
 
My experience of this community was significantly positive, and I had a very 
strong sense of hospitality, warmth and that people deeply cared for one another. 
At the same time, I became progressively more aware of undercurrents that I 
found out to be related to political and ethnic differences. Being a government-
sponsored student was something quite different to being a refugee who was 
studying here. And being Hutu or Tutsi in origin certainly affected community 
relations. Alongside this, I was fascinated by allusions to the 1994 genocide, 
which had left not a single Rwandan untouched. References to genocide tended 
to be on the clinical side and were sometimes even mixed with humour, albeit 
cynical or sardonic. The relational dynamics, coupled with the way various people 
individually and as a community were processing one of the most horrendous 
events of human history, moved me deeply.  
 
In January, 2005, I had decided to make this the topic of my doctoral thesis. At the 
summer school early in the academic year, I had the opportunity to meet a 
number of other Rwandans who were studying by distance and had flown from 
Rwanda for the purpose of attending the week-long school. This gave me access 
to a new and diverse group of Rwandans who were studying in the same field, 




In July, 2005, I made my first reconnaissance trip to Rwanda. The agenda of this 
trip was completely open. My intention was to look, see, hear and feel. I stayed 
with a Rwandan, in his home, for the period of one week. During this week I 
visited Rwandan friends who had moved back from Pietermaritzburg, family 
members of friends from the Pietermaritzburg community, friends I had made at 
the summer school and saw some of the sites. Wherever I went, people were 
made aware of my research, and most social, casual conversations led to 
discussions around the genocide, healing, reconciliation and politics. This formed 
the first level of my ‘data collection’. 
 
In January, 2007, I returned to Rwanda for a two-week period, this time with the 
intention of interviewing people to gain a clearer concept of the process of 
reconciliation in Rwanda. I stayed with a study colleague who is researching the 
gacaca hearings in Rwanda and also worked for the UN in Kigali. This gave me a 
different perspective on Rwanda than the previous visit. During this trip, I 
interviewed five NGO leaders and had informal interviews with some ten other 
Rwandans. I also had the opportunity to experience a gacaca hearing. This 
formed a second level of ‘data collection’.    
  
Having a clearer picture of the situation in Rwanda, and combining this with a 
thorough literature review in the area of Rwandan politics and history, 
reconciliation theory, and narrative theory I felt equipped to start on what formed 
the core of this research, namely, the recording of four life stories.  In May 2008, I 
returned again to Rwanda for two weeks, this time recording life histories and 
attending the Amahoro Gathering, an international conference whose theme this 
year was reconciliation. This contributed to my grasp of the Rwandan situation 
and the concept of reconciliation. I stayed with the editor of a controversial 
newspaper in Rwanda. This editor had been beaten and left for dead only a year 
previously, as a result of articles he had published in his paper. Experiencing 
Rwanda through his eyes gave yet another perspective. 
 
In June, 2009, I returned to Rwanda for another two week trip. During this time, I 
held follow-up interviews with some of the young men whose life histories I had 
recorded. I also attended a Reconciliation Forum which was hosted by Shalom, 
Educating for Peace in conjunction with the National Unity and Reconciliation 
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Commission. I had further conversations with Rwandans I had had informal 
interviews with on previous trips. I stayed with a close Rwandan friend who, due 
to the nature of our friendship, was able to share honestly about experiences in 
Rwanda. These short trips over a period of five years helped to see the process of 
reconciliation in action over time. 
 
6.2.2. Selection of the sample  
 
My sample selection was initially influenced by the community of Rwandans 
studying in Pietermaritzburg that I first came into contact with. It has further been 
influenced by the Rwandan students I met at the summer school. My sample 
method may be described as ‘cascading’ or 'snow-balling'. Each person I met 
introduced me to someone else, furthering and diversifying my network. I 
consciously chose to work with people based in Kigali who were students and 
could speak English. Part of the reason for this was practical. Not having to work 
through a translator has many advantages, and having a shared academic 
background means that those I engaged with understood, at least to a degree, the 
concepts and methodology I was working with.  
 
Of the four Rwandans who shared their life stories, two were collected from 
refugees outside of Rwanda while the other two came from Rwandans living in 
Rwanda. The intention with the life stories was to gather in-depth narratives from 
eight Rwandans of varying backgrounds to explore the relationship between 
history, identity and reconciliation. In the event, it proved exceptionally hard to find 
people willing to speak on the record, into a dictaphone, with a signed consent 
form before them. Many people who had engaged freely with me in casual 
conversation about these matters were very reluctant when it came to formalizing 
these conversations in an official interview. This was particularly the case with 
people of older generations. The four who did agree to be interviewed were all 
men between the ages of twenty-five and forty. A factor contributing to their 
willingness may be that none of them were the heads of their households at the 
time of the conflict and thus had fewer responsibilities. Another possible reason 
may be that those of older generations seemed to hold stronger prejudices and 




Perhaps because of the nature of Rwandan culture, many of those I have met 
have become friends. I have visited in their homes, shared food with them, and 
often shared travel or other social experiences with them. Every one of those 
sharing their life stories is a friend. As will be discussed later in this chapter, trust 
is a major factor in Rwandan society. Rwandans, by their own admission, tend to 
be very careful about what they say to whom. Complete strangers would never 
share with me at the level of honesty that my friends have been prepared to 
share, and my findings would have been considerably less significant or relevant.  
 
6.2.3. Formal and informal interviews 
 
As mentioned above, I engaged in informal interviews in Rwanda between 2005 
and 2009, and formal interviews in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In addition, I have been 
in constant conversation with Rwandans in Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, and Durban 
and email communication with Rwandans throughout the world over the five year 
time span. These informal conversations and emails contributed to my 
understanding of the situation and dynamics in Rwanda as much as reading 
books and articles, if not more so. 
 
Clive Seale draws attention to the fact that with every interview we have access 
only to the speakers version of an account, and that it is very difficult to ascertain 
how this version corresponds with reality (1999, 203). Apart from the content of a 
speakers account, the way in which they share their account, the words they 
choose to use, the themes they choose to emphasise, the emotions they express 
and their body language is of importance. The aim with the interviews was not to 
draw universal conclusions based on information gathered from large numbers of 
Rwandans, but rather in-depth, authentic insights into atmospheres, feelings and 
subjectivities (Seale, 1999, 205). Large sample research has been carried out by 
various research institutes to measure the extent to which people are ready for 
reconciliation. Such research brings different results than spending time over 
several years with people in close relationship and ‘feeling out’ as it were, where 




As I approached my trips to Rwanda, I would think about what I wanted to have 
clearer insights about. I would draft conversation topics, and central questions to 
which I wanted answers. I allowed my genuine curiosity to lead conversations 
towards my intended topics. So although I had drafted concepts or questions I 
wanted to explore, my approach was flexible, and allowed for following up 
interesting leads (Seale, 1999, 205). In this way, I was often led to new ideas and 
angles I had not encountered in the literature or considered before. I was also 
exposed to undercurrents that would often be hidden from a researcher taking a 
more formal approach. 
 
In an environment where it can be perceived to be a danger to share anything 
which might be construed to be ‘inciting ethnic hatred’, it is difficult for people to 
speak openly and honestly about issues of identity and reconciliation. In 
conversations with people over time, it was almost as if the same conversation 
would be repeated but each time another layer would be peeled off, and I would 
gain a little more insight into the speakers ‘true’ feelings on a matter. With each 
layer, a little more of the complex dynamic would be revealed. For example, in 
initial conversations with many speakers, when asked whether there were 
tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, the response would almost always be, “There is 
no tension. We are all Rwandan. We live together, we eat together, we share the 
same language and culture”. As this peeled away, the speaker might start to 
admit that there was some level of mistrust and that they would trust someone of 
their own ethnic group more than someone of another ethnic group. As the next 
layer peeled away, they might start to admit certain prejudices they were brought 
up with, certain stereotypes they were taught as children. And as the next layer 
peeled away, they might tell me about their own prejudices, their own stereotypes, 
their intense fear of those of the other ethnic group, and in some cases, an 
admission that they would act to protect their own ethnic group at whatever cost, 
even if it meant violence, and even if it meant killing. This careful peeling away of 
the layers would not be possible with a survey, a questionnaire, or even a formal 
interview with a stranger. It was only possible because of the generous trust and 
friendship given to me by Rwandan friends who, like me, hope that somehow, 





The more formal interviews with NGO leaders followed a somewhat less relational 
path. I had conversations with Antoine Rutayisere from African Evangelical 
Enterprise, Michel Kayitaba from MOUCECORE, and Rev Anastase from PHARP, 
each of whom have engaged in research into reconciliation in Rwanda, are 
familiar with the concepts I am working with, and have interacted with quite a 
number of other researchers working in the same field. It was thus easy to speak 
with them freely on an analytical and conceptual level. The purpose of these 
interviews was to test some of the findings beginning to emerge around identity, 
history and reconciliation in Rwanda. For these interviews, I developed a set of 
questions in order to facilitate comparisons. These questions, listed under 
Appendix A,  included, for example, how they would describe the reconciliation 
process in Rwanda and where they thought it was and was going. I asked them to 
explain the identity-dynamic that seemed to suggest that on the one hand ‘we are 
all Rwandan’ but on the other there is still much underlying ethnic tension. I asked 
them to share their views about whether Rwanda was being forced to accept a 
particular politicized understanding of history. I asked whether they believed there 
was an openness for dialogue in Rwanda or if Rwandan society was still 
dominated by fear, suspicion and mistrust. Their answers were candid and 
honest, and allowed for in-depth discussion of some difficult and critical issues.  
 
Similarly, the formal interviews with Avocaats Sans Frontiers (ASF) and the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) allowed for honest 
exploration of these issues. These two interviews differed from the above three in 
that these were not faith-based NGO’s, but government-related organizations. 
NURC is a governmental body responsible for implementing and monitoring 
national unity and reconciliation through a range of projects and programs. ASF 
has the specific role of monitoring the gacaca process and other legal processes 
dealing with genocide as well as current legal disputes. Although ASF is 
independent of government, it works very closely with government projects and 
departments. With these two organizations, I explored many of the questions 
mentioned above, but with a level of greater care, being acutely aware that these 
were government-related organizations with all the implications this holds. 
Nevertheless, representatives from both organizations were also very open and 




In addition to these, some twenty informal conversations provided valuable 
research data. I recorded all formal interviews by taking notes with pen and paper 
and then fleshing these out later. All informal conversations were recorded 
afterwards, thus perhaps losing some of the details, but maintaining the ‘feel’ of 
the conversation, which was often more relevant than the actual content. For 
example, it was significant that several people felt the need to whisper in their own 
homes when speaking of certain topics and that some people would shift their 
opinion depending on who was with us during different conversations. 
 
As Liisa Malkki found in her ethnographic research in a Burundian Hutu refugee 
camp in Tanzania, during informal conversations about everyday matters, 
historical narratives would almost inevitably arise (1995, 49). I am convinced that 
my informal conversations offered much more material for my research than 
would have resulted from more formal methods. As Malkki describes, it was far 
easier to find men willing to engage in formal interviews than women (1995, 49). 
However, on an informal basis I was in continual conversation with a number of 
Rwandan women over a period of five years about matters related to this 
research. Their contribution has been invaluable but is unfortunately not 'on the 
record'. 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of this research, almost all of those interviewed, 
except the four NGO leaders and the representative from NURC, have asked to 
remain anonymous. This means that the names and particulars of the interviews 
have not been recorded in this thesis. 
  
6.2.4. Life stories 
 
The difficulty of finding Rwandans willing to engage in the life story component of 
my research was discussed in section 6.2.2. The diversity of the life stories was 
further limited by the number of interviewees I was able to get hold of within the 
time limit of my research. However, this had the unintended advantage that all 
four life stories that were recorded had similarities of focus that I could then 
explore in greater depth.  It also unintentionally resulted in a dialogue between 
two Ugandan Tutsi and two Hutu refugees, all four of them being highly educated 
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and articulate Rwandans. This is significant in that much of the conflict around the 
way forward in Rwanda is not between peasant farmers but between the Ugandan 
Tutsi government and the Hutu intelligentsia, the larger part, or at least the vocal 
part, of which remains outside of Rwanda. 
 
The life stories may either have been enhanced or limited by my long-standing 
friendship with all but one of the participants, who is a close friend of a relative. 
The interviews were enhanced by this because trust is a major factor for 
Rwandans and it is unlikely that anyone outside of a trust relationship would have 
participated as honestly as did these four young men. It often felt more of a 
collaborative project between myself and four friends than a researcher-
researched relationship. This was in line with my hesitation with the researcher-
researched dynamic which, as was described by Johan Galtung, can become a 
form of violence. However, the limitation of interviewing friends is the potential for 
researcher bias which will be discussed in section 6.3. 
 
Another limitation was the difficult position I found myself in when engaging with 
the highly divergent views between the Hutu refugees and the Tutsi Ugandans. 
None of those interviewed would want to be categorised in this way and each of 
them dissociated themselves from these categories in various ways, but there 
were certainly powerful differences of opinion between the two groups. I was 
aware of the fact that I might be compromising my integrity and their trust in me if I 
seemed supportive of the Ugandan Tutsi viewpoint when with the Ugandan Tutsi 
and supportive of the Hutu refugee viewpoint when with the Hutu refugees. In fact, 
in each case I was supportive in so far as I could see how the situation looked 
from their viewpoint and was at that moment fully convinced of their way of seeing 
things. In each case, though, I could also see how their views may have been 
coloured by prejudices or pushed to unhealthy extremes. I realise in retrospect 
that the way I engaged in informal conversations with interviewees may have 
influenced the kinds of things they shared in the formal recording. This may 
particularly have been the case when we discussed the summaries of the other 
three life stories and supports Ochberg's comment that the very relationship 




When discussing the summaries, I fully participated in the conversation with the 
desire to play the defendant of each interviewee. To the Ugandan Tutsi, I 
defended the views of the Hutu refugees and vice versa. My purpose in this was 
to try to establish as far as possible whether there was any understanding on 
either part for the side of the other. I was not only interested in 'measuring' the 
level of understanding one participant might have for another, but to actually 
influence this, through dialogue with other participants with myself as impartial 
mediator. This role of researcher as mediator was made clear from the start and 
all participants knew that I was hoping to create some form of useful dialogue 
between the four of them without them having to meet. Meeting, in their case, 
would be far too dangerous, perhaps even to the risk of their lives, according to 
one of those interviewed. He suggested that were he to air his views publically 
then members of his family might be jailed or simple ‘disappear’. The chosen 
research methodology seemed the closest alternative to an actual dialogue 
between people on seemingly different sides of a divide. 
 
6.3. Limitations of narrative research 
 
6.3.1. Limitations in the literature 
 
The most obvious weakness of the narrative research method is its subjectivity. 
The entire process rests on the subjective interpretation and analysis of the 
researcher. Further, the participants’ involvement is also subjective. Responding 
to this, Lieblich et al write,  
 
“No reading is free of interpretation … The illusion that we have a static text 
of narrative material, and then begin a separate process of reading and 
interpreting it, is far from the truth … Based on our experience, our claim is 
that in the mere act of being together in a room, stating the purpose of the 
encounter, asking questions, relating to the responses, and participating in 
the creation of an atmosphere, some interpretive choices have already 
been made … Narrative studies may profit from the researchers’ 
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sensitivities to and awareness of these subtle processes and their 
willingness to share them with the reader” (1998, 166). 
 
In evaluating quantitative research, the key criteria are reliability, objectivity, 
validity and replicability. These  
 
“contradict the very nature of the narrative approach, which, starting from 
an interpretive viewpoint, asserts that narrative materials – like reality itself 
– can be read, understood and analysed in extremely diverse ways, and 
that by reaching alternative narrative accounts is by no means an indication 
of inadequate scholarship but a manifestation of the wealth of such 
material and the range of different sensitivities of the reader” (Lieblich et 
al., 1998, 171). 
 
How then must one evaluate qualitative research? Runyan (in Lieblich et al., 
1998) argues that there are internal criteria and external criteria. In terms of 
internal criteria, what is important is style, vividness, coherence and apparent 
plausibility; and for external criteria, correspondence with external sources of 
information is essential (Lieblich et al., 1998, 172). He lists several subpoints to 
these criteria that the researcher needs to fulfill: providing ‘insight’ into the person, 
clarifying what was previously meaningless or incomprehensible, suggesting 
previously unseen connections, providing a feel for the person, conveying the 
experience of having known or met him/her, helping us to understand the inner 
subjective world of the person, how s/he thinks about their own situation, 
experiences, problems, and life, deepening our sympathy or empathy for the 
subject, effectively portraying the social and historical world that the person is 
living in, illuminating the causes (and meanings) of relevant events, experiences 
and conditions, being vivid, evocative and emotionally compelling to read. 
 
Lieblich et al. have developed their own criteria, which includes width, coherence, 
insightfulness and parsimony. Width refers to the comprehensiveness of the 
evidence, including the quality of the interview and observations as well as to the 
proposed interpretation or analysis. Coherence refers to the way different parts of 
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the interpretation create a complete and meaningful picture, both internally (how 
the parts fit together) and externally (how it fits in with existing theory and 
research). Insightfulness looks at the sense of innovation or originality in the 
presentation of the story and its analysis; has it resulted in greater insight and 
comprehension regarding the readers own life? Lastly, parsimony refers to the 
ability to provide an analysis based on a small number of concepts, and elegance 
or aesthetic appeal (Lieblich et al., 1998, 173). 
 
Rather than referring to a truth-value, they propose a process of consensual 
validation through sharing one’s views and conclusions and making sense of them 
within a community of researchers and interested, informed individuals (Lieblich et 
al., 1998, 174). This is another reason for sharing the summaries of the life story 
interviews amongst those interviewed and even the completed research project 
was shared with various interested Rwandans and their feedback incorporated 
into the finished product.  
 
6.3.2. Limitations in the Rwandan context 
 
Until quite recently, Rwanda has been described by various researchers as a 
military-state, or even a military dictatorship. Although Rwanda is officially a 
democracy, practicing democratic principles, this is not always the reality. Until 
today, whether due to high levels of trauma or government policy, there remains 
for many an atmosphere of fear, suspicion, uncertainty and insecurity. This level 
of fear is difficult to understand until one is fully immersed in the Rwandan 
context. 
 
In conversations with Rwandans prior to traveling to Rwanda, I was aware that 
they seemed slightly guarded in what they said, but I could not really work out 
why. People did warn me that I needed to be careful about what I said and the 
questions I asked once I was in Rwanda. I took this warning seriously, but also 
quite lightly. On spending a week in Rwanda in 2005, I was fully baptized in a high 
dose of Rwandan fear, suspicion and paranoia. By the end of that week, I was 
looking over my shoulder at every moment, thinking and rethinking every word I 
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spoke and running conversations over and over in my mind to pinpoint possible 
things to be suspicious of. 
 
On the second trip, in the company of two friends who had no prior knowledge or 
experience of the Rwandan situation, I was surprised to find that all three of us 
were fearful and suspicious by the end of our two week stay. A number of people 
said to us that president Kagame is ‘very clever’ and has an omniscient presence 
through his intelligence system. In casual conversation, mention would be made 
time and again of Kagame’s intricate spy network, and that ‘anyone we talk to 
could be one of those spies’. Consequences for saying the wrong thing ran from 
‘mysteriously disappearing’ or being in a sudden fatal accident to at the very least, 
being barred from the country, which has indeed happened to the Belgian 
researcher, Filip Reijntjens.  
 
The fear and suspicion is of such heights that after distributing a newsy, light 
newsletter about my first trip to Rwanda to Rwandan friends, I was horrified to find 
out that one of the Rwandans I had spent some time with during that trip felt the 
need to carry his passport constantly for fear that he might need to flee the 
country as a result of a passing comment I made that might be read as being 
critical of the government. On considering publishing an article on my research 
thus far, a Burundian friend sent an email in which he wrote, “remember that there 
is quite a strong presence of RPF militants in [South Africa], so be careful who 
you talk to there” (Email correspondence, 13 April, 2007). According to several 
Rwandans, a military person chose to embark on a study in the same field as 
mine with the express purpose of keeping an eye on my own and other projects 
researching the Rwandan situation. During my research, I have become more and 
more wary of talking to people and trusting people. I have become suspicious of 
every Rwandan I have interacted with and have found myself wondering, after 
every conversation, what that person wanted me to think and why; what agenda 
they had, what card was up their sleeve. It has become difficult for me to enter 
into a conversation with a Rwandan without wondering what is going on at a level 
I perhaps cannot perceive or interpret. 
 
It is not clear whether this fear and suspicion is grounded in anything real or is the 
most real aspect of Rwandan society imaginable. An outsider reading this may 
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well think this level of fear and absolute paranoia bordering on the absurd. For a 
Rwandan, it is second nature, a way of life. For a Rwandan, it is unthinkable that I 
do not take their warnings ‘not to trust anybody, even me’ absolutely seriously. To 
be told by the vast majority of Rwandans I have interacted with that ‘even what I 
say may not be true, even I have an agenda’ is a potential limitation of my 
research. Focus groups, interviewing strangers and formal interviews of ordinary 
people become a challenge in this context. A relatively close friend has told me 
that he cannot tell me the truth because of fear and because of a lifetime of 
speaking in layers. This pervasive atmosphere of fear in Rwanda hinders open 
dialogue. This is what led me to reject the idea of a focus group. Some Rwandans 
I spoke to felt it would be a waste of time to put Rwandans of different ethnic 
groups, or even the same ethnic group, in the same room, and expect to gain any 
meaningful insight into the Rwandan situation. 
 
This is the background which led to my chosen research methodology, which 
developed during the research journey and differs greatly from my original 
intentions. Analysing this very issue, of fear and suspicion, mistrust and paranoia, 
has formed an important part of my research, and has given a clearer 
understanding of the context in which healing and reconciliation need to occur. 
Being immersed in it myself has allowed me to begin to grasp the complexity of 
being in relationship with someone yet never fully trusting them; loving my country 
but never being sure of where I stand in it; dreaming of reconciliation during the 
day, but having nightmares of being hacked to pieces by a neighbour in the night.    
 
Thus my greatest limitation was this atmosphere of fear, mistrust, suspicion and 
paranoia. This limitation was also my ethical bane. To gain a person’s trust in the 
Rwandan context means so much more than it does in any other context I have 
operated in. At no point did I want to exploit that trust for the purpose of my 
research. And yet this happened in spite of my best intentions. One example of 
this was the betrayal one Rwandan friend experienced when he fully realized that 
every word he spoke in casual conversation with me had the potential of 
becoming a quote in my research project. I had assumed it would be commonly 
understood that anything said relating to my research topic could contribute to my 
final research product but this assumption was not shared with those I was in 
conversation with. After this experience, which took place early in my research, I 
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became a lot more explicit about my desire to use conversations in my research. 
Because conversations often developed unplanned, over breakfast, or drinks in a 
restaurant, it would be difficult to ask permission to use conversations before they 
happened. But I became a lot more conscious about asking after a stimulating 
conversation whether that was ‘on the record’ or not, and whether I could use it in 
my research project. I also talked to my Rwandan friends about my research 
methodology and the implications that would have for them. After understanding 
my approach, most Rwandans I interacted with continued to be open in 
conversations and supported my project.  
 
As the project developed I began to see it less as mine and myself less as 
researcher versus researched, but more and more I saw it as a shared project to 
which we were all contributing for a common purpose. Especially once the life 
story research began, I had the feeling people were sharing details for the 
express purpose of allowing me deeper insight into difficult issues so that more of 
the ‘truth’ would be revealed. Nevertheless, my ethical over-stepping of the 
boundaries in 2005 resulted in much regret, and it is a testimony to the 
tremendous generosity and kindness of the person in question that our friendship 
has continued in such good faith.  
 
Liisa Malkki, whose ethnographic research was amongst Burundian Hutu 
refugees in Tanzania, writes that the success of her fieldwork was not so much 
the result of “a determination to ferret out 'the facts' as on a willingness to leave 
some stones unturned” (1995, 61). She writes that she displayed her trust in her 
informants in not prying where she was not wanted but accepting that which they 
offered her. She argues that there is no guarantee that the 'hidden' will reveal to 
us what we are looking for and that is may be better research not to extract the 
truth just to get to the bottom of the truth (1995, 61). I approached my research 
similarly, not ruthlessly digging into things that people avoided but allowing all 
those I spoke with the space to withdraw, to change the subject, to share as much 
or as little as they were comfortable with, believing that in this very dynamic lay a 




6.4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has explained the narrative research method and the reasons for 
making use of this method in the context of this research project. It has argued for 
an inter-subjective, relational approach which places emphasis on the 
researchers’ interpretation of the data which allows for depth and insights a more 
formal approach might not allow. 
 
The next chapter will explore the four life stories, analysing the content and 
discussing some insights interactions with these four Rwandans brought to the 
fore. It will also focus some attention on the formal and informal interviews in so 
far as they dialogue with the life stories. 
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This chapter will analyse the four life stories, looking at the themes of history, 
identity and reconciliation. In the previous chapter it was explained that the 
narrative research methodology used in this project falls under the 'holistic 
content' model where the entire story and content is taken into consideration. 
Central themes that run through the narrative are considered significant rather 
than the analysis of individual utterances or categorizing specific aspects of the 
narratives (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998, 18).  
 
The four life stories, which were collected in sessions lasting around two hours, 
were recorded on a dictaphone and then transcribed. The transcriptions were 
summarised for the next step in the research project which was to have all four 
participants read each others’ summaries for the follow-up interview. This chapter 
will analyse the life stories, and the following chapter will focus on the participants' 
responses to each others' life stories. 
 
Although the life story interview was open-ended, it made use of several guiding 
questions. The opening question was for the participants to share their story from 
birth until today, describing where they grew up, their family history, their 
education and significant life events. This was followed by the question of when 
they became aware of their ethnic identity and the existence of ethnic groups. 
Next was a series of questions that explored their awareness of what was going 
on politically and socially around them and how that impacted them and their 
understanding of identity. Lastly, they were asked to share their thoughts on how 
they thought reconciliation in Rwanda could become a reality. Coupled with this 
question was the question of what it meant to them to be a Rwandan. The 
following section will give a brief background to each participant's life story before 




7.2. Background to the life stories 
 
The life story interviews were held between October 2007 and September 2008. 
One of the reasons for this long time period was due to geography, as two of the 
participants were in Rwanda and two outside, so the interviews depended on my 
travel schedule. Another reason was the hesitancy of participants to participate 
and the need for several conversations prior to the actual interview. The 
interviews were held at locations decided on by participants and progressed as 
relatively open conversations between us.  
 
Although participants were all relatively relaxed and ready to share their story, 
there was uncertainty about the possibility of being asked 'political' questions 
which might compromise them. Three of the four participants asked me not to ask 
them any direct question about the president or anything that might force them to 
take political sides. Participants were regularly reassured that they did not have to 
answer any question with which they might be uncomfortable. Interestingly, 
though, alongside the fear of being compromised in terms of what they said, all 
four participants expressed a desire to tell the truth as they saw it. For the 
protection of the participants, their names were changed with their consent. 
 
7.2.1. Life story 1: Robert 
 
Robert grew up in Uganda during Idi Amin’s rule. His family lived with other 
Rwandans, called 'Ugandan Rwandese'. For a period, he and his family 
experienced living as refugees in a Rwandan camp in Uganda. After he 
completed his secondary education, he joined the RPA to fight for the refugees to 
be allowed to return to Rwanda. During the interview it became evident that his 
ethnic identity had little significance, and even being a Rwandan meant less to 
Robert than having a place in which he could determine his own future. While 
living in Uganda this was threatened, and returning to Rwanda was more about 
securing his future for education, a career and self-determination as opposed to a 
patriotic act per se. He emphasized his desire for an East African community 
which would allow people to move freely across borders, saying that the denial of 
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entry of Rwandan refugees back into Rwanda prior to 1994 was at the heart of 
much conflict. 
 
7.2.2. Life story 2: Fred 
 
Fred also grew up in Uganda. His parents owned their own home in the capital 
city and lived with other Rwandan families. They never had the experience of 
being in a refugee camp but did experience being negatively treated because they 
were Rwandan. Fred completed his studies in Uganda while the RPA were 
invading Rwanda. It was only after the war and genocide were over that he went 
to Rwanda to see if he could find a job there or make a contribution. He did find a 
job with a humanitarian aid organization and has stayed in Rwanda since then. 
Being a Rwandan is important for Fred largely because it allowed him a sense of 
belonging that he did not experience while living in Uganda.  
 
7.2.3. Life story 3: Francois 
 
Francois’ family was from the south but he grew up in the north, and the north-
south divide plays a significant role in his story. It was only due to the events of 
the early 1990s that he became aware of ethnicity. Because he came from mixed 
ethnic parentage, his sense of belonging to either ethnic group has always been 
in contention. He stayed in Rwanda after the war in the hope of being part of 
something new. After completing school, Francois was sent to an Ingando camp 
and told he needed to fight in the DRC, but he was not interested in going to fight 
and instead left the country. During the interview, Francois stressed repeatedly his 
love for truth and justice and how he felt that these were two things severely 
lacking in Rwandan society today. He had a strong desire to return to Rwanda but 
only if he could feel free to express his views and bring attention to the injustices 
he saw. He felt strongly that no person should be forced to live outside of their 




7.2.4. Life story 4: Reginald 
 
Reginald's family was from the north and his father was a mayor (burgemestre) of 
his district. His father was accused for allegedly participating in a coup against the 
then president, Habyarimana. He spent time in jail and later died in mysterious 
circumstances when Reginald was nine. Reginald's family, although Hutu, was 
thus seen as siding with the RPA against the current government. This placed his 
family in a difficult position during the war as they were seen as the enemy by 
both sides. After the war, Reginald pursued his schooling in Kigali, and then 
attended an Ingando camp where he received military training and education. 
During this time he became increasingly aware of injustices in Rwandan society, 
and like Francois, when he was called to fight in the DRC, chose rather to leave 
the country. Reginald, too, would like to return to Rwanda were he allowed to 
speak freely and be himself. 
 
7.3. Themes in the life stories 
7.3.1. Ethnic identity 
 
Amartya Sen writes about how we have allegiance to a plurality of identities that 
together make us who we are. He argues that we constantly 'explicitly or by 
implication' make choices about which identity we favour over others (2006, 19). 
In the case of the life stories, all four participants rejected simple identification 
along ethnic lines. None was comfortable with being labeled either Hutu or Tutsi 
or as Hutu refugee and Ugandan Tutsi, which are categories into which each 
could be placed on the basis of their histories and present circumstances. Robert 
and Fred, both Ugandan Tutsi, expressed their disinterest in their ethnic 
identification. Robert favoured his allegiance to the East African community 
whereas Fred emphasised his Rwandan identity. Francois was the least 
comfortable with his ethnic identity, having been brought up by a Tutsi mother but 
being labeled Hutu due to his absent father's identity. There was even some 
doubt whether his father's line was in fact Hutu or had had their identity cards 
changed to Hutu at the beginning of the First Republic in order to gain favour with 
the authorities. Reginald was the only participant who seemed to experience pride 
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in his ethnic identity, identifying confidently with being Hutu, but this identification 
seemed secondary to what was far more important to him: being a Rwandan, an 
African and a member of the human race.    
 
For Fred and Robert, ethnic identity played an insignificant role while they were 
growing up in Uganda. They were made constantly aware of their Rwandan 
identity, and this was seen as something derogatory and demeaning, but they 
were not aware of the terms Hutu and Tutsi. Robert’s refugee camp in Uganda, as 
far as he remembers, held both Hutu and Tutsi, but these distinctions meant 
nothing; everyone just wanted to return to Rwanda and leave the country that was 
treating them so badly.  
 
Robert described the RPA as being Pan-Africanist, focused on the African 
continent and a united Rwanda. Their training was not only military but also 
included Rwandan and African politics and history. Robert says,  
 
“In the RPA, Hutu and Tutsi wasn’t spoken about. They dealt with 
segregation with military discipline and strictness. They wanted to show 
that Rwandans could live without those, and it was forbidden. You couldn’t 
even speak of being Tutsi. They promoted patriotism and unity”.   
 
When asked if he felt any hatred towards Hutu during the war, he replied, “Not at 
all. In the military we were mixed and what we were doing was a military 
operation. I never had a background which gave me a reason to hate anyone”. 
 
None of the participants looked the part of their ethnic group. Reginald joked 
during the interview about how his limbs and fingers were too long to be a Hutu 
but his nose too flat to be a Tutsi. Francois similarly described how his neighbours 
always said he was too tall for a Hutu. Fred, although tall, joked that he was too 
heavily built to be a Tutsi. Although all the participants were dismissive of 
appearance as a means of defining ethnic identity, Francois expressed 
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experiencing a distinct lack of belonging in either ethnic group as a result both of 
his appearance and his mixed parentage. He says,  
 
“You can even hear it amongst people, you can sit down, and the people 
you are with think you are Tutsi so they start telling me certain things, then 
they realise I'm a Hutu and change what they were saying. When I'm with a 
Hutu they don't tell me anything. They think, they don't know with this guy. 
You have to fight to convince someone you are a Hutu or a Tutsi. You have 
to fight to say that no matter what I am doing, I am still a Rwandan”. 
 
He describes how as he was growing up he spent more time with his mother’s 
side of the family, who were Tutsi, but never felt he was one of them. During the 
interview he expressed the belief that Tutsi have secrets or inside knowledge that 
Hutu don't have, suggesting this might be intrinsic to being Tutsi. On the other 
hand, his Hutu friends never fully trusted him because of his close interactions 
with Tutsi and so never divulged their true thoughts. This has left him in an 
awkward position, the effects of which he still feels as a refugee today. 
 
Each of the participants seemed to place less value on their ethnic identity than 
other identifications. Each also insisted that there was nothing that made a person 
essentially Hutu or Tutsi apart from upbringing and what they had been taught. 
And yet, Francois' experience as described above brings to attention the myriad 
of unspoken factors that might give a person access to a particular group or not. 
These factors are taken for granted, implicit, assumed and are most probably 
unknown or unrealised by those in the group, but for those forced to remain 
outside they are very real and felt. During informal interviews, the secretiveness of 
the Tutsi was often mentioned and there was a sense that there was a hidden, 
shared knowledge between Tutsi that Hutu would never be able to have access 
to, making Tutsi essentially untrustworthy and unsafe to anyone outside of the 
ethnic group. When discussing ethnic stereotypes, Reginald commented that: 
 
“Tutsi are considered to be superior, more collected, more intelligent, more 
secretive. Hutus are considered to be indifferent, don't care what will 
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happen tomorrow, concerned only with today; derogative depictions were 
used, people who are greedy”.    
 
Elsewhere he describes Hutu as being 'transparent', in opposition to Tutsi who are 
more mysterious. Whether Tutsi experience themselves in this way, or believe 
themselves to have a secret knowledge denied to other was never expressed to 
me by a Tutsi. Two comments may bring this into question, though. The first was 
that several Rwandans, both Hutu and Tutsi, said to me on several occasions that 
Rwandans were not to be trusted and were not likely to tell the truth. But this 
statement was made by people from both ethnic groups and implicated people 
from both ethnic groups. The second was an informal conversation where a Tutsi 
man said he would sit at the same table as a Hutu but he would never trust a 
Hutu. I said that sitting at the same table as a Hutu was a positive step towards 
reconciliation. Another Tutsi friend who was there pointed out to me that the only 
reason he would sit at the same table as a Hutu was because Tutsi were 
expected to show good behaviour and superior manners at all times. Although he 
would pretend to welcome Hutu into his home and share food with them, it would 
be without sincerity and with hidden motives. This story is of course anecdotal but 
it feeds into the belief many Hutu have that the hospitality of a Tutsi, or anything a 
Tutsi may offer, cannot be fully trusted. 
 
7.3.2. Ethnic stereotypes 
 
From the literature and conversations with Rwandans, it was clear to me that 
there was a sense of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority. Although Reginald and 
Francois had many experiences while growing up that confirmed this, growing up 
in Uganda with families who spoke little of ethnicity meant that Robert and Fred 
were much less aware of this.  
 
Robert suggests that his first experiences of ethnic stereotyping was when the 
war started and he heard how Tutsis were classified as animals. After that, the 
survivors and those who came back from the diaspora where there had been a lot 
of segregation, especially in Burundi, wanted to glory in the fact that they have 
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survived. They would strive to show they were superior because they had 
survived. According to Robert, Rwandan Tutsi suffered a great deal in Burundi 
and celebrating their ability to survive was a matter of pride. 
 
Francois was much more direct in response to the questions of ethnic 
stereotypes:  
 
“I don't want to lie now, I'm going to tell you as a Christian, mostly the Tutsi 
they are manipulative. Secondly, Hutu, they are stupid. I say this because 
Hutu sometimes don't know what they want ... I don't know how to put this, 
Hutus have a reaction now and it’s over. You will never see a Tutsi being 
angry now. They keep quiet and you think everything is fine and after a 
while something happens. Hutu get angry quickly. Tutsi try to be clever, 
which doesn't mean they are clever but they think they are which adds to 
their arrogance”. 
 
It is clear that for Francois, who has never found a sense of belonging with either 
Hutu or Tutsi, each group has distinct characteristics, neither of which he feels a 
part. He explains these stereotypes in terms of an example: 
 
“A clear example is how one person was killed and everyone picked up 
machete and started killing other people. It doesn't make sense. But look 
how Tutsi are killing Hutu now. They are killing them slowly, by not allowing 
them to study, for example. They think they are clever but ultimately they 
will fail. The one group uses anger, the other uses [cunning]”.  
 
Reginald admits the existence of these stereotypes but takes them in a far more 
positive light.  
 
“My argument is that we must be able to display those traits without hurting 
others, in a way that is accepting of others. In a way that says, “Yes, thank you 
so much, you are whatever they say you are, strong physically or transparent, 
content with life, etc. So be it! Take pride in that if you want to keep that. If you 
want to change that behaviour then do! If you're intelligent, collected, think 
 
142 
ahead, and a natural leader, then what's wrong with that? There's nothing 
wrong with being Tutsi. As long as it is not used to discriminate against or be 
superior to another. You don't need to compare yourself with the other... 
 
In all typical definitions of Hutu and Tutsi that I've seen in literature and 
experienced there are good and bad qualities, things I wouldn't necessarily 
take on. But there are others I would like to be associated with. I would like to 
be transparent, content with life, I would like to be settled in my heart without 
fear of what might happen tomorrow. But at the same time I would like to plan 
ahead, but without being afraid, I would like to take pride in saying that I have 
good manners, and that I am a natural leader. If we tell a child you are a 
natural leader, they will become one, if we tell them the opposite they'll 
become that”. 
 
Reginald thus suggests an integration of the positive stereotypes of both ethnic 
identities, as opposed to denying that such stereotypes exist. Yet many 
Rwandans have not been able, as Reginald has, to overcome the negative 
implications of what it means to be Hutu and Tutsi, and remain trapped in a cycle 
of believing themselves to be 'less than' and a victim of the others' clever, 
secretive cunning, or 'more than' and deserving of leadership and power due to 
one’s apparent superior ability. 
 
7.3.3. Being a refugee 
 
Interestingly, all four participants have experience of being a refugee. Robert and 
Fred were refugees in Uganda before 1994 and Reginald and Francois have been 
refugees since the late 1990s. All four emphasise the importance of every person 
having access to their home country and having the freedom to decide their own 
future. When asked what it meant for him to be a Rwandan, Fred said the 
following: 
 
“All in all, I have a home, I belong somewhere. I was in Africa but I didn't 
belong anywhere. I feel an added value being in my own environment. I 
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feel I need to protect my own identity as a Rwandan. I wouldn't enjoy 
seeing any Rwandan out as a refugee”. 
 
Both Fred and Robert could see no reason for anyone to stay outside of Rwanda 
but Reginald and Francois said it was impossible for them to live in Rwanda at 
this time. They gave as reasons the injustices, the lack of freedom of speech and 
the inability to freely be who they are, without apology. This latter theme was 
identical to that which Fred and Robert experienced living in Uganda. Robert 
describes an experience at school while playing volleyball. He accidentally 
knocked into another player who turned to him angrily and said, “I've been hit by a 
Rwandan!” The way in which this was said implied that being a Rwandan was 
something dirty and bad. Similarly, Fred describes how at school if children were 
irritated with him, they would say, akayirwanda which is like saying, 'you’re tiny or 
useless', which made him  very frustrated, especially as his family was better off 
in every way (educationally and economically).  
 
These experiences of being seen as something lesser just because of your 
identity and not because of anything you have done was a repeated theme in 
Robert and Fred's life stories and the emotions expressed when mentioning 
specific incidents were frustration, a sense of injustice and an underlying anger. 
These same emotions were expressed by Reginald and Francois as they 
described their lives in Rwanda, both before 1994 and after. Reginald told the 
following childhood story: 
 
“When visiting my friend, the son of the family next door, there was an 
argument between his friend and his sister as to whether a friend who was 
visiting them would buy enough bottles of Fanta to include me or not. I was 
in the room but only my friend knew. As the two children were fighting the 
visitor turned to the mother and said, “Oh my goodness, your children have 
turned into Hutus! This is not the behaviour of imfura”. (Imfura means 'first 
born' and Tutsi consider themselves as having the position of the first born 
in Rwandan society). They continued having this conversation and when 




Variations of this kind of story were mentioned to me by a wide variety of Hutus I 
spoke to formally and informally, and gave them the impression that they were 
'less than' not because of anything they had done but merely because of their 
affiliation to an identity category they didn't even understand at that age. This 
'being less than' just because of affiliation with the Hutu category was repeated 
again after 1994. Francois describes being made to feel guilty or responsible for 
genocide even though he had no part in it. Both he and Reginald describe how 
education was freely available for Tutsi children whose parents had died during 
the war and genocide, but not to Hutu children similarly orphaned. Some Hutus I 
have been in conversation with privately have described being kicked or spat at 
by neighbourhood children while others say they don't feel safe to be outside their 
homes and cannot live a normal, free life. The words of one Hutu were, “This 
doesn't feel like my country any more. I am not safe here.” 
 
The experiences of Reginald and Francois in terms of being a refugee thus hold 
many similarities to those of Fred and Robert. While the latter two experienced 
feeling discriminated against because of their identity while being outside of their 
country, Reginald and Francois experience being discriminated against within 
their own country. And yet all four long for the same thing, the right to make 
decisions about their own future, access to education and a career, a family living 
together freely in their own country, the freedom to be who they are without being 
made to feel like they are 'less than'. The following section will explore this further 
in terms of what it means to the participants to be a Rwandan.  
 
7.3.4. Being a Rwandan 
 
For some, their Rwandan identity meant more than for others. Both Fred and 
Robert expressed relief to be proud of being a Rwandan after their experiences in 
Uganda. However, Robert believes far more in an East African identity: 
 
“We still have a lot of problems in the region which are coming from the 
problem of nationality and citizenship. Oppressing people of other 
nationalities, like oppressing Rwandans in Tanzania and Uganda, is a 
failure of African leaders and they don’t realize that these identity crises 
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lead to political crises and violence. This is something that needs to be 
addressed at a regional, policy level. If there had been no reason to leave 
Uganda I would not have gone to Rwanda. If people had security there 
would be no need to engage in violence. If there was an East African 
Community that secured people’s futures there would be no need for 
nationalities”. 
 
Robert said during his interview that he would like young people to be given the 
chance to live their lives identifying themselves according to their nationality, and 
not suffer the consequences of what their parents, cousins or whoever might have 
done. He added that all Rwandans should have the chance of growing up as 
Rwandan. 
 
But this becomes a complex challenge in a country flooded with people who have 
lived outside of Rwanda for most of their lives. I asked Fred whether there is any 
conflict in Rwanda because of there being so many people from all over the 
diaspora. He responded with a joke, “My only fear is that because we don't all 
know our family lines because we are all coming from different areas and are 
young we may end up marrying our family members!” On a more serious note he 
added that groups may have formed according to their backgrounds; those who 
had lived together in the Congo might still feel an affiliation to one another, as 
might Rwandans who had lived in Uganda or Tanzania. “You meet someone and 
start speaking Kinyarwanda and you put in a French word. The moment you put in 
a French word I know you have a French background”. But he emphasizes that 
your background doesn't make you more or less Rwandan. He adds that there is 
even a community of Rwandans who studied in Russia.  
 
Speaking of the survivors he mentioned how some may feel jealous of those from 
the diaspora as they come with big families who weren't affected by genocide. He 
adds,  
 
“Some might say, if the Rwandans from Uganda had not attacked maybe 
genocide would not have happened. Such things come up. It doesn't 
please us at all. We from Uganda may be proud that we started this whole 
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thing so that everyone could get home, another is not so happy about it: 
'When you came, I lost. I lost riches, I lost my families. Now you are here 
you are useless to me.' You can't bring back the dead. But in a struggle 
you have to forfeit something. Myself, mother’s side they lost five brothers 
who died in the war”.  
 
It is with such difficult realities that Rwanda has to grapple in terms of national 
identity.  Yet both he and Robert remain confident that in time everyone will be 
able to internalise a new, united identity all can be proud of. 
 
However, this hope seems elusive for Reginald and Francois. A recurring theme 
in both their interviews was that being Rwandan today seemed to go hand in hand 
with accepting a certain version of Rwandan history and of what happened during 
and around 1994. Further, being Rwandan seemed to require being trained for the 
military and being sent to fight in the DRC. Francois struggled to be proud of 
being a Rwandan at all as every time he mentioned where he came from he 
sensed people wondering if he was a killer. Reginald expressed being far more 
proud of being a Rwandan, but reappropriated what that might mean in a poetic 
statement: 
 
“Victimhood is a choice. So is endurance, forgiveness and hope. I am 
proud to be Rwandan, and grateful for all the experiences brought through 
what horrified the entire world. I believe from Rwanda will come what 
glorifies our humanity too. I want to experience and be part of that glory. As 
to the meaning of being Rwandan, it is a living question to which I hope to 
find an evolving answer as my journey unfolds”. 
 
Thus Rwandan identity remains a complex issue which is constantly impacted on 








7.3.5. The impact of history on identity 
 
When asked whether there is actually a difference between Hutu and Tutsi or 
something that makes a person essentially Hutu or Tutsi, each of the participants 
began to talk about Rwandan history and the impact it had on ethnic identity. It 
was clear that each participant struggled with articulating the constructedness of 
ethnic identity while also acknowledging its prevailing reality in Rwandan society. 
There was an agreement that physical features were not decisive at all but that 
other factors, primarily due to upbringing, played a role. 
 
Robert suggested that the economic activities of being either nomadic pastoralists 
(Tutsi) or cultivators (Hutu) influenced the kinds of songs or cultural activities that 
developed. People who live a nomadic life have different behaviours based on 
their lifestyle and life experiences. He says that nomadic people, whether in 
Rwanda, Tanzania or elsewhere in the area, are similar in that they use similar 
utensils and similar customs, for example.  
 
Fred's response to the same question was: 
 
“I wonder what you’re calling ethnic? This thing is very hard to explain. I might 
claim I’m Tutsi but when you go back to the colonial times, physical 
appearance was measured and then you are classified as Tutsi … You were 
classified on the basis of your appearance and wealth. If you were Hutu and 
became rich you could become a Tutsi … There is a term in Kinyarwanda 
that says to grow out of Hutuness”. 
 
Fred captures here the complex development of ethnic terminology and identity in 
Rwanda. He joked during the interview that were the colonialists to return to 
Rwanda today to classify his family, they would classify some as Hutu and some 
as Tutsi. He adds that there has been a lot of intermarriage, not only between 
Hutu and Tutsi but between Rwandans and other east Africans, making identity 




Francois easily dismissed ethnic identity as a construction of Belgium colonialism. 
He has seen in his own family how easily this construction has been manipulated 
when he discovered from his grandfather after the genocide that his family had 
had their ethnic identity changed from Tutsi to Hutu during the 1950s. His 
continual experience has been of not belonging in either group and it is clear that 
this leaves him frustrated. Reginald, on the other hand, is the only participant to 
insist that there was such an identity as being Hutu or being Tutsi prior to 
colonialism, although their meaning may have been different.  
 
“We have proverbs or sayings in Kinyarwanda that go back to long before 
colonialism which imply that there were Hutu and Tutsi. Storytellers clearly 
indicated that there were Hutu, Tutsi and Twa; the Twa always playing a funny 
role in the stories. But in history (...) Rwanda had a king. The king was neither 
Hutu nor Tutsi but he did come from the Tutsi identity. There is a saying in 
Rwanda that were the king to resign his throne he would become a Tutsi 
again. In the stories we had, if the king was demoted he would be a Tutsi and 
in the following one he would be Hutu (...) Yes, there were Hutu and Tutsi and 
people were told who they are. In Rwandan stories and sayings there would 
be a question, 'How many Hutu do you have?'” 
 
When asked what role colonialism might have played in terms of this, he 
responded: 
 
“It's not an either/or situation in my mind. There were migrations. But Tutsi 
were more from the north and Hutu were more from Chad, more Bantu. That 
story to me makes sense. However, I don't think that there is a Hutu or Tutsi 
there who can claim to have only Hutu or Tutsi blood”. 
 
This leads Reginald to the conclusion that people need the freedom to choose 
what they identify themselves with but doesn't see this as a threat to a united 
Rwandan identity. 
 
Several of the participants point at how politics and the struggle for power have 
played a significant role in the development of ethnic identity and division. 




“What makes me feel I am a Hutu or Tutsi? Politics! If the Hutus win power, 
I am 100% a Hutu, if not, I have nothing to do with them - this is the game 
people are playing. That's maybe my stupidity, I don't see any difference 
between Hutu and Tutsi except what the stupid Belgians said about our 
differences. Biologically can you prove anything? My mother is a Tutsi but 
she is short. What makes people different? Parenting plays a big role, and 
politics”. 
 
Reginald takes this further in saying that until today, politicians have manipulated 
ethnic identity to their advantage: 
 
“Everyone wants to describe their history in a way that suits them, that makes 
them to be the victim. The intention is to justify whatever wrong doing is done 
to the other. If you read the two versions, they conflict with each other. The 
former wants to make Hutu the victim of the Tutsi and justify the revolution and 
the war and the defense of national pride and democracy because of being the 
majority... The other says those things didn't exist, there was no slavery, there 
was no such thing as the revolution, things were orchestrated by the 
colonialists... But both stories break down, as if those things didn't exist Tutsi 
refugees would not have had to go into exile and the genocide of Tutsi would 
never have happened”.  
 
Having said this, as they grapple with the difficulty of articulating a constructed yet 
prevalent ethnic identity, each of the participants would most likely agree with 
Fred's words: 
 
“I would claim I’m a Tutsi because that’s what I’ve been told but genetically, if 
I look back a hundred years, am I one? Where do I belong? I don’t know. I 





7.3.6. Reconciliation   
 
Where the participants differed the most was with regard to reconciliation. Robert 
and Fred both defended and supported the current efforts made towards 
reconciliation by the government and felt Rwanda was making good progress. 
Francois and Reginald were very critical of the current policies and approaches 
related to reconciliation and saw this as a primary reason for remaining outside 
the country. 
 
Robert, like the other participants, says he would like everyone to have a chance 
to grow up as a Rwandan. I asked him about the government's law against 
inciting divisionism, which seemed to others I had spoken to as a means of 
controlling freedom of speech and criticism aimed at the government.  He 
responded,    
 
“To stop all the division one has to be very strict. It's not something you can 
theorise about…It takes too much to hate someone, to kill someone, to kill 
your wife, your kids. Anything that can save future generations from a 
mentality that will lead to that, is worth it”.  
 
He argued that the government needed to step in and protect people from 
allowing their differences to lead to genocide through 'strict' policy and legislation.  
 
“A strong policy can assist the process of leaving behind differences – until 
people are ready to talk and think about these things without it inciting 
violence. The issue is very sensitive, the wounds are very fresh”. 
 
As can be seen here, he believes the strict approach is a temporary measure until 
the wounds have been healed and there is an atmosphere more conducive to 
open dialogue.  
 
Although Reginald and Francois had much to say on the injustices they felt were 
present in Rwandan society today only Fred commented directly on issues of 




“They should be punished and they should pay back... If we feel sorry, or 
say this is a child, it was his father who killed, we shouldn't touch his 
property as the son will stay poor, I don't think that is the way it should 
work. We have a justice system and the justice system should do its work. 
People should be brought to justice. The whole world should understand 
this was a crime that was performed that should be punished. If they just 
leave it like that and they don't take measures even the so-called 
reconciliation will never be there. How can reconciliation be there if some 
deny genocide happened? They need to admit that the mistake was there. 
If that mistake is there we punish it. You accept you are wrong, I accept 
you did this to me, now this is the moment we come together, we reconcile. 
But if you are left free ... because the so-called human rights organizations 
are protecting you, I don't see reconciliation happening. If they bring people 
to justice, people admit they were wrong, we can sit at the same table and 
say, okay, how will we move forward”. 
 
But it is partly this position that worries Reginald and Francois. Both made 
mention of what they felt to be an injustice in Rwanda: that the son of an RPF 
soldier who died is looked after by a government supported fund but the son of a 
former Rwandan government soldier is held responsible for his father's behaviour. 
Even though both children were caught up in a war not of their own making, the 
one is made to suffer for it for the rest of his life and haves his future choices 
limited by this, while the other is favoured and given opportunities for his future. 
Fred himself mentions the challenge presented here but sees no way around it: 
 
“There are a lot of divisions here that are hard to understand. They [the 
perpetrators] feel out of place. You find organizations to help children of the 
survivors to go to school or to have shelter because their houses were 
destroyed. But that group you are mentioning [the perpetrators] are not 
considered ... they died in war, they are the ones that were fighting or they 
are there in the Congo. This child is as vulnerable as the other one, but 
these are the conditions of politics and wars. Such things are there. 
Sometimes you feel sorry for that person but what can you do? Not so 
much. You see the father has property but because of the law that property 
has been impounded to settle what the father did, but the father is dead 
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and the child is paying. Or the father is in the bush and the child doesn't 
want to talk about it. These are the after effects of war. They are there”.  
 
Even though these challenges remain a reality, Fred sees a clear path ahead for 
reconciliation.   
 
“I think [Rwanda is] moving on because the phases are so clear. One, the 
justice system is doing their work. We feel they are doing something. The 
international community is disappointing us, it is not doing what it’s 
supposed to be doing. If you are to bring people to justice let us do it in the 
quickest possible time and then we forget all about that phase. But they 
take too long on that. And Rwanda stepped in with the gacaca system. 
Groups of people are judged. Sometimes there are failures of people being 
competent in justice but there are other levels to rectify that. But whatever 
the case, it is faster than the Arusha court. People are brought to justice, 
and after most of the gacaca courts are closed, people have been judged 
and need to pay back by doing physical work ... doing something for the 
community. Justice is taking its steps, and if that one is going on I see 
reconciliation as not being very far. We are about to move on which is the 
way forward. The NURC is trying to do that as the other phases are getting 
through. With time I believe the other phases will be getting through”. 
 
For Francois, principles of truth and inequality lead him to an alternative 
viewpoint: 
 
“If someone were to say, “Tutsi did not kill people” but then in five years the 
truth comes out that they did, what then? But you only want to believe what 
you already know. Always, we are busy lying. Now if my parents, I know 
were killed by the RPF, maybe in Rwanda or probably in the DRC [and] it 
happens that you become my friend and your parents have been killed by 
Hutu or interehamwe, now I have someone to pay for me but you don't 
have anyone to pay for you for school fees. Just because of what your tribe 




Another theme that arose was being forced to do military training and fight in the 
DRC. For both Reginald and Francois, this was not in line with their expectations 
of a democractic country at peace. When asked why he did not want to stay in 
Rwanda and rebuild the country, he responded: 
 
“So, rebuilding a country, so I really thought we would be in a country that 
would be having peace, but my expectations were not met. I was keen to 
help but the system did not allow it. If you take a high school student and 
force them to military training, that is not right ... It happened to me three 
times that I was called from high school for military training but each time I 
escaped ... The system did not allow me to do what I dreamed to do”.  
 
Further, Francois argued that no one is innocent and this makes punishing people 
a complex issue. Rather, he argues that only punishing some or unjustly 
punishing the wrong people can result in yet another crisis requiring justice and 
reconciliation. 
 
“If you deny as a Hutu that Hutu killed you are either one of those killers or 
there is something wrong. But also Tutsi are not innocent. The innocent 
people are those who were killed ... The solution, if one hits you is not to hit 
back ... But you find that this person is not in jail. Probably, he is innocent. 
But we don't want to see him because he is Hutu. So we put him in jail 
because we have the power and the rights to do it. So now the survivor is 
no longer innocent. We are creating something similar as what was done”.  
 
I asked Francois what would need to be in place for him to return to Rwanda. He 
said that he wanted to see a government that was not obviously affiliated to any 
ethnic group. Further, he would want a leadership in place that allowed all 
Rwandans to feel free and punished those who were guilty, regardless of their 
ethnicity. “What is happening now is that people with power who have any links to 
the opposition are being removed, accused of crimes. Or else, people from the 
street are being jailed without knowing or understanding what they did” and that 
they should rather be educated and reinstated in society. Reginald adds to this 
that the problem in Rwanda is that its history has always been one-sided in 
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support of those in power. The truth about history needs to be revealed, according 
to him, in order for justice and reconciliation to take place. 
 
When asking what would bring about reconciliation, Robert suggests that practical 
projects in which people can get involved will assist the process of reconciliation. 
He argues for activities such as theatre or school events that bring people 
together. But he suggests the approach needs to be something you can plan, 
execute and then evaluate the results. I asked him about workshops where 
people could dialogue and his response was that these would “become too 
difficult to control. People become traumatized”. He says that this, as with the 
remembrance days, reminds people of what happened and incites hatred 
amongst the survivors. He does, however, feel that debate should take place in 
writing (in the media) as between memorials there is little debate and discussion. 
When I suggested that many people were afraid to discuss anything genocide 
related due to the divisionism law, he said they shouldn't be afraid as “You are not 
arrested for talking. You are arrested for inciting”.  I then described the fear of 
some of my Hutu friends outside of Rwanda. 
 
“The fear is not substantiated. There are very distinct things you can be 
punished for by law. Through staying outside of Rwanda they have not 
seen how the country has progressed. I think it has to do with exposure to 
changes over time (…) They have not gone through the process of the 
country’s changes. They have been targeted by oppositional media with 
negative stories”.   
 
Yet both Reginald and Francois feel they cannot speak out about the injustice 
they see. Francois said, 
 
“As a Christian I don't like to see injustice happening. If you're my brother 
and you're missing the point I will tell you. I won't keep quiet because you 
are my brother. When I see injustice somewhere I don't tolerate it, I have to 
say, this must stop (…) Someone you know is innocent is treated unjustly 




Francois insists that the truth must come out. “What is known in Rwanda is only 
one side of the story. If both sides of the story are known no one is going to ask 
question ... Now, someone reads an article about Rwanda and asks if it is true I 
have to explain that this is half the story but there is more to it too”. It is difficult for 
Francois to endorse the punishment of those guilty of genocide when others just 
as guilty of heinous crimes walk free just because of their ethnic identity. 
 
When speaking about future generations, Robert suggests that he would not want 
to tell his children their ethnic identity. They would probably find this out from 
society but as far as he is concerned, all they need to know is that they are 
Rwandan. Francois is less optimistic. He says that when he was a child he knew 
very little about ethnicity but that children today know too much as many of them 
are taken to the genocide memorial where ”he will read on those walls that Hutu 
killed Tutsi. So his way of thinking will be different from me when I was growing 
up”. 
 
For Reginald and Francois, a major issue is the contradiction they see in the 
government's position on ethnicity. According to them, on the one hand the 
government preaches the message that “we are all Rwandan” and has outlawed 
the use of ethnic categories. On the other, they insist that a genocide of Tutsi took 
place and that it is Tutsi survivors that need to be looked after by the government. 
Both advocate accepting and coming to terms with ethnic identity rather than 
denying or disallowing its existence. As Francois says, “We need to sit down 
together, without denying you are a Hutu – because I don't agree with the RPF 
idea of saying we are all Rwandan. No, no, no. We can't deny our identity. If you 
feel you are a Hutu or a Tutsi, fine, but can you allow each other to stay together”. 
Reginald feels strongly that ethnic identity needs to be dealt with openly: 
 
“How is reconciliation possible if there are not Hutu and Tutsi to reconcile with 
each other? Otherwise we need to reconcile the RPF with the former army or 
the current government and the former government... There are two groups 
that need to be reconciled. People went into exile in the past because they 
were Tutsi. The RPF accused the former government of genocide against 
Tutsi so there must be Tutsi. [Ethnic identity] should be an essential part of 
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people's dignity. Whichever way you choose to tell Rwandan history, you need 
to know what your history is and take pride in it”.  
 
Reginald believes that a reappropriation of ethnic identity towards something 
positive and unifying, as opposed to the suppression of ethnic identity, is the way 
forward. 
 
“My argument is that we must be able to display those [ethnic] traits without 
hurting others, in a way that is accepting of others ... People say Hutu were in 
slavery but we are here now. So what? If you take pride in having such a 
difficult past and making it to where you are now, out of slavery, then that is 
something to celebrate! Why wouldn't you, rather than feeling victimised. Also, 
[as regards Tutsi history], so what? In all typical definitions of Hutu and Tutsi 
that I've seen in literature and experienced there are good and bad qualities, 
things I wouldn't necessarily take on. But there are others I would like to be 
associated with”. 
 
Although each of the participants prefers a different path to get there, all four 




This chapter has outlined themes that emerged from the life stories. All four 
participants revealed a similar desire for all Rwandans to be free to be themselves 
in the new Rwanda, but they differed on how to make this a reality. For Robert 
and Fred, the strict government laws and policies, such as the divisionism law, the 
protection of survivors, and the execution of justice for genocide related crimes, 
seemed the best way forward for reconciliation. Such an approach seemed 
necessary due to the risk of renewed violence. For Reginald and Francois, these 
laws and policies were seen as the root cause of injustices and an impediment to 
freedom of speech and the freedom to be themselves.  
 
All four have experience of what it means to be a refugee and what it feels like to 
be treated badly, not because of having done anything wrong but merely for 
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belonging to a particular identity classification. This common experience between 
participants seems to me to be a starting point for dialogue. The shared desire for 
a country of which all Rwandans can be proud is a vision all four participants may 
be willing to build on. In the following chapter, this tentative dialogue between the 
participants through their summaries and dialogue with myself as mediator will be 
described. Along with this, the Reconciliation Forum, where thirty-five community 
leaders debated reconciliation and forgiveness, will be analysed. They, along with 
all those interviewed, would probably agree with Francois’ words with which this 
chapter concludes, “I can't feel like I am on the side of Hutu because I want to be 
part of Rwandans who want peace”.  
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The previous chapter ended on the positive and hopeful note that the shared 
experience of having been outside Rwanda and the shared desire for a united 
Rwanda would be a starting point for reconciliatory dialogue. This chapter will 
show that although this is partially true, the divisive narratives described in the first 
four chapters of this thesis pose a challenge to the possibility of reconciliatory 
dialogue.  
 
As we explore the follow-up interviews, which form a dialogue between the four 
Rwandans of the previous chapter, this chapter will show how, on the one hand, 
we have a group of people who see Rwandan society as safe, united and 
progressive, and on the other, as dangerous, divided and false. Apart from the 
interviews around the life stories this chapter will also examine the dialogue that 
arose during a conference on reconciliation that took place in a rural district in 
Rwanda. Here, thirty-five district leaders who sit on a government initiated 
Reconciliation Forum, discussed and debated whether reconciliation was taking 
place in Rwanda or not. Although a genuine desire for open dialogue was 
expressed by all participants, they had mixed levels of optimism about the 
progress. 
 
As mentioned before, the issue at hand is not who is right or what the truth is but 
to look at the impact these divisive ways of seeing reality have on the possibility of 
reconciliation. This chapter will point to both the challenges that the divisive 
narratives portray as well as the possible opportunities that came to light in the 





8.2. Critical reflection on the life stories  
 
The life story interviews were held between August, 2007 and September, 2008. 
The follow-up interviews were held between May and September, 2009. This 
means that there was approximately a year to a year-and-a-half between the 
initial interviews and the follow-up interviews. This allowed for interesting dialogue 
around what had changed in the intervening time. Robert and Fred were more 
realistic and open about some of the challenges in Rwanda. Francois was more 
cynical of the process of reconciliation in Rwanda and expressed a higher degree 
of fear than in the initial interview. Reginald was guardedly positive about the 
development of Rwanda’s infrastructure but remained skeptical of the 
government’s motives and the possibility of reconciliation. 
 
From the interviews several themes emerged which have been arranged below as 
a dialogue between the participants even though they did not speak with one 
another. However, the positions of each of these themes were presented to each 
participant in order for them to respond to. The themes include perspective on the 
country as things have developed over the past ten years including injustice and 
freedom of speech, forced conscription and Ingando, power relations in Rwanda 
and homecoming and reconciliation. 
 
8.2.1. Perspectives on the Rwandan context 
 
During the follow-up interviews, of the four Rwandan men interviewed, Francois 
was significantly the most negative about progress and reconciliation in Rwanda. 
When I described to him the positive changes I had seen in visiting the country 
over a five year period, he responded that you can’t base what you see on the 
street as an indicator of what is actually going on. He then recounted some of the 
reasons for his negativity. He began by referring to the growing evidence of RPF 
crimes during and directly after the genocide. He made mention of evidence 
emerging at the trials held at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) in Arusha that the genocide was in fact not preplanned, which suggests 
that it is was not a genocide but rather a civil war that took place in 1994. 
Supporting this allegation he asks why the United Nations did not investigate the 
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plane crash which incited the killing in April of 1994 directly after the genocide, 
unless it was to hide something that they knew. 
 
Francois stated that all Rwandans know the truth but are not speaking out about 
it. The strongest emotion during the interview was a deep sense of fear. Francois 
saw the government as one that has control over everything and a desire to hold 
onto power at whatever cost. While speaking, Francois on several occasions 
warned me to be careful with my research and further to be careful with what I 
sent through my email accounts or said over the telephone as everything could 
potentially be tapped. 
 
Mention was made that the government was systematically eradicating educated 
people that were seen as opponents through accusing them of corruption and 
then having them jailed, or having them accused of participating in genocide or 
spreading genocide ideology. He then said that there is a “need for a new 
revolution like the one in 1959” and suggested this was brewing under the 
surface. He described a growing anger and resentment due to so many people 
being silenced as a result of so much injustice. He argued that teachers are 
forced to take early retirement as schools change their modem of language from 
French to English. Most French speaking teachers are Hutu and the new English 
speaking teachers that take their place are Tutsi. 
 
When this perspective was placed before Robert, he proposed an interesting 
interpretation. He described the enormous pressure on ordinary Rwandans, 
especially young Hutus. He described how in a very short space of time, Rwanda 
had transformed itself from being a country operating according to a traditional 
economic and societal structure to a western one. Development has become 
Rwanda’s focus together with a very rapid introduction of technology. There is 
pressure on Rwandans to be wealthy and yet there is a harsh response to 
corruption. Many people travel and bring with them new ideas and ways of doing 
things. Due to the government’s vision for progress and development, they have 
replaced French and the Francophone system, which they believe has brought 
much damage to Rwanda, with English and new political and developmental 




Robert suggests that these many changes, which have taken place in the short 
space of ten years, have created a lot of insecurity and pressure for the ordinary 
Rwandan. Coupled with this, he describes how the vast majority of Tutsi in the 
country are linked to survivors whereas the vast majority of Hutu in the country 
are linked to perpetrators. The genocide is a daily topic of conversation that 
everyone is confronted with constantly. Although Robert believes it important to 
talk about what happened he believes this also makes it difficult for people to 
move on, especially for young Hutus who have to work through many complex 
and difficult emotions. 
 
In the context of a rapidly changing society, and the burden of living in a society in 
which a million people were killed, Robert says it is not hard to imagine why what 
he calls ‘negative feedback loops’ may develop, which allow for everything that 
the government does to be interpreted along the lines of conspiracy and control. 
These negative feedback loops are intensified, he suggests, by the government’s 
aggressive hunting down of high ranking genocidal leaders all over the world. 
These leaders are tapped into networks in the diaspora. Those in the diaspora 
may see that high ranking officials have their phones or email accounts tapped 
and witness their arrests, and assume this is the government’s treatment of all 
Rwandans. But Robert thinks it unlikely that the government would have the 
resources or interest in following the lives of most Rwandans in the diaspora, 
particularly young Rwandans who were not old enough to participate in the 
genocide in 1994. 
 
When presented with Robert’s version of the Rwandan context, Reginald said that 
“fantastic things have happened in Rwanda” with regards to development and 
progress and that “credit must go to where it is due”. However, he remains 
skeptical of the government’s motives. He argues that if Robert’s version of 
events in Rwanda were true then he cannot understand why criticism of the 
government was not being dealt with on a public platform. If the Francophone 
system was being replaced with an English system for the good of the Rwandan 
people, why were there not public platforms for people to debate and discuss 
this? “The consequences [of government policy] are not being addressed in the 
public arena,” argued Reginald. He suggested that the government has adopted a 
good strategy of developing the country and insisting on “one version of history 
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long enough until it is true” but that he does not trust the motives behind this as 
being for the good of all Rwandans. He is also skeptical of the move from an 
economic system dependent on agriculture, which places power in the hand of 
every farmer, to a service-based economy which is controlled by a few powerful 
people. 
 
On the question of individuals in the diaspora being followed by the government, 
he says that, as unlikely as it seems, he was surprised when one of his refugee 
friends was contacted on his cell phone by the Rwandan embassy in his host 
country. Officially, refugees should not be contacted or acknowledged by their 
countries of origin and in the case he cited, his friend had never given his contact 
details to the embassy. These stories incite fear and suspicion. 
 
Francois, more cynically than Reginald, feels that Robert’s theory of a negative 
feedback loop is only a guise to hide what the government is really up to, although 
exactly what that might be remains unclear. During the interview he handed me a 
document signed by a woman who alleges that her husband was assassinated by 
the Rwandan government in June, 2009. This allegation can be found on several 
websites which suggest that the author’s husband, a Tutsi with a high ranking 
position in the Rwandan army,  was hired by the government to help make people 
the government deemed to be a threat ‘disappear’. The author’s husband became 
progressively uncomfortable with this job and began to protest. One night, in June 
2009, gunmen entered her home and shot her husband while she and her 
children managed to escape. Following websites such as these can instill a sense 
of fear and conspiracy, particularly if they are supported by alleged witness 
accounts which are then spread through the diaspora. These allegations are 
difficult to verify but have a powerful effect on those following them. 
 
8.2.2. Injustice and freedom of speech 
 
Apart from fear of the government, Francois also highlighted the injustices that he 
feels need to be taken seriously before reconciliation can take place.  He says,  
 
“I can’t reconcile with you until you accept what you have done. The RPF 
needs to say what they did. People were orphaned. How can we ignore 
 
163 
that? … I have friends who have family members killed by the RPF and 
they can’t say anything about it. How can there then be reconciliation?” 
 
Francois suggests that a way forward would be to have an external mediator. He 
identified three groups, namely, Hutu extremists, Tutsi extremists and moderates 
in the middle. The Hutu extremists blame everything on the RPF. The Tutsi 
extremists blame everything on the genocidaires. It’s hard to find people in the 
middle. I suggested that President Kagame may be in the middle in that he 
releases prisoners and tries to reintegrate people back into society but Francois 
responded by asking how many Hutu students are studying on government 
scholarships abroad compared to Tutsi students? He added that jobs are 
reserved for Tutsi. Hutus might hire Hutus as they fear the Tutsi may be spies but 
Tutsi will hire Tutsi. He argued that the president is making diplomatic decisions to 
protect his position of power. 
 
Yet another fear of Francois is the lack of freedom of speech. He says that not 
only do people keep quiet about the ‘truth that everyone knows’ but that there is 
no room for public debate. In response to this, Fred suggests that the Rwandan 
government is doing the best they can on limited resources. One of the major 
challenges is the competence of journalists. Investigative journalism has a long 
way to go in Rwanda and journalists may be shut down not because they are 
exposing things but because they are printing rumours and gossip rather than 
carefully and thoroughly investigating issues and allegations. Fred adds that there 
are newspapers, such as Umeseso, which are critical of the government and 
widely read on the street without being under threat. 
 
Robert further describes how the governments National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) is working hard to bring public debate into communities, 
encouraging people to talk about controversial and difficult topics together in 
public spaces. He adds that NURC’s work is probably not moving fast enough to 
counter the powerful negative feedback loops that spread by word of mouth but 





Where the focus of NURC’s efforts were on the reasons for genocide and what 
happened, Robert suggests that now they are moving towards more positive 
stories, including rewarding people who did good and heroic deeds during 
genocide. These awards are an acknowledgement that not everyone was 
collectively guilty during genocide but that there were also positive things that 
happened that can form the foundations for a new vision for the country. 
 
Reginald repeats that the need for public debate is urgent. Even if there were 
public debates on critical issues, he argues that Rwandans have a “particular way 
to tell their story”. He suggests that there is an unspoken understanding between 
Rwandans that only certain topics can be addressed and critical issues are 
addressed in particular acceptable ways. People are scared, and however difficult 
it may be to articulate why, “the bottom line is that they are”. One of the things that 
cannot be publically debated, for example, is the government’s version of the 
genocide story.  
 
Both Francois and Reginald feel that the problem of freedom of speech is 
exacerbated by the lack of political opposition. National elections take place in 
2010, but Francois is doubtful that they will mean anything in a one-party state. 
He says that the reconciliation process in Rwanda is like putting a bandage on a 
sore muscle instead of massaging and healing the muscle. It is all about creating 
an appearance of development and progress to impress donors when under the 
surface there are issues that are not being addressed. 
 
When I described the improved circumstances of Hutu friends in Kigali, Francois 
responded by saying that in Kigali people generally don’t know each other and 
people from all over the country and the diaspora live side by side. In the city, 
people have access to resources such as lawyers and can protect their property 
and livelihood. But in the rural areas, everyone knows each other well and has 
lived together for generations. People live alongside those who killed their family 
members. There is no access to the legal system or other resources and it is 
difficult to protect yourself against others who may accuse you of genocide or 




On the question of genocide ideology, I mentioned to Robert that this creates a lot 
of fear within the country as well as a feeling that everyone is part of a spy 
network. I told him of a friend of mine who admitted that were I to mention the 
name of a Hutu friend who spoke against the government, they would feel 
compelled to report him to the government. Robert responded that the ordinary 
Rwandan wants to be a good citizen but are not always aware of what that 
involves. He doubted that the government would have the resources or the 
interest in following up every individual Hutu who might say something negative in 
a private conversation. They may be interested in following up teachers or people 
in public positions who were trying to pass on genocidal ideologies to others. He 
referred again to the pressure many Rwandans are under to maintain a high 
standard of living with competition for jobs and resources and that being a model 
citizen is something to strive for and may lead people to an exaggerated 
compliance to laws in a way that the government did not intend. 
 
8.2.3. Forced conscription and Ingando 
 
Interestingly, in the initial interviews both Francois and Reginald had mentioned 
that one of the reasons they had left Rwanda was because, after the Ingando 
training, they would be forced to fight in the DRC. Fred and Robert responded to 
this saying they had never heard of forced conscription in Rwanda. Robert, being 
of a similar age to Francois and Reginald, had never been called to fight. When I 
mentioned this to Reginald, he said that there is no longer forced conscription but 
there was in 1998 and 1999. “I don’t need to debate this one. I narrowly escaped 
conscription to the army,” Reginald states simply.  
 
Both Robert and Fred were supportive of the Ingando camps. Fred said it was 
part of tertiary school training and used the example of Israel where in a country 
that faces war, it is useful for its young people to have some military training. He 
experienced something similar while growing up in Uganda. He describes the 
purposes as educative and to ‘sensitize’ people. Robert adds the reason of 





8.2.4. Power relations 
 
Alongside the injustices that Francois sees in Rwanda, he argues that all the 
power lies in the hands of the former RPF and Rwandans from Uganda. Both 
Robert and Fred, being from Uganda, admit that this is true. Robert says that on 
entering Rwanda, the country was devastated, with Hutu and those Tutsi who 
survived all fleeing Kigali in fear and confusion. As a result, the RPF had to set up 
administrative systems from scratch, drawing their resources largely from a 
military staff. As the country started rebuilding itself, it was difficult to then remove 
the RPF and Ugandan people from the high positions they held, especially, as 
Robert points out, when the military works according to rank and experience. It 
would be very difficult to demote or remove people of high rank and experience in 
order to make room for non-Ugandans of lesser ranks. Both Robert and Fred feel 
this needs to change and that it will change in time, but for now it remains a reality 
that much of Rwandan economic and military power does indeed lie in the hands 
of Ugandans. 
 
Alongside this, Fred reacted with some offense to the allegations that Ugandans 
were given handouts as he felt that everything he has he worked for. When he 
came into the country he had nothing but has built up a life for himself. He feels 
that some others from the diaspora, like Tanzania and Burundi, may come to 
Rwanda expecting to be given jobs and homes on a platter and are not prepared 
to put in the hard work that others have had to do. 
 
8.2.5. Homecoming and reconciliation 
 
During his interview, Fred repeated that those that are abroad need to ‘come 
home’. He says that only if they are in Rwanda can they begin to work through 
some of the issues that remain in the reconciliation process. Robert says that it is 
not easy for young Hutu but that they need to be part of the process. But Francois 
insists, “I don’t feel okay to go home. They can’t accuse me of anything” but he 
cites again the injustice and people being put in jail even when they are innocent. 




On asking Francois if he would consider being part of a focus group, his response 
was that there would be no chance. “I could not expose myself. It would not be 
safe. It is not even safe talking to you. I still have family in Rwanda.” Fred, on the 
other hand, could not understand why open dialogue between himself and 
Rwandan refugees in other countries would not be possible and found it hard to 
imagine that others would feel unsafe to be speak freely. 
 
Reginald, however, said that it is just not true that he is free to voice his opinions 
in Rwanda. “You can’t stand in Kigali and say the RPF killed people”. He 
describes how many Rwandans in the north have lost family members to the RPF 
but that you never hear from them. “Do you think their pain has healed?” he asks. 
“If there is no fear in Rwanda, why are we not hearing their stories?”  
 
Fred found it difficult to understand why someone would choose to be a refugee 
and remain away from home unless the person was in fact guilty or benefiting 
from being a refugee. When I mentioned that these Hutu men were too young to 
have been involved in genocide, he suggested that there must be economic gain 
for them in staying outside. He described how several Hutus he knew had 
returned to Rwanda, and through the legal system had reclaimed their properties. 
He added that Rwanda needs all the educated people from the outside to come 
back to help rebuild things and kept reiterating that those outside must “come 
home, feel free”.  Until they feel they are free to speak out, however, Reginald and 
Francois have no desire to return home. 
 
Reginald suggests that with the way things are going the chances of violence 
happening are very high. He says the current government is sabotaging itself and 
that the cost of the truth coming out will be very high. He describes the approach 
of the current government as confrontational, a case of accepting their way or 
nothing else. He sees this as a significant block to reconciliation taking place.   
 
On the topic of reconciliation, Francois says that reconciliation doesn’t need to 
happen between strangers but between “me and the people I am angry with. With 
strangers it will be like an academic debate. It needs to be between the 
government and opposition leaders”. He adds, “The government wants to solve 
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issues militantly but that’s not going to work. Reconciliation needs to happen from 
the top.” 
 
Fred feels that there is some progress being made in terms of reconciliation. He 
says that the government started with justice and is now moving on with things 
like community work. He thinks it’s a good idea to use those in prison to rebuild 
the country. He can’t tolerate people who have killed and are now comfortably off, 
but says their children are welcome to be free in Rwanda. He adds that the 
standards are not always high because of a lack of resource, but that they are 
doing the best they can under the circumstances.  
 
What is evident from Francois’ interview is the high level of fear. There was fear 
that I was a government spy and fear that other Rwandan refugees may be plants 
by the Rwandan government to secure information about other refugees. There 
was a sense that Francois could not trust anyone, even being outside of his 
country. This same fear was not shared by Robert and Fred, who seemed 
completely confident of all ordinary Rwandans who wanted to contribute to the 
development of the country. Fred even said that he would like to buy flight tickets 
for people who are outside the country just to come and have a look at how things 
have changed and then to decide if they want to stay or go.  
 
Interestingly, as these interviews were taking place, during mid-October, 2009, 
news agencies reported that four hundred Rwandans had fled to Burundi to seek 
refuge there. The reasons for fleeing were as cited as being ‘fear of persecution in 
Rwanda’. “One said he was acquitted before Rwanda's community-based gacaca 
courts in 2006 on charges of having burned the house of a Tutsi during the 1994 
genocide. In September, though, he was summoned to respond to the same 
charges, was convicted, and sentenced to 30 years in prison. He fled to Burundi” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009). Alongside this were allegations by some Rwandans 
that “their neighbors had been taken from their homes in the middle of the night 
and had not been seen again” (Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
These reports give some credence to Francois’ fears and add fuel to the ‘negative 
feedback loop’ which pervades so much of undercurrents of Rwandan society. 
Where Rwandans may want to believe in the governments’ vision, and in the 
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confidence of Robert and Fred that things are moving forward, other stories 
suggest something quite different. Reginald says, “Development is fantastic and is 
working, but is it working as it should be? It works for the IMF, the international 
community, the governments’ image, the AU and so on, but is it working for the 
Rwandan people?” 
The following section will report on and analyse the dialogue that took place 
during a NURC Reconciliation Forum seminar. This is significant in its own right 
but particularly because of the light it sheds on the dialogue between the four 
young Rwandan men. Where the dialogue between the interviewees was largely 
divisive, the dialogue amongst members of the Forum, although still full of 
tensions and challenges, gives more reason for optimism. 
  
8.3. Reconciliation conference 
 
In June, 2009, I participated in a seminar for thirty-five community leaders who 
form the NURC-initiated Reconciliation Forum. Districts throughout Rwanda have 
formed these forums, where religious, agricultural, economic and political leaders 
meet together to discuss problems in their communities, specifically around 
reconciliation processes. This fairly new initiative is also an opportunity for NURC 
to pass along government policy and educate communities on the government’s 
stand on various reconciliation related matters. For some, these forums are an 
important step in the reconciliation process, encouraging communities towards 
dialogue and public debate, whereas others see them as yet another way the 
government is trying to control communities by monitoring what leaders say and 
think and feed them the official line. During the seminar, however, the level of 
open dialogue and debate was surprising in the light of so many warnings to me 
to be careful in the way this research was conducted and so much explicit fear 
amongst those within and outside the country in terms of speaking out. 
 
The purpose of the seminar, which was organised by Shalom, Educating for 
Peace, a young NGO bringing peace education to local communities, was to 
dialogue around reconciliation and forgiveness. Specifically, Shalom wanted to 
challenge the idea that reconciliation was the same as ‘cohabitation’, given that so 
many Rwandans have said that they don’t need reconciliation; they already 
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manage to live side by side. Three talks were given, one by Shalom’s director, 
Jean de Dieu Basabose, on the concept of forgiveness and reconciliation, one by 
Penine Uwimbaba, a member of Shalom, on leadership that supports sustainable 
reconciliation and one by myself on the role of storytelling in reconciliation. After 
these talks and a shared lunch, there were several hours within which members of 
the Forum could ask questions and discuss the content of the talks. Apart from 
the rich dialogue which took place, further insights could be drawn from the 
feedback forms participants completed after the seminar. Three broad themes 
emerged. The first was around the process of reconciliation, the second was 
around the need for open dialogue and truth, and the third was the need for 
practical interventions, such as poverty reduction, that would support the 
reconciliation process.  
 
8.3.1. Perspectives on reconciliation 
 
While one participant expressed that it was a waste of time to discuss 
reconciliation because people were already reconciled in Rwanda, another 
expressed how difficult and painful the reconciliation process is. This captures 
well the kinds of comments heard amongst Rwandans generally, with some 
feeling reconciliation has already happened in that Rwandans are living side by 
side and getting on with their lives, while others feel the process has hardly 
started as there is still so much mistrust and unforgiveness in people’s hearts. 
This brings to light the importance of clarifying what one means by reconciliation 
before embarking on efforts to bring about reconciliation.  
 
In the context of storytelling, I spoke about how negative things in our past stories 
can sometimes continue in our present and future stories and that it is difficult to 
leave these behind. One participant mentioned that in Rwanda’s past story there 
was an approach to leadership that was authoritarian and aggressive. He said 
that this story has been carried over and that the current governments approach 
to the national reconciliation process was similarly done in an authoritative and 
aggressive way. Others laughed about this and the conversation that developed 
from there expressed both an appreciation for the government’s efforts to bring 




Related to this, one participant commented that perpetrators are required by law 
to show remorse and that they are required to ask forgiveness from the 
government, within the gacaca process, rather than from the victim. They felt this 
side-stepped the central issue in reconciling people, which is for the perpetrator 
and victim to come face to face, and not the perpetrator with a legal system. This 
echoes what Francois said about reconciliation needing to take place between 
himself and those who had hurt him. Robert also reiterated distrust in the gacaca 
process because the remorse expressed by some perpetrators was not regarded 
as genuine. 
 
There was a suggestion made during the discussion that perpetrators and victims 
should sit in one room, face to face, thrashing things out. My presentation was an 
attempt to show that it is not always easy to say who the perpetrator and who the 
victim is. To those at the Forum, however, it was clear that these were two 
demarcated groups without any doubt as to who fell into which group.  
 
On evaluation forms, respondents were asked what they had learnt from the 
seminar. A few mentioned that although much work has been done in the area of 
reconciliation, there are still many challenges ahead. Some mentioned that the 
seminar had revived in them a desire to participate in reconciliation processes and 
highlighted the necessity for their participation in order for them to live in peaceful 
communities. Mention was made of the need for both offender and victim to play a 
role. Several referred to what Jean de Dieu Basabose had said about victims 
forgiving their perpetrator before the offender asks for pardon for the sake of the 
victim’s own healing process. Another referred to Basabose’s presentation which 
highlighted the need for the offender to also forgive themselves. 
 
On evaluation forms, respondents were asked what they recommended various 
groups would do, including the district authorities, NURC and Shalom, Educating 
for Peace, and other NGO’s working in the area. One comment suggested that 
NURC needed to “recognize that reconciliation is a voluntary process and should 
not be forced”. Although participants expressed appreciation for what the 
government is trying to do, there was a sense that a rushed process that is driven 




8.3.2. Open dialogue and truth 
 
There was discussion around why the stories we tell about the past differ so much 
and the challenge this holds for teaching history at schools. I spoke of the need to 
create a new story for the future together but that this would require 
acknowledging the diversity of old stories. However, there was a sense that just 
knowing the ‘true’ story would make things simpler and that some people’s stories 
were more valid and counted more than those of others. 
 
A related comment in the feedback forms was that there was a need for 
“establishing a dialogue around Rwandan history in order to read together the 
history and avoid divergences and different antagonistic tendencies”. This may 
also reflect the government position, which suggests that all Rwandans need to 
align themselves to one understanding of history in order to move forward. 
However, it also holds potential in that ‘reading together the history’ is the 
beginning of understanding one another’s differences and may allow for open 
dialogue.  
 
When respondents were asked what the obstacles and challenges were to the 
process of reconciliation, the first comment was the ‘divergence’ of Rwandan 
history. Again, it is evident that the divisive stories regarding Rwanda’s past are a 
central issue for many Rwandans. Secondly, it was said that there was a “lack of 
a platform where people can sit and speak truth to each other in their community, 
at grassroots level”. Repeated comments from participants during the discussion 
and through the feedback forms reiterated the message that there was a desire 
for more open dialogue in communities. On feedback forms, respondents were 
asked what needed to happen to strengthen the Reconciliation Forum. The 
responses included the need for more such forums, with greater time for 
discussion “in order to allow participants to openly express their feelings and 
thoughts”. This was interesting in the light of previous conversations with 
Rwandans that they do not feel safe to openly express their opinions. This Forum, 
made up of a diverse group of Hutus and Tutsis in a semi-rural setting, openly 




One response distinguished the objective of reconciliation from the process being 
used.  “Many people disguise their feelings and thoughts on the way the 
reconciliation process is undertaken: Some people seem to appreciate what is 
done whereas they are not convinced and satisfied with the process”. This 
highlights a crucial point for the reconciliation process, that although members of 
this Forum express the desire to debate and dialogue openly there is nevertheless 
an awareness that many people are still too afraid to express what they really 
believe. One respondent merely wrote, “Silence, fear and suspicion”. Added to 
this were the responses that genocidal and divisionist ideology still persisted 
amongst some people and that many of the offenders who ask for pardon are not 
sincerely remorseful. These issues exacerbate trust in the reconciliation process 
and the fear people have to speak out freely.  
 
When asked what the Forum could do to overcome some of these challenges, 
interestingly, again, mention was made of organizing opportunities where dialogue 
around Rwandan history could take place. It was also suggested that dialogue 
need to take place between and with victims to discuss redress. Further, there 
were suggestions around more efforts to equip the community and allow for more 
opportunities for dialogue at various levels. In terms of recommendations to the 
district authorities there was a general suggestion to “educate leaders and citizens 
to speak the truth to each other”. NURC was encouraged to organize workshops 
on the village level (umudugudu), and not just the district level. NURC was also 
asked to “create dialogue spaces where victims and offenders could meet and 
speak truth with each other and build strong foundations for sustainable 
reconciliation”.   
 
8.3.3. Practical interventions 
 
 
Several mentions were made of the need to be equipped to resolve conflicts and 
having resources to educate their communities in reconciliation and peace. 
Further, it was recognised that members of the Forum themselves have wounds 
from which they need healing and some members asked for trauma counseling 
and support. One respondent mentioned the need for a workshop on the role of 




The last set of responses referred to the lack of educational resources, poverty, 
the absence of a monitoring and evaluation system in terms of reconciliation 
projects and misconceptions around what reconciliation actually is.  
 
 
The responses from the Reconciliation Forum show that there is a growing desire 
amongst Rwandans for space for open dialogue and for a more truthful and 
honest level of engagement. Where in the past, many Rwandans may have felt 
that the way to survive was to say only what was acceptable by someone in 
authority, here there was a sense that people wanted a higher level of 
transparency and openness. There was an acknowledgement of the fear, mistrust 
and suspicion that still exists, and repeated mentions were made of the challenge 
of a divisive narrative of history. The sense from this discussion is that some of 
the fears of the young Hutu men interviewed are echoed, but some of the 
openness of the Tutsi men was also present. It could be said that the 
Reconciliation Forum was a realistic reflection of both the challenges present in 
terms of reconciliation but also the potential and the hope where people have a 
strong desire to build sustainable peace and reconciliation. 
 
We now return to the dialogue between the four young Rwandans with new 
insights and new emphases, particularly around the distinction between insisting 
on one official narrative that all Rwandans should accept and having many 
narratives that are mediated by higher levels of tolerance. 
 
8.4. Recontextualizing the narratives 
 
The follow-up interviews with the four Rwandan men, where the ‘dialogue’ took 
place,  brought to light the divisive narratives still active in Rwanda society today. 
Francois spoke of the fact that genocide may never have happened and that 
instead there was a civil war. Further, he placed emphasis on the judicial process 
in Arusha, seeing gacaca as an attempt at eradicating government opposition. He 
feels the crimes committed by the RPF need to be taken in the same light as the 
genocide. He speaks of another revolution like the one in 1959 needing to take 
place. He sees the Hutu majority in Rwanda as being significantly oppressed and 
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silenced by a small group of Ugandan Tutsi who are going to extreme lengths to 
maintain power in the country. The government is seen as a dangerous, dictatorial 
regime that needs to be overthrown. Under these circumstances, Francois sees 
no reconciliation taking place. 
 
On the other side, Robert and Fred speak of a country that is the midst of 
progress and development. After decades of bad leadership and a horrifying 
genocide, the country was rescued by the RPF who have returned order and have 
rebuilt the country to what it is today. They pay little regard to the ICTR in Arusha 
and believe gacaca, with its weaknesses and limitations, is nevertheless playing a 
significant role in the reconciliation process. Although they admit that Rwanda is 
tightly run, they believe this is gradually changing as the country begins to work 
through its trauma, and believe any strict controls are there to help the country as 
it comes to terms with some terrible realities. They believe the RPF’s crimes don’t 
compare to that of the genocide and cannot be considered in the same light. They 
see a country that is slowly becoming more open, with increasing degrees of 
freedom of speech. They feel reconciliation is taking place although there is still a 
lot of work that needs to be done. Although they are critical of the government, 
they believe it is doing the best it can under very challenging circumstances. 
 
Alongside these narratives are also the narratives of the survivors and Tutsi from 
countries other than Uganda. As mentioned, some survivors and Tutsi from 
Burundi, Tanzania and the DRC feel they have been sidelined and may have a 
harder line than the Ugandans. Some survivors feel the perpetrators of genocide 
are being dealt with too ‘softly’ and want a society that benefits them more overtly. 
Some Tutsi from the diaspora even support the return of the monarchy and an 
overt return to Tutsi power in the country.  
 
Developing new narratives in this context poses a challenge, especially if it feels 
like a single new narrative is being enforced from the top down on all Rwandans. 
Johan Pottier is one researcher who has been particularly critical of the 
governments’ attempt to create a new narrative. He argues that the political 
doctrine of the RPF is the dominant voice in Rwanda, and has ‘the monopoly on 
knowledge construction’ (2002, 202). He argues that ‘depictions of reality have 
come to be led by political visions and ideas, not by empirical studies’ (2002, 203). 
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Part of the way this new narrative has been developed, he suggests, is by 
simplifying reality and using ‘feelings of guilt and ineptitude’ on the part of the 
international community (2002, 202). Following the genocide, there was a vacuum 
of research and information with regards to Rwanda, much of the available 
research being grounded in European race ideologies from the 1900s. Into this 
vacuum, the RPF carefully constructed a new narrative that the international 
community and all Rwandans would need to accept. 
 
Chi Mgbako argues that the Ingando solidarity camps are where the RPF ideology 
is most overtly being passed on. He speaks of the attempt by the government to 
erase ethnic identity for political purposes; that instead of teaching tolerance for 
difference, difference is being ‘obliterated’ (2005, 218). Further, he describes how 
Ingando camps are the only place where history is currently being taught in 
Rwanda, with it having been removed from the school syllabus. But the history 
that is being taught is a pro-RPF version which sidelines all other possibilities 
(2005, 219). 
 
The problem with this new narrative is that it does not take into account the other 
subtle and complex narratives continuing to find a voice, however quietly, in and 
outside Rwanda. As those at the Reconciliation Forum said, the government’s 
approach to reconciliation is as authoritative as the kind of leadership style 
existent in Rwanda for the past few thousand years. Further, fear, suspicion and a 
hesitancy to speak one’s mind has resulted in many narratives not finding voice. 
Not allowing for critical engagement with issues of identity and history, argues 
Mgbako, leads to a ‘resentment’ and he fears people will ‘mouth government 
rhetoric, but not necessarily reorient themselves’ (2005, 19). 
 
Yet, in the context of a country recovering from genocide, where the majority of 
the country is either a perpetrator of extreme violence or a survivor of extreme 
violence, is a strong and tight form of leadership not necessary? Many would 
argue that were freedom of speech to exemplify Rwandan society, genocide 
ideology would spread and new violence would erupt. It is argued that were 
people not controlled by the divisionist law, not exposed to Ingando camps, and 
not consistently fed a new government-approved narrative by the country’s media, 
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those in authority and through policy and law, the country would not be able to 
move beyond destructive, divisive narratives. 
 
This presents us with two possible responses to the divisive narratives that 
pervade Rwandan society. The one is to create a new, unified, simplified narrative 
that can be passed on to all Rwandans, from the top down, until everyone accepts 
it and it becomes internalized and forms part of a new national Rwandan identity. 
The other is to allow for dialogue and debate to take place where each person 
brings to the table their diverse narratives, as dangerous and destructive as they 
may be, and allow for multiple new narratives to emerge that can stand side by 
side to form a plural, hybrid national identity that can encompass the tensions and 
contradictions existent in Rwanda. 
 
The answer is not simply the latter. In a society under extreme stress and 
pressure, following absurdly high levels of violence, it may not be a simple task to 
encourage open dialogue and trust that it will lead to something healing and good 
in a society where many are still in denial of the crimes they have committed, still 
believe in the very ideology that led them to participate in genocide, are still 
entrenched in understandings of identity founded in ethnicity, still carry wounds 
and unforgiveness, and are still dominated by trauma, fear and horror at all that 
has gone before. Alongside this, add the stress of the continued presence of 
genocidaires on the borders of Rwanda, with constant, confused and confusing 
violence breaking out between the Rwandan army and an unknown force on the 
border. And again, alongside this add the pressure of a rapidly progressing 
society which is introducing technology, a higher standard of living, English as a 
first language and a western economic and political system into the deal. We are 
speaking here of a country which is in the most painful stages of transformation. 
Simply encouraging greater freedom, the input of opposition politics, an open 
media and a plurality of identities and narratives may not be a realistic way 
forward. These are some of the challenges that the interviews, follow-up 
interviews and feedback from the Reconciliation Forum bring to light. Although 
Pottier’s critique is important to keep in mind, the reality of Rwanda today begs for 




At the heart of Pottier’s critique is the fact that the new Rwandan identity and 
narrative is being created by what he describes as ‘a subordinate minority which 
after protracted struggle overcame the relations of domination which had kept it in 
exile’ (2002, 204). The question is whether such a minority, namely the Ugandan 
Tutsi who formed the RPF, can legitimately rewrite and pass on this new narrative 
on behalf of the rest of Rwanda, however good and upright their intentions might 
be. Previous attempts at rewriting the Rwandan narrative do not bode well. In 
addition to this, there is a sense of disconnection not only between the Hutu 
majority and the Ugandan-dominated Tutsi who are rewriting the narrative, but 
between this group and all other groups, including survivors and Tutsi from other 
countries. There seems to be a half-formulated question of what gives these 
Ugandan Tutsi the right to decide for everyone how Rwanda will move forward. 
And the common answer is that they have no choice; the country was devastated, 
someone had to take charge, and now they are doing a good job of it. However, 
as much as the country may be progressing well, and as much as the new 
narrative may be a positive one, it is not a shared one and it is doubtful that it can 
forcefully be internalized or made into the national identity and narrative without 
the explicit participation of more of the population over a period of time. 
 
In the following chapter we will begin to explore the concept of healing and how it 
takes place. We will investigate the relationship between healing and 
reconciliation and what would need to be in place to facilitate a process of healing 
and reconciliation. Some of the issues brought to light in this chapter will be 
considered with regards to healing and reconciliation theories.  
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CHAPTER 9: HEALING AND RECONCILIATION 
 
“It was an image from hell: row upon row of corpses, hundreds and 
hundreds of them stacked up like firewood … How many years – how 
many generations – would it take for Rwanda to recover from such horror? 
How long for our wounded hearts to heal, for our hardened hearts to 
soften?” (Ilibagiza, 2006, 179).  
 
However much research and theorizing may have been done on the topic of 
healing and how it happens, at some level it remains a miracle. Many would 
assume that it is human nature to want revenge on the one who has hurt us. Yet 
again and again, as can be seen in the Rwandan context, people reach out with 
forgiveness, compassion and a desire for healing both for themselves and for their 
broader society.  
 
This chapter will bring us back to our premise and our central questions. Our 
premise is that our narratives bring coherence to our lives, and that it is through 
our narratives that we make sense of the world around us. But our narratives, 
especially in terms of how we view history and identity can pit us against one 
another. However, through critically engaging with our narratives, in dialogue with 
one another, there is the potential for emancipation, for transcending ‘my’ 
narrative and embracing a shared narrative. This shared narrative would not need 
to be a single narrative, but would include many different narratives standing 
alongside one another. In this process of sharing narratives, this chapter will 
argue that healing and reconciliation begin to take place. 
 
This chapter will first explore the relationship between healing and reconciliation, 
looking at how they are defined, and various elements of and approaches to them. 
Using Lederach’s model of truth, justice, mercy and peace, it will explore healing 
in terms of these four elements. Through this, reconciliation efforts in Rwanda will 
be explored, as well as the work of NURC and the process of gacaca. A narrative 
approach to healing and reconciliation will be discussed, through a comparison 
with the narrative approach used in South Africa through their Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The role of stories and dialogue in the 
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narrative approach and the kind of context needed for this approach to take place 
will be explored. Chapter ten will describe what a narrative approach to healing 
and reconciliation in the Rwandan context might look like. 
 
9.1. The relationship between healing and reconciliation 
 
Staub et al. describe the relationship between healing and reconciliation as 
cyclical; as healing begins, reconciliation becomes possible and as reconciliation 
begins, security and trust are fostered which facilitate further healing (2003, 288). 
They say, “Healing is essential both to improve the quality of life of wounded 
people and to make new violence less likely” (2003, 289). They emphasise that 
healing needs to take place both for the victim and for the perpetrator as both are 
wounded (2003, 288).  
 
The term ‘reconciliation’ is used to support a wide variety of agendas although its 
actual meaning often remains elusive. Reconciliation is a priority of the Rwandan 
government and yet, as Arthur Molenaar points out, it is difficult to know what 
exactly the government means by this term (2005, 65). During conversations with 
Rwandans it was often said, “We have reconciliation. Reconciliation is not our 
problem. We live together, we eat together, we are reconciled”. This would be 
followed by suggestions of what their problem is and this would normally include 
justice, forgiveness, truth and trust, as was reflected in the feedback and 
discussion from the Reconciliation Forum. 
 
A minimalist definition offered by Louis Kriesberg states that “Reconciliation refers 
to the process by which parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship 
or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship 
that they believe to be minimally acceptable” (2001, 48). Kriesberg is writing in the 
context of preventing further violence, but more than this is desired when we 
speak of healing and reconciliation. Rwandans may well be living together and 
eating together, a relationship they may believe to be ‘minimally acceptable’, but a 
devastated nation is looking for more than ‘minimally acceptable’ relationships 




Staub et al. describe reconciliation as “mutual acceptance by members of groups 
previously in conflict with each other” (2003, 288). This already takes the definition 
a step further, bringing in terms such as mutuality and acceptance. They believe 
that reconciliation involves a “changed psychological orientation toward the other”.  
 
“Reconciliation means that victims and perpetrators do not see the past as 
defining the future, as simply a continuation of the past. It means that they 
come to accept each other and to see the humanity of one another and the 
possibility of a constructive relationship” (2003, 288).  
 
But more than even this, Lederach insists that reconciliation is the rebuilding of 
relationship. He rightly states that people may be living as neighbours “and yet are 
locked into long-standing cycles of hostile interaction”, animosity, fear and 
stereotyping (1997, 23). “Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways 
to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations, but instead is built on 
mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-
relationship” (1997, 26). Restoring relationships is what Mark Hay sees as central 
to reconciliation along with the ‘recovery of the dignity and humanity of every 
person’, both victim and perpetrator (1999, 12). This kind of reconciliation leads to 
healing. 
 
As mentioned above, Rwandans would often mention that such things as justice, 
truth, peace and forgiveness are some of the factors lacking in Rwandan society. 
Lederach argues that these are all integral elements of reconciliation. He has a 
four-part model of reconciliation which includes peace, truth, justice and mercy 
(1997, 28). He argues that these elements, although seemingly contradictory, 
cannot operate independently from one another. Truth without justice would be an 
offence to the victims. Justice without truth might result in historical revisionism 
which would open the way for new conflicts. Mercy, which is sometimes translated 
as forgiveness, would be meaningless without acknowledging truth and justice, 
resulting in impunity for perpetrators. And peace is an essential ingredient for the 
other elements to become a reality (Lederach, 1997, 29; Molenaar, 2005, 35; 
Nolte-Schamm, 2005, 25). In the Rwandan context, there has been a high 
emphasis on justice due to the fear that perpetrators would be released with 
impunity, as has often been the case in Rwanda’s history. However, opponents of 
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the government would say that there is justice but no truth and that this is indeed 
resulting in revisionism and a less than complete justice, with only one group of 
perpetrators being targeted.  
 
The following sections will explore reconciliation through truth, justice, mercy and 
peace. This kind of reconciliation has the potential to foster deep healing in 
individuals and communities. Section 9.2 will look at the role of history and 
memory in healing, as well as how truth is told and whose truth is heard. Section 
9.3 will explore justice in Rwanda, looking at the gacaca system and consider the 
implications of various approaches to justice. Section 9.4 will describe a model of 
forgiveness and discuss some of the complexities in a forgiveness process. 
Section 9.5 will consider peace in terms the Rwandan approach of promoting 
national unity through oneness. It will discuss alternative approaches to national 
identity as a means of creating unity and peace. Section 9.6 will introduce a 
narrative approach to healing and reconciliation. 
 
9.2. Healing through truth 
 
Adami and Hunt, in the context of the ICTR, describe the cathartic effect speaking 
the truth may have: “For those who remain, for those who lived through the 
ultimate evil, for those who despaired of seeing the world react, the ICTR 
becomes a tremendous place to speak. There people can give voice to their 
suffering, ritualise it, objectify it, reopen the wound to better let it out, let it heal, let 
it scar over” (2005, 112). Once the truth is spoken and recorded it becomes a 
testimony in the collective memory of a nation, and of the world, and it is ‘fixed in 
history’ (2005, 113). In the discussion on South Africa’s TRC, in section 9.6, it will 
become clear that speaking out the truth in and of itself is not necessarily healing. 
Yet, saying what happened and bringing events of the past out into the open is a 
significant part of the healing process. Truth encompasses various elements, such 
as how we speak of history, how we remember the past collectively, and what is 
said about the past in a judicial context. These will be discussed in the following 
section, focusing on the work of NURC. 
 
A significant role that NURC purports to play is that of developing a shared 
understanding of Rwanda’s past, the reasons for conflict and the way forward in 
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the future. A representative from NURC stressed the importance of a ‘same’ 
understanding and ‘same’ thinking, arguing that when everyone is thinking in the 
same way, there will be no more division, and thus unity and reconciliation 
(Personal interview, Kigali, January, 2007). On asking the NURC representative 
whether there was room for diverse views concerning history his answer was yes 
and no. On the one hand, they are working to create public spaces, through 
debate, dialogue, workshops and the like, for ideas to be challenged and formed 
by a diversity of people. On the other, NURC remains a government-sponsored 
organization, and the government maintains its controversial law against ethnic 
division, which limits what may and may not be said in terms of identity and 
history.  
 
Alongside this, the NURC representative mentioned the complexity of Rwandan 
society, where ones public view might well contradict ones private views. Or, as 
one interviewee explained, one’s public identity often takes precedence over 
one’s private identity, and having the appearance of having the ‘right’ view publicly 
may well be more important in Rwandan society than standing up for a divergent 
private view (Personal interview, Kigali, January, 2007). As Reginald was quoted 
as saying in section 8.2.2, Rwandans seem to have an unspoken understanding 
of which topics can and can’t be discussed, and what the acceptable way of 
discussing these is. 
 
Staub, Pearlman and Miller would agree with NURC in the necessity of providing 
information to communities with regards to the origins of genocide and developing 
a shared history (2003, 289). “Understanding genocide helps people move 
beyond the belief held by many people in Rwanda that what they experienced 
was incomprehensible evil. It helps them to see genocide, however horrible, as a 
human process. It helps them to see their common humanity with others who 
have suffered mass violence” (2003, 290). However, they feel that this shared 
history needs to be acceptable to both sides in order for reconciliation to take 
place (2003, 290).  
 
Staub, et al. argue that conflicting views about history lead to the persistence of 
blame, mistrust, and antagonism (2003, 290). Particularly when groups live 
together, creating a history that is acceptable to both sides may be central to 
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reconciliation. The challenge is in creating an understanding that is acceptable to 
both sides. This seems crucial in building a shared understanding, rather than a 
same understanding. A shared understanding suggests acknowledging and taking 
into account a diversity of views and perspectives and piecing this together into a 
version everyone can share. A shared understanding also allows for a dynamic 
interaction between different groups over time.  
 
Both identity and our understanding of history are constantly in flux, constantly 
being rethought and renegotiated. It is this fluid interaction with history and identity 
that is needed to allow reconciliation the space to become a reality.  Similarly, 
Adam and Adam argue that there needs to be room for various versions of the 
truth rather than a unified, official version. “Only a pluralist interpretation of history 
may at best achieve a shared truth, or at worst, reinforce divided memories. 
History as an ongoing argument is still preferable to the myth-making of official 
collective memory” (2000, 37). A critique against the Rwandan government is that 
only an ‘official’ version of the past is considered. 
 
Part of the process of developing a shared understanding of what happened and 
what needs to happen is through healing memories. In Rwanda, every April is a 
month of remembrance. Traumatic images of the horror of genocide are displayed 
publicly throughout the country. People are reminded of the death and mayhem 
that overwhelmed the country for 100 days. The purpose behind this is to say, 
‘never again’. Yet, Cyprian Fisiy argues that in the Rwandan context social 
memory has been manipulated for the purposes of holding onto power throughout 
Rwandan history and that it is difficult to separate the many layers of truth and 
memory, even when it comes to remembering what happened during the 
genocide (1998, 20).   
 
One response to this might be giving victims and perpetrators, or victims from 
both sides of the conflict, the space and context in which to speak out their 
memories. Hay makes mention of the importance of giving victims the space to 
mourn and grieve their suffering. He highlights how trauma leads to the loss of a 
sense of self, a loss of human dignity, a loss of meaning, and a loss of trust  
(1999, 122). In this context, victims need to be provided with a context of safety to 
experience healing from their trauma. A part of this, for Hay, includes what he 
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calls a ‘conversion’ from victim to survivor. He sees this as a fundamental shift 
from brokenness and dehumanization to a restored human dignity. Similarly, 
perpetrators have been dehumanized by their own actions and need their 
humanity restored. This process happens as shared rituals, such as remembering 
April, 1994, take place. But they need to be shared rituals where everyone’s 
stories are heard and truths are shared. Victims of the genocide as well as of the 
civil war would need the space to mourn and experience healing of memories. 
 
In terms of the process of healing through truth, Villa-Vicencio writes that 
storytelling assists us in the process of accepting and celebrating our differences, 
enables us to understand each other well enough to co-exist, and build a common 
nation “in diversity and difference” (1995, 105). How the past and the nature of the 
conflict is perceived and remembered has a significant effect on the likelihood of 
conflicting parties reconciling. It is necessary for everyone’s stories to be heard 
and told, and not only for one set of stories to be heard, as is often the case in 
Rwanda. As Reginald said in section 8.2.5, the stories of Rwandans in the north 
who have lost family members to the RPF during the war have not been told. “Do 
you think their pain has healed?” he asks. 
 
The process of gacaca is helping to allow the story of what happened to be heard. 
Bronkhorst writes, “The dead must be counted and buried, the victims’ stories 
must be recorded, told and retold until the whole truth is out. Reconciliation 
between opposing classes and groups can only be realized once the facts, the 
background, motives and emotions have been recognized and admitted by both 
sides” (in Hay, 1999, 117). Gacaca has helped to bring the facts of the genocide 
out into the open, at least with regards to the actions of the genocidaires against 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu in the attempt to eradicate an ethnic group. In terms of 
embodying truth and justice in a way that all Rwandans can accept, though, it has 
probably fallen well short. Someone like Francois, one of the young men 
interviewed, might argue that only a part of the truth has been told.  
 
Graybill argues that “whereas the South African TRC required all perpetrators of 
human rights abuses on both sides—the government and the resistance 
movements—to apply for amnesty, the gacaca system will only judge the 
perpetrators of the genocide” (2004, 1224). The Rwandan government has said 
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that cases that involve RPF soldiers who committed crimes need to be taken to 
the military jurisdiction, a legal process separate from genocide crimes. When 
asked about this, the representative from ASF said that most Rwandans find the 
military judiciary intimidating or inaccessible and that they had recommended to 
the government that an accessible system needed to be put in place so that 
Rwandans can feel sufficiently safe to report these crimes (Personal interview, 
Kigali, January, 2007). 
 
Villa-Vicencio has argued in the South African context, that for a culture of human 
rights to exist human rights violations on all sides of the conflict need to be 
investigated and acknowledged. Even were the crimes committed for the purpose 
of liberation, they need to come into the light for a culture of human rights to be 
established (2000, 29). Similarly, Graybill argues that considering that crimes by 
the RPF resulted in possibly 100 000 civilian casualties, it will affect the 
reconciliation process if it seems that only one side is receiving justice. 
“Exclusively judging Hutu acts, while ignoring RPF violations, may be one reason 
for the drop in willingness to participate [in gacaca], as Hutus view this as patently 
unjust,” writes Graybill (2004, 1224).  
 
In a report for the Institute for Social Security, Stephanie Wolters argues that 
“anyone who might choose to speak openly about the problems associated with 
the gacaca process would be accused of ‘divisionism’” and that this leaves little 
room for the kind of national dialogue such a process needs (2005, 15). Added to 
this is the fact that participation in gacaca is mandatory by law and anyone who 
does not testify may be imprisoned for up to six months (Wolters, 2005, 7).  As a 
result of these kinds of strictures some of the Hutu diaspora view gacaca as a 
government tool to exact revenge against the population, and view it as victor’s 
justice (Wolters, 2005, 15).  
 
This section has discussed the role of truth and memory in healing, saying that 
although the truth in itself is not always cathartic and healing, it is nevertheless an 
important part of the healing process. It has suggested that although NURC is 
creating important public spaces for debate, these spaces are limited due to 
government policy and the tendency towards ‘double-speak’ in Rwandan society. 
It has mentioned the significance of rituals to remember what happened, such as 
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the April memorials but suggested that these memorials need to incorporate the 
story of victims across the political divide, as well as the stories of perpetrators. It 
has considered the role of gacaca in allowing the story of what happened to be 
told, critiquing it for only allowing one side of the story to be heard. The issue of 
truth remains complex and will be explored further in relation to the TRC in section 
9.6.1. 
 
9.3. Healing through justice 
 
This section will examine the issue of justice, starting with Mamdani’s 
differentiation between victor’s justice and survivor’s justice. It will then consider 
the difference between a retributive and a restorative style of justice, arguing that 
Rwanda’s gacaca system incorporates some of both. It will also look at whether 
people should be individually or collectively responsible for what has happened. 
Judith Zur, writing in the context of Guatemala, where after extreme violence the 
entire country continued in complete denial of what happened, writes that impunity 
has a significant negative psychological effect  on healing processes (1994, 14). 
She writes that not only is it necessary to find a language to be able to talk about 
what happened collectively, but that those who were responsible need to be 
identified and named. This section will argue that impunity will not aid in healing in 
Rwanda, but that the way justice is meted out needs to be carefully considered so 
as not to lead to renewed violence. 
 
Mamdani suggests there are two forms of justice. He characterises the justice 
present in Rwanda as ‘victor’s justice’ with an overwhelming sense of moral 
responsibility for the very survival of all remaining Tutsi, globally. Postgenocide 
power is committed to removing any trace of conditions that could possibly lead to 
a repeat of genocide, and this is done through violent methods, where necessary. 
He describes the founding ideology of post-genocide Rwanda as being the 
memory of genocide and the moral compulsion never to let it happen again (2002, 
271). This justifies the pursuit of genocidaires and the possibility of labelling any 
opposition to the government as genocidaire.  
 
“Arrests can be made on the basis of denunciation, not investigation … The 
moral certainty about preventing another genocide imparts a moral 
 
188 
justification to the pursuit of power with impunity … The price of victors 
justice is that the victor must keep holding onto his victory; thus a continued 
civil war or a political divorce. As there has been no divorce between Hutu 
and Tutsi in Rwanda we must assume that there will be another round of 
civil war” (2002, 272).  
 
But far more productive than this would be survivor’s justice. Mamdani describes 
how victory provides power and thus alternatives to the victor: “He has the choice 
of reaching out to the vanquished and transcending earlier opposition by the two 
and form a united community of survivors of civil war” (2002, 272).  Marcia 
Hartwell similarly discusses how after a violent conflict the power lies in the hand 
of the victor and it is their decision how justice and reconciliation is going to unfold 
(2004). In the South African context, Desmond Tutu discusses how revenge 
would have been the easy route to take after Apartheid, but that the tempting 
victors justice was surrendered for the sake of creating a shared South African 
future built on the foundations of democracy, equality and freedom for all (1999, 
23). 
 
Although Rwanda should not necessarily have followed South Africa’s route of 
justice, it nevertheless needs to consider whether the route it has chosen will lead 
to healing. Justice is often seen as being either restorative or retributive. 
Retributive justice focuses on punishment and is normally based on a hierarchical 
approach to justice. Justice is in the hands of the authority and meted out by 
those in authority to the perpetrator. Restorative justice, on the other hand, is 
between victim and perpetrator. Jim Consedine describes it as follows: 
 
“Restorative justice is a philosophy that embraces a wide range of human 
emotions, including healing, mediation, compassion, mercy, reconciliation 
as well as sanction where appropriate. It also embraces a world view that 
says we are all interconnected, and that what we do, be it for good or evil, 
has an impact on others. Restorative justice offers a process whereby 
those affected by criminal behaviour, be they victims, offenders, the 
families involved, or the wider community, all have a part in resolving the 




The focus is not vengeance but healing for both victim and offender. In the case of 
Rwanda, in response to the justice crises following genocide, the government had 
to put a far reaching system in place that could try hundreds of thousands of 
people in a short space of time. The leader of the Constitutional Committee during 
the time when gacaca was implemented said,  
 
“Rwanda is a poor country. The human rights in our prisons are nothing to 
brag about. The prisoners are suffering, but what is the alternative? We 
cannot let them out, but we cannot really keep them in now either. To 
follow the Western trial process would take far too long [a] time and 
therefore be a violation of the human rights [sic] itself. We had to do 
something” (in Morrill, 2004).  
 
The origins of gacaca were discussed in section 5.1.2. Constance Morrill looks at 
whether gacaca is retributive or restorative in its approach by comparing 
traditional gacaca with the way it functions today. In the traditional gacaca system, 
Morrill describes how resolving disputes was not “compartmentalized into 
separate phases of pre-adjudication, pre-trial, adjudication, and sentencing, as is 
the practice in the classical judicial system. Instead, conflicts within the community 
were not fragmented, but approached holistically, which was seen to facilitate 
reconciliation” (2004). Any reconciliation process would involve the offender and 
victims’ entire family or clan, thus the repairing of the relationship being a 
collective affair.  
 
In the gacaca process adopted in Rwanda today, the whole community is 
involved, but offenders stand alone before their accusers. At the gacaca trial I 
attended in January, 2007, some seventy or eighty community members gathered 
with little benches and blankets along the side of a main road. Tables and chairs 
had been set up before them where a row of judges sat. The offenders would 
come before this table of judges and the community and defend their case. Unlike 
in the traditional model, here the offender carries the burden of what they have 
done alone. Further, the community was invited to ask questions or make 
comments on what the offender had said. Although the community participation 
was clearly high on the part of the victims, the offender seemed to have little 
support, and if the community decided they were guilty they would have no lawyer 
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(as in a western model) or family members (as in a traditional model) to stand up 
in their defence. An Amnesty International report states that the accused should 
by law have access to legal representation.  
 
“Amnesty International believes that the gacaca jurisdictions would not 
respect the principle of ''equality of arms'' - an essential criterion of a fair 
hearing which ensures that both parties have a procedurally equal position 
during the trial and are in an equal position to make their case. In response 
to this criticism, the government has denied that the prosecution would 
have an unfair advantage, as it would not participate in the gacaca trials. 
However, cases would clearly be judged on the basis of case-files 
prepared and passed on by the prosecution. It would be extremely difficult 
for defendants without the assistance of a lawyer to counter in an effective 
manner the accusations already contained in these case-files.  
Furthermore, those presiding over the gacaca tribunals, having little or no 
legal training, are unlikely to challenge the information in the official case-
file or the very basis for the case-file” (2006).  
 
Further, their guilt and punishment would be decided on by the judges rather than 
the community collectively. So rather than it being a negotiated process between 
an offender and their family and a victim and their family, in this case it is a legal 
process where an individual takes individual responsibility with the input of the 
community in terms of clarifying what actually happened. 
 
This would make gacaca more of a retributive than restorative approach. 
However, a fully restorative justice process may be argued to take too long and, 
as the representative from ASF suggested, such a process would be difficult to 
monitor. How would one ensure that victims and their families did not mete out 
revenge on offenders, who often had no family to stand with them, their families 
being either dead or refugees in the DRC? Thus the current gacaca system where 
communities were involved but certain standard western legal system practices 
were incorporated seemed the best alternative. 
 
Hartwell argues that the need for revenge on the part of victims after violent 
conflict is normal and even, perhaps, a necessary part of the healing process. She 
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suggests that any reconciliation process needs to undergo periods of revenge, 
lack of remorse and an inability to forgive, amongst other things, but that these do 
not need to be viewed negatively (2006). She describes that immediately after 
conflict justice is closely related to fairness, both from the perspective of the 
victims who want their perpetrators to suffer as much as they did, as well as from 
the perspective of those who perceive themselves to have ‘lost’. In terms of the 
victim, Hartwell suggests that trials and truth commissions often fall short of the 
kind of action victims are looking for, as has indeed been the case in Rwanda. 
Hartwell lists four ways in which justice can be seen to be fair. Firstly, there need 
to be opportunities for all those involved to have a voice in stating their case and 
making suggestions. Secondly, their needs to be a trust in the neutrality of the 
authorities and the forum through which justice is meted out. Thirdly, the motives 
of those in authority need to be trusted. Lastly, all parties need to feel they are 
treated with dignity and respect (2006).  
 
In the case of Rwanda, the issue of fairness has played a significant role. On the 
part of survivors of genocide, there has been frustration with regards the light 
sentencing of perpetrators, as well as sick and elderly perpetrators being released 
by the president at various times over the past few years. Added to this, there was 
a feeling directly after genocide that more aid was going towards those people 
who had fled to the DRC (and were seen by many to be guilty of genocide) than 
towards survivors of genocide within the country. On the part of perpetrators, as 
has been reiterated throughout this thesis, many feel voiceless and mistrust the 
motives of the current government and the way it is carrying out justice. The 
danger of feeling unfairly treated, according to Hartwell, is that it is easy to trigger 
a victim-mentality (2006). Perpetrators feel they are victimized and victims feel 
they are being revictimised. So although the desire for revenge is normal, in a 
society recovering from violent conflict that wants to create a new way of relating 
to one another, retributive justice may be unhelpful in the healing process. 
 
Coupled with the debate between a retributive and a restorative system is whether 
guilt is collective or individual. Rhiannon Lloyd runs a reconciliation program which 
encourages individuals to apologise on behalf of their group. For example, at one 
of her workshops, a Hutu will stand up and ask for collective forgiveness for the 
crimes committed by Hutus, and then a Tutsi will stand up and ask for forgiveness 
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on behalf of all Tutsi. Lastly (or many times at the beginning), Lloyd herself will 
stand up and ask for forgiveness on behalf of Europeans and the international 
community. There is then a ceremony of forgiving one another and acknowledging 
shared humanity. This is successful in that it highlights the roles of all involved in 
causing harm, but a danger is that an entire group is seen as collectively 
responsible (Lloyd, 1998). 
 
Mamdani warns against the pitfall of seeing a particular group collectively as 
victimised or as collectively guilty as it has the danger that the collective group of 
victims self-righteously and unrestrainedly demands justice. He recommends 
instead that all Rwandans be seen as ‘survivors of an era gone by’ and that 
individuals take responsibility for particular crimes, on both sides of the political 
spectrum (1997, 25). Lemarchand writes, “Tutsi elite [tend] to substitute collective 
guilt for individual responsibility, and to affix the label ‘génocidaire’ to the Hutu 
community as a group” (1998, 8). He accurately states that the refugees in the 
DRC after the genocide were collectively criminalised, and that certain Tutsi 
survivors applied ‘a logic of guilt by association: to be a Hutu was to be presumed 
a killer’, even those who risked their lives to save Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1998, 8). 
Lemarchand suggests that ‘lumping together the perpetrators of genocide with 
innocent civilians’ creates the very conditions that may influence some Hutu to 
resort to renewed violence (1998, 8).     
 
Because genocide was executed by a large portion of the population, Mark 
Drumbl suggests that it is easy to forget that individuals chose to become 
perpetrators (2002, 11). During his research in Rwandan prisons, Drumbl found 
that the vast majority of perpetrators did not see themselves as having done 
anything wrong (2002, 16). “Most see themselves as prisoners of war, simply 
ending up on the losing side” (Drumbl, 2002, 16).  Drumbl found that many 
perpetrators would conflate war with genocide, whereas he states that war implies 
a mutuality whereas genocide implies innocent victims and unjustified 
perpetrators (2002, 16). As long as perpetrators felt they were fighting a justifiable 
war, they would not be able to take responsibility for their crimes, which largely 
involved violence against unarmed women and children. This would mean that 
were violence to break out again, many Rwandans might not see the difference 
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between fighting a military war (between trained soldiers) and attacking innocent 
civilians. It is for this reason that Drumbl argues for individual responsibility. 
 
A phrase often heard in Rwandan society when discussing justice is that of a 
'culture of impunity'. With this it is said that in Rwanda, historically, people have 
not been held accountable for what they have done. This has given people the 
impression that in Rwanda, you can get away with anything, especially if it is 
politically motivated. Drumbl suggests that with a collective restorative justice 
model individual perpetrators would not need to take personal responsibility for 
their actions (2002, 16). Graybill describes how the Rwandan government was 
skeptical of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission which adopted a 
system of amnesty because of the history of impunity (2004, 1121). Further, it was 
feared that survivors would take justice into their own hands. There needed to be 
an immediate and tangible sense that justice had taken place and that 
perpetrators were punished, so that Rwandan society could move on. 
 
Several of the NGO leaders I interviewed stressed how gacaca was imperative in 
breaking the ‘culture of impunity’ that existed after the violence in 1959, the 1970s 
and the 1990s. Gacaca, according to many of those interviewed, is contributing to 
the important task of holding individuals accountable for their violent crimes and 
allows victims to see justice is done. A representative of ASF, when asked 
whether gacaca was contributing to reconciliation, immediately responded, 
“Justice is being done.” At a later stage she added that one cannot legalise 
reconciliation. Gacaca may create a space where reconciliation has the potential 
of taking place but it is up to individuals to make use of this opportunity (Personal 
interview, Kigali, January, 2007). 
 
But does it create this space? There was a high expectation that gacaca would 
bring about healing and reconciliation. Molenaar writes how “at its incept, it was 
hoped that through the very act of participation in gacaca, a degree of truth-telling, 
confession, forgiveness and thus reconciliation would take place”. Molenaar 
quotes the Mayor of a district in Rwanda as an example of official discourse 
regarding gacaca when it was first introduced: “Rwanda has great confidence in 
gacaca because it will solve our problems and bring about reconciliation. It is you, 
the population, who has to do it. It is you who must participate. In the first place, 
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you must come here and tell the truth about what happened” (2005, 51). Graybill 
describes that a survey done showed high percentages of Rwandans wanting to 
participate in the process. And yet, as it progressed, those participating became 
more skeptical.  
 
When gacaca started, some last remaining survivors in rural areas of the country 
were killed by perpetrators who did not want to be identified. Then there were 
retributive killings of those perpetrators (Graybill, 2004, 1224). Apart from this, 
survivor groups have complained that gacaca is too lenient on perpetrators 
(Wolters, 2005, 16). Further, because perpetrators receive a reduction in 
sentence on confession, survivors experience perpetrator confessions as being 
insincere (African Rights, 2000, 98). Many perpetrators thought that merely by 
testifying and confessing they would contribute to reconciliation but survivors were 
resentful of this process as it felt it made light of their suffering (2000, 99). 
 
This section has described the importance of bringing an end to ‘the culture of 
impunity’ in Rwanda, and having individuals take responsibility for their actions 
rather than emphasizing collective identities which may perpetuate ethnic division. 
It has also emphasized the need for fairness in a justice process, where the acts 
of violence committed by all those involved are dealt with, both as a result of 
genocide and as a result of civil war. It was also suggested that it is important that 
perpetrators understand the difference between inflicting harm on innocent people 
and engaging in military combat. Gacaca was explored in terms of its retributive 
and restorative qualities and it was critiqued for being more retributive than 
restorative. However, the difficult circumstances in which it was implemented and 
its positive contribution to the process of justice were also mentioned. Healing 
through justice remains one of the most difficult challenges to the reconciliation 
process and we are left with more questions than answers.  
 
9.4. Healing through forgiveness 
 
Although healing occurs most obviously in a process of forgiveness, it is also the 
most challenging of all the elements of a healing and reconciliation process as it 
seems that the natural response from a victim is the desire for revenge. Yet the 
stories coming out of Rwanda describe again and again the miracle of victims 
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forgiving perpetrators and thereby bringing healing to themselves, the perpetrator 
and their broader society. Making use of Harwell’s discussion of forgiveness, this 
section will explore how forgiveness takes place. 
 
Apology and forgiveness is difficult after violent conflict, suggests Hartwell, 
because in many cases the perpetrators may be dead or absent (2006). Hartwell 
stresses that a process of forgiveness needs to be engaged in by victims 
regardless of perpetrators expressing remorse, for healing to take place. In an 
informal interview, a Tutsi survivor stressed to me how she learnt that she needed 
to forgive her perpetrator even though he was not sorry, for her own sake. “I will 
never be free if I do not forgive”, she said (Personal Interview, Kigali, January, 
2007). In addition to this, as mentioned earlier, perpetrators also need to forgive 
themselves and their fellow perpetrators. 
 
Hartwell uses Enright’s model, which includes six stages of justice and 
forgiveness development, to explain the stages people tend to go through after 
violent conflict. According to this model, the kind of justice one desires is coupled 
with the progress of one’s ability to forgive. In the beginning stages, one may find 
it impossible to forgive, and desire revenge, whereas in the final stage, one is able 
to forgive without needing anything in return. Here are the six stages:  
 
• Stage one: ‘Heteronomous morality’ says that justice should be decided by the 
one in authority, leaving the outcome in the hands of others. Here, forgiveness 
is revengeful: I can forgive someone who wrongs me only if I can punish him 
to a similar degree to my own pain.” (Enright et al, 1992, 104-6).  
• Stage two: ‘Individualism’ defines justice in terms of reciprocity; if you help me, 
I must help you. With this stage, there is conditional or restitutional 
forgiveness: “If I get back what was taken away from me, then I can forgive. 
Or, if I feel guilty about withholding forgiveness, then I can forgive to relieve my 
guilt.” This depends on the explicit action on the part of the perpetrator to show 
remorse and apologise.  
• Stage three: ‘Mutual interpersonal expectations’, where group consensus and 
group pressure decides what is right and wrong. Forgiveness in this stage is 
‘expectational forgiveness’; there is pressure from others to forgive and people 
may forgive because they believe it to be expected. In stage four, ‘social 
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system and conscience’ justice, societal laws and the need for an orderly 
society guide justice.  
• Stage four: ‘lawful expectational forgiveness’ where one may forgive because 
ones religion or government demands it.  
• Stage five: ‘social contract’ justice’, acknowledges that people hold a variety of 
opinions and that one should uphold the values and rules of one’s group. 
Forgiveness here is in order to maintain social harmony. 
 
Stages three and four both depend on external pressure in terms of forgiveness, 
even though it would not be dependent on an apology or reciprocal action. Stage 
five is not as driven by external pressure but nor is it a completely internal 
decision one comes to.  
 
• Stage six: forgiveness as “an unconditional act of mercy and a complete 
abandonment of revenge” (2006). At this stage forgiveness happens because 
of the recognition of every human being as a human being and out of a place 
of love.  
 
This would relate to the concept of ubuntu, which suggests that in order for me to 
be fully human I need to recognize the humanity of another. Here, Enright 
suggests that the act of forgiveness is not to control the other, but to release the 
other, and arguably, also oneself. This version of forgiveness acknowledges the 
presence of an injustice while releasing the hurt of the act. “While the offended 
realise they have been treated unfairly, and have no duty to show compassion, 
they decide to go beyond seeking a “fair solution”, tied to a conditional justice of 
retribution or reparation, to reach for a compassionate one. (Enright et al, 1992, 
104-6) This last stage is seen as a final resolution and answer to the offence and 
it will not be revisited again by either the individual or group involved” (Hartwell, 
2006). 
 
During any post-conflict situation, all these levels of forgiveness would be 
happening simultaneously, to varying degrees, amongst different people and 
communities. Some Rwandans I have spoken to suggest that the word for 
forgiveness, kubabarira, and its understanding in Rwandan, means to completely 
forget what was done without the perpetrator taking any responsibility. For this 
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reason, many have said to me they will not forgive as people will then not need to 
be accountable. However, Michel Kayitaba suggests that the word kubabarira 
finds resonance with the Rwandan word urira which means ‘to cry’. During the 
MOUCECORE workshops he suggests that forgiving is to cry with one another at 
our lost humanity. Victims cry for their perpetrators that they could have done 
such inhumane things. Perpetrators cry for their own inhumane actions. Crying 
together leads to healing and reconciliation. This process would need to include 
acknowledging the inhumane act that was committed and would also involve 
remorse. 
 
Kayitaba stresses, however, that many perpetrators are not ready to show 
remorse because of the difficulty of coming face to face with what they have done. 
He encourages victims to begin the ‘crying’ or mourning process. Victims need to 
mourn the broken humanity of their perpetrators and their own brokenness. As 
perpetrators see the mourning of the victim, there is the hope that they will begin 
to experience remorse. But this is not a given and, as Enright’s model suggests, a 
truly freeing forgiveness does not depend on remorse, apology or restitution. 
 
As desirable as Kayitaba’s ‘crying with one another’ is, in a highly politicized 
environment shortly after violent conflict, most people will be at the earlier stages 
of justice and forgiveness which include the need for revenge and restitution. It is 
in this context that the Rwandan government has had to act, with hundreds of 
thousands of perpetrators in prison and victims demanding what they perceive to 
be fair treatment, and gacaca was a response to this. But where gacaca falls short 
is that no system can force perpetrators to a place of remorse, nor can it force 
victims to forgive. Churches and reconciliation organizations can create 
environments where this process might take place, but it is the action of 
individuals who rise above their hatred and revenge who make healing through 
mercy a reality. 
 
Rwandan musician, Jean-Paul Samputu, describes this reality in his own life in a 
book on forgiveness. He tells the story of how he was on a music tour outside of 
the country when the genocide took place. When he returned his parents had 
been killed. After a long time of searching he discovered that the killer had been 
his close childhood friend, Vincent. For the next nine years, he gave in to drugs 
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and alcohol as the bitterness and hatred overcame him. He went through a 
divorce and spent time in prison. Through a religious conversion he managed to 
piece his life back together, but he didn’t experience true freedom until he came to 
a place where he was able to forgive Vincent. When asked what led him to the 
place of forgiveness, his answer was that until he forgave his friend, he too was a 
killer. In his heart, he longed for his friend to be dead. He didn’t want to become a 
killer himself and instead chose the path of forgiveness. He relayed the message 
of his forgiveness to Vincent, who was in prison. “After Vincent accepted my 
forgiveness, he was able to repent and forgive himself” (2009, 170). This story 
illustrates powerfully how when a victim is able to forgive a perpetrator, not only is 
he himself freed, but the perpetrator is able to begin to forgive themselves. 
Through mercy, through forgiveness, healing takes place. 
 
9.5. Healing through peace 
 
It is sometimes thought that if the citizens of a country live in unity, then there will 
be peace. In both Rwanda and South Africa, the governments have called 
themselves the governments of national unity. Yet, how to create a sense of 
national unity in a country previously violently divided remains under debate. In 
Rwanda, the route that has been taken is to strive for a sense of oneness through 
eliminating ethnic difference and insisting on a single shared identity. Further, it is 
believed that unity will be achieved through having one understanding of history 
and the way into the future. This section will discuss how effective this approach is 
to national unity and peace. Before this, it will look at the dynamics of identifying 
people as perpetrators and victims and the impact this has on sustainable peace. 
 
9.5.1. Victims and perpetrators 
 
As has been apparent throughout this thesis, the issue of identity stands central to 
any efforts of healing and reconciliation. In chapter five the multiplicity of identities 
in Rwanda were described, from old case load refugees to new case-load 
refugees, between northerners and southerners, between those who were 
formerly in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania or elsewhere and of course between Hutu 
and Tutsi. Amidst all of this is the government’s attempt to unite all Rwandans 




Many have written about how identity has been manipulated throughout Rwandan 
history until today, as was mentioned in chapter two and three. Much of this 
manipulation has been around who is a victim and who is a perpetrator. 
Identifying people as perpetrator or victim has immense political consequences 
and remains a sore point in Rwandan society. Some would say the Hutu were the 
victim of the Tutsi monarchy during the pre-colonial and colonial period. Others 
would say the Tutsi were the victim of the Hutu during the two republics. Although 
prior to the violence of the 1990s, Rwandans may well have lived side by side in 
harmony, the moment the propaganda campaign began wielding its hate speech 
and conflict started rising, victim-perpetrator identities started to form. In a study of 
justice and identity, Hartwell describes how during peace, identities tend to be 
fluid, but during conflict they become frozen: “you are simply not whatever or 
whoever your enemy is” (2006). Further, during conflict, three central identities 
dominate, namely, victim, perpetrator and observer. In the case of Rwanda, as 
perhaps in all situations of conflict, who is in which role is not always clear. 
Although Tutsi, who were being slaughtered at the hands of genocidal killers 
during ethnic cleansing, were perhaps the most obvious victims, many Hutu 
nevertheless viewed themselves historically as victims of Tutsi subjugation. This 
victimhood, and the fear of being re-victimised by the Ugandan Tutsi infiltrating 
the country was a significant motivator for many Hutu to participate in the killing. 
While the genocide was taking place, there was nevertheless also a war between 
the Rwandan army and the RPF, and the RPF was attacking the country, acting 
against the Arusha Accords. It has also been suggested that both during and after 
the genocide, the RPF killed civilians who were not armed. This would make the 
RPF to be perpetrators as well.  
 
Directly after conflict, Hartwell argues that political identities are formed around 
perceptions of winning and losing, depending upon who is getting the most 
external assistance, humanitarian aid, financial reconstruction assistance, and 
international military protection (2006). As the RPF took control of Rwanda, the 
genocide came to a halt, and millions of Hutu began to flee. However, it was not 
only Hutu who were fleeing. In her autobiography, Beatrice Umutesi describes 
how everyone started fleeing for fear of what new violence the new situation 
would bring, including many Tutsi (2000). When some two million of the fleeing 
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refugees flooded refugee camps in neighbouring countries, the world saw them as 
the immediate victims; victims of cholera, dysentery and starvation. Humanitarian 
aid organizations began providing millions of dollars worth of aid. Little attention 
and aid was given to the millions of displaced and suffering people within 
Rwanda. But the RPF intervened quickly to show the world that the refugees were 
in fact perpetrators and not victims.  
 
Pottier would argue that the RPF would on the one hand talk about the ‘social 
construction of ethnicity’ or ‘the mistake of ethnicity’ and at the same time speak 
with ‘assertive, essentialist’ terms regarding identity: “outsiders as well as insiders 
readily resort to ‘the Hutu’ or ‘the Tutsi’. The former are ‘perpetrators’ of genocide, 
or in the case of those who died in 1994, ‘victims of politicide’; the latter are 
‘survivors’ or ‘victims of genocide’” (2001, 130). Hartwell writes that “Perceptions 
of unbalanced access to political power and privilege contribute to the shaping of 
a ‘victim’ identity…This is how former dominant groups begin perceiving 
themselves as victims and can become a danger to sustainable peace” (2006). 
She describes how easily this can develop, as political leaders use the victim 
identity to mobilize people to fight, manipulating real and perceived slights against 
their group as justification for revenge. They then construct a one-sided version of 
current and recent events that aid the creation of a new generation of perpetrators 
(2006).  
 
This clearly occurred during the genocide to incite people to fight. It has continued 
to occur after genocide, first in the refugee camps, and then in the prisons, where 
hundreds of thousands of accused genocide perpetrators have been awaiting trial. 
Pottier argues that the international aid effort ‘construed the Rwandan Hutu 
refugees as a collectivity, ‘which made the notion of collective guilt [for genocide] 
– and hence disposal – more acceptable’ (2001, 131). Every year in April, when 
the genocide is remembered, the emphasis is on the innocent Tutsi victims who 
were mercilessly slaughtered by the Hutu perpetrators as they were manipulated 
by their political leaders. Hutu opponents, on the other hand, would bring attention 
to the victimization of Hutu, not only historically, but since 1994 as well. There are 
stories of RPF massacres of women and children, which some, particularly Hutu 
refugees, have labeled ‘counter-genocide’. There are stories of continued 
harassment of Hutu in Rwanda. Filip Reijntjens would go so far as to say that the 
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very thing genocidal leaders feared, namely that the infiltrating Tutsi wanted to 
take and hold of power for themselves, has in fact happened (1999, 6). Thus 
many Hutu may feel they have become the new victim. 
 
Mamdani writes, that “Every round of perpetrators has justified the use of violence 
as the only effective guarantee against being victimised yet again. For the 
unreconciled victim of yesterday’s violence, the struggle continues. The continuing 
tragedy of Rwanda is that each round of violence gives yet another set of victims-
turned-perpetrators” (2002, 268). He argues that colonialism in Africa led to two 
types of ‘genocide impulses’: the genocide of the native by the settler (coloniser) 
and the genocide of the settler by the native. Mamdani further argues that where 
the first violence, of settler to native, was ’obviously despicable’, the second could 
be described as self-defense, or even an affirmation of the natives identity (2002, 
10). In the case of Rwanda, as mentioned above, the Tutsi took on the role of 
colonialist settler and the Hutu of subjugated native. Thus many Hutu saw 
themselves not as senseless killers but as natives of a country that had been 
overrun by outsiders. As Mamdani writes, “For the Hutu who killed, the Tutsi was 
a settler, not a neighbour” (2002, 10). This, together with the strong inferiority-
superiority complex, led to a strong victim mentality on the part of the Hutu. 
Simultaneously, Tutsi felt vicimtised both within the country, by ethnic-policies and 
outside of the country and by the fact that hundreds of thousands of refugees 
were denied return to Rwanda. Thus both felt they were victims defending 
themselves against a feared and hated perpetrator.   
 
As Hartwell and Lemarchand have warned, if we continue to operate according to 
winning and losing, victim and perpetrator, the conditions are being created that 
will incite some to rebel and ultimately kill. Both sides are correct in perceiving 
themselves as having been, at some point victimised, but both sides have also at 
some point been the perpetrator. Although the Rwandan government is 
attempting to transcend ethnic identity, the victim-perpetrator identities remain rife 






9.5.2. Eliminating ethnicity 
 
Alongside the victim-perpetrator dynamic is that of what to do with the ethnic 
divisions which have played such a divisive role in Rwanda. The dominant rhetoric 
of the current government concerning identity is that of national unity in national 
identity. In an interview with a representative from NURC it was mentioned how 
education campaigns teach people, “You are no longer Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, you 
are all Rwandan. You are not from Chad, Hutu; you are not from Ethiopia, Tutsi; 
you are not from the forest, Twa. Even taking into consideration migrations, for 
each one of you your heritage is Rwanda” (Personal interview, Kigali, January, 
2007).  
 
Michael Dorf writes about the Rwandan government’s policy to ‘eliminate’ ethnic 
identity using re-education camps and the law of divisionism. Although the basis 
of the divisionism law is ‘the fomenting of ethnic violence’, Dorf says that its critics 
“charge that it can also be used as a means by which the party in power stamps 
out even legitimate opposition” (2004, 2). Dorf suggests that these means are 
more extreme than one would normally find in a democracy but that they may be 
successful in the same way as Nazi re-education programs were arguably 
successful after World War II, and that the ethnic identities in Rwanda are 
‘artificial’ to begin with. “If ethnic division can thus be created by government 
policy, perhaps it can be destroyed the same way” (Dorf, 2004). He later asks 
whether identities really can be erased and whether people don’t have the right to 
identify with others in their own group. His answer to this question is that distinct 
identities need only to be preserved if there is some value in preserving them. If 
they are tied to religion, language or culture it would make sense to preserve 
them, but in the Rwandan case they are not (2004, 5).  
 
One of the central questions discussed during interviews was that of sameness 
and difference. In the South African context, Desmond Tutu introduced the 
concept of unity in diversity; the rainbow nation which allows for all colours and 
creeds to express their diverse ways of being while still being incorporated into 
the national identity. Rwanda has taken a different route, that of emphasizing the 
constructed nature of ethnic identity, and from here, denying its existence. The 




The danger of the government’s stance of national unity is perhaps that it not only 
tries to ignore the reality of ethnicity but further disallows any privileging of 
disadvantaged groups. A case in point in the Rwanda context is that of the Twa. 
The Twa are an ethnic group that have been severely stigmatized and abused 
throughout Rwandan history and remain a group that all other Rwandans look 
down on. The NURC representative spoke of the Twa as being seen as ‘dirty, 
stupid people that lived in trees’. He also admitted that the policy of ‘no ethnicity’ 
meant that is was impossible for the Twa to assert their rights as a disadvantaged 
ethnic group. Although it is the commonly held belief that the Twa are short, 
pygmy-type people, nevertheless they are now, according to official rhetoric, no 
longer a distinct group but like all other people in the country, ‘Rwandan’. 
Although the Rwandan constitution allows for the protection of all citizens rights, 
and equal opportunity, the Twa remain behind in education and in general society. 
Until today, it remains difficult for the Twa to integrate in society due to deep 
prejudices and stereotypes. And yet the ‘no ethnicity’ policy renders them without 
a collective identity from which to act and assert their equal rights in Rwandan 
society.   
 
Rather more skeptically, Pottier would go so far as to argue that the government 
has a distinct political agenda behind eliminating categories to their advantage. 
Both Englund and Nyamnjoh discuss how in many cases in Africa, a multi-party 
democracy becomes an opportunity for a dominant group to legitimately channel 
all cultural and ethnic identities into the dominant way of thinking and being under 
the guise of citizenship and national unity.  Even pluralistic governments ‘continue 
to have major difficulties in envisaging diversity within their polities, particularly if 
that diversity takes on ethnic markers” (2004, 9). Marianne Andersen looks at the 
discrepancy between Kenyan political rhetoric of national unity which fails to make 
itself known in practice. She writes, “The ideology of equality based on common 
civic citizenship can be understood as a rhetorical device for the legitimization of 
existing hierarchies and forms of political power” (2004, 128). And further, “The 
ideology of equality in dignity and rights, when articulated only or mostly at the 
level of rhetoric, provides a practical tool for the suppression of identities not 




In the case of Rwanda, it has already been made apparent that the history and 
politics associated with being Hutu and being Tutsi, and the relationship between 
these two ethnic groups cannot simply be undone by a governmental campaign 
that insists those identities no longer exist. Although everyone would agree that 
Rwanda needs to be moving towards unity, the question is whether eliminating 
ethnicity is the way to go. When questioned about this, Antoine Rutayisere, then 
director of African Evangelical Enterprise, argued for a separation of present state 
and future hope. The present state may be one of incorrectly experiencing a 
constructed ethnic identity; the future hope would be of a Rwanda without ethnic 
categories. Currently, he says, Rwanda is in a transitional generation, between 
artificial ethnic identities and a future state where these no longer exist. 
Rwandans cannot ignore what they are now but they can change the future 
(Personal interview, Kigali, January, 2007).  
 
9.5.4. Nationalism and national identity 
 
A prominent factor in identity politics and securing sustainable peace in Rwanda is 
that of nationalism and national identity. Jenkins defines nationalism as “the 
expression and organization of political claims to territory and self-determination” 
as a nation” (2003, 124). It was nationalistic instincts that led hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandans who were enforced to live in neighbouring countries, to 
take up arms and violently reclaim their right to ‘territory and self-determination’. In 
the interview with Robert, who was a refugee in Uganda, it was apparent that the 
primary reason he wanted to return to Rwanda was exactly this: self-
determination, as an individual. In Uganda, he had no rights, no access to 
education or employment. In his own country, he believed he would have access 
to these things. 
 
Jenkins differentiates between nationalism and national identity in that nationalism 
is a ‘public ideology of identification with the state’ whereas national identity refers 
to ‘an implicit sense of being a kind of person, or living the kind of life appropriate 
to membership in that state’ (2003, 160). Those refugees living in Uganda and 
Tanzania, for example, had a very strong sense of their national identity, of being 
Rwandan, even in these foreign countries.  And this identity became violent when 
 
205 
it was translated into political claims of territory and self determinism. Similarly, 
those within the country turned to violence when it seemed their claim to territory 
and self determinism was under threat. 
 
In Rwanda, there is a tension between the old ways of doing things and new 
ways, between modern and traditional, western and African, and individual and 
community-based ways of being. Nyamnjoh elaborates on these divides, using 
the case of Botswana as an example, arguing that it is often assumed that liberal, 
western style democracy, based on such concepts as the nation state, citizenship 
(and loyalty to the nation-state) and the autonomous individual is the best form of 
governance and thus adopted by African states (2004, 33). Englund elaborates on 
this saying,  
 
“…post-colonial governments in Africa have great difficulties in 
acknowledging and accommodating difference. A rhetoric of unity 
dominated discourse during the first decades of independence. Nation 
building was the altar at which ethnic and linguistic diversity was to be 
sacrificed” (2004, 9).  
 
Influenced by modernization ideology, African regimes ‘ruthlessly suppressed’ 
difference. “Ethnicity, for example, was a remnant of a ‘tribal’ past that had no 
future in a modern nation-state” (2004, 9). However, he also makes clear that 
rather than uniting a nation through ‘the inculcation of national identity’, often one-
party states would emerge that were ‘highly selective in their choice of national 
symbols and political allies, feeding covert dissent’ (2004, 9). This has strong 
resonance with the reality in Rwanda today. Robert described in his follow-up 
interview how Rwanda has undergone a significant shift from the old way of doing 
things to a more western way of operating. This has been necessary to participate 
in a global economy, but politically and socially the cost has been high. 
 
NURC is actively educating Rwandans with regards to democracy and citizenship. 
Yet the uncritical acceptance of these concepts without integrating them into the 
African context can have dire consequences, according to Nyamnjoh. He is wary 
of simply describing African societies as being all that western societies are not, 
and warns against caricatured, idealized, or romanticized concepts of community 
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and togetherness. But also, he speaks of how African society is held together by 
integral and complex relationships and hierarchies that act as checks and 
balances to power and allow interdependent individuals to gain from and 
contribute to a community in such a way as to ensure its survival (2004, 35).  
 
By emphasizing national identity, the nation-state, citizenship, democracy and the 
like, the danger is of losing other aspects fundamental to a harmonic Rwandan 
society. Robert emphasized in an earlier interview that it is the interdependent 
community relationships that have allowed for at least some forms of 
reconciliation to take place and have forced people to draw together; not because 
they are citizens of one nation with a shared national identity, but because their 
very survival depends on the intricate interdependency of their community. And in 
Rwanda, every community constitutes Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, survivor, victim and 
perpetrator, old case-load refugee and new.   
 
Claude Ake, in The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa (2000), discusses how a 
communal sense of personhood (as opposed understanding personhood in terms 
of the autonomous individual) asks for the purpose of the good of all.  
 
“People participate not because they are individuals whose interests need 
to be asserted, but because they are part of an interconnected whole … 
Participation is based not on the assumption of individuality but on the 
social nature of human beings and is as much a matter of taking part as of 
… sharing the burdens and rewards of community membership. It is also 
more than the occasional opportunity to choose, affirm or dissent, in that it 
requires active involvement in the process of decision-making and 
community life in general” (2000, 184). 
 
This kind of unity is based deeply in communal and cultural values that resonate 
deeply in Rwandan society, particularly the Rwanda outside of Kigali.  
 
Jenkins suggests a way forward in terms of the tension between national identity, 
personal autonomy and a sense of community when he distinguishes between 
nominal and virtual identity (2004, 166). Nominal identity refers to that which is 
titled (eg: Hutu, Tutsi, Rwandan, etc) and virtual identity refers to that which is 
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lived. He argues that these overlap but aren’t always the same thing. The nominal 
is less likely to change than the virtual, which remains dynamic. By freezing 
identity categories in terms of the nominal, the natural processes of virtual identity 
are hampered and disallowed to morph into something new. The following section 
will discuss narrative approaches to healing and reconciliation which allow identity 
categories to remain more fluid. 
 
9.6. Introducing a narrative approach to healing 
  
A narrative approach to healing and reconciliation focuses on issues of identity 
and history, and how we speak of these individually, communally and nationally. It 
focuses on the stories we tell as a central point for personal healing and for 
engaging the other with empathy and compassion. Our narratives can become 
restrictive and unhelpful or they can open up channels for healing and 
reconciliation. This section will briefly examine South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to see the strengths and weaknesses of a narrative 
approach to reconciliation and healing. It will then consider other narrative 
approaches that have been used internationally and in Rwanda, such as the 
Healing of Memories, the Alternative to Violence program, the Sociotherapy 
project and others. It will look at how sharing stories impact on healing processes. 
It will consider the kind of context needed for a narrative approach to develop. 
And finally, it will describe some narrative healing events that might be helpful in 
the Rwandan context. 
 
9.6.1. South Africa’s TRC 
 
South Africa’s TRC is relevant to consider in the context of a narrative model of 
reconciliation for several reasons. One is that the TRC was primarily narrative in 
its approach. Another is that the debate around the role of history, and of personal 
narratives in dialogue with broader socio-political narratives played a significant 
role. Yet another is that the TRC brought to the fore the question of what should 
take precedence in the fine balance between peace, justice, truth and mercy in 
bringing about reconciliation. The following section will consider the TRC in terms 




During South Africa’s Apartheid, 18 000 people were killed, 80 000 opponents of 
Apartheid detained, with 6000 of these being tortured. Structural violence was 
present in every area of society, with policies and laws that led to the systematic 
dehumanizing of millions of people on the basis of their race. The TRC was 
established to investigate human rights abuses committed between 1960 and 
1994, and offer amnesty to individuals in exchange for their full disclosure about 
their past acts. According to Graybill, “its mandate was to give as complete a 
picture as possible of the violations that took place during the period, focusing on 
gross human rights violations defined as ‘killing, abduction, torture, or severe ill 
treatment’” (2004, 1117). 7000 people applied for amnesty and about 16% of 
these were granted amnesty. Only a tenth of the 20 000 people wanting to testify 
at the TRC were heard (Graybill, 2004, 1117). But the TRC hearings were not 
intended as a means of trying everyone involved in Apartheid, but rather as an 
opportunity for all South Africans to hear the complexity of the stories of what 
happened. Nolte-Schamm writes that preference was given to those whose 
stories included particular trauma or those whose stories had never been heard 
(1999, 40).  
 
The TRC proceedings culminated in a five hundred page volume which describes 
thousands of stories. In the report, the slippery issue of truth and history is 
discussed at some length. The approach was to adopt four understandings of 
truth: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social or 'dialogue' truth, 
and healing or restorative truth. Colin Bundy critiques the report, saying that on 
the one hand it argues that the past is a 'a site of contending constructions and 
perspectives, a realm of subjective, partial truths', truths that may only emerge in 
time, and are dynamic, changing and multiple. On the other hand, it argues that 
this report is the final, factual truth of our past, and that 'we should accept that 
truth has emerged' (2000, 14). Bundy argues that the report makes no effort to 
negotiate the discrepancies between the forensic data and the many contradicting 
narratives of people. In terms of Stewart and Stratherns’ assertion that history is 
the ‘narrative of the interaction of narratives’, this unresolved tension could 
perhaps be argued to be necessarily a part of any narrative of history. 
 
Villa-Vicencio argues that the stories that emerge in testimony are incomplete, as 
memory is incomplete. He prosaically calls for a listening to the incompleteness, 
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the silences, the body language, and the complexity of emotions that accompany 
telling narratives of the past. The important issue, for Villa-Vicencio, is not that 
one complete, coherent truth is told, but that new insight is gained into what 
happened, along with “an empathetic understanding of how a particular event is 
viewed by ones adversaries" (2000, 27). The crux is not getting to the truth, but 
having people on opposing sides begin to see each others’ truths with an empathy 
and understanding that will allow for healing to begin to take place. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that what happened does not matter. Villa-Vicencio stresses 
that violations of human rights on all sides must be investigated and 
acknowledged in order to create a culture of human rights in the present (2000, 
29).  
 
Creating a culture of human rights was also a driving force behind choosing 
amnesty as the route of justice. Some of the reasons for this included the fact that 
those who might have been regarded as perpetrators were also the ones to carry 
the country forward in terms of the economy. Further, as Tutu describes in his 
book, No Future without Forgiveness, a retributive response may have resulted in 
renewed violence (1999, 23).  But more than this, Tutu describes how the desire 
to live out the precepts of the Constitution and have the reconciliation process be 
a shared one between all South Africans were fundamental in deciding for a truth-
telling with amnesty route. 
 
He quotes Judge Ismail Mahomed, who was deputy president of the 
Constitutional Court at the time, as saying,  
 
“For a successfully negotiated transition, the terms of the transition 
required not only the agreement of those victimised by abuse but also 
those threatened by transition to a ‘democratic society based on freedom 
and equality’. If the Constitution kept alive the prospect of continuous 
retaliation and revenge, the agreement of those threatened by its 
implementation might never have been forthcoming” (1999, 22).  
 
Those ‘threatened by transition’ needed to be incorporated in the process of 
transitioning in order not to become the new victims and renew violence. Because 
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the participation of those ‘threatened by transition’ was sufficiently high, the 
possibility of renewed violence was relatively low. 
 
The Nuremberg trial option was considered, but it was immediately clear that this 
process would take too long and be too costly to be practically possible. Further, 
such drawn out trials would be “too disruptive of a fragile peace and stability” 
(1999, 23).  Tutu writes, “We have had to balance the requirements of justice, 
accountability, stability, peace, and reconciliation” (1999, 23). And he goes on to 
say that had South Africa chosen a retributive path, it would have destroyed the 
country. “Our country had to decide very carefully where it would spend its limited 
resources to the best possible advantage” (1999, 23). The TRC seemed to 
respond to this requirement. On the official TRC website it is stated that “the 
conflict during this period resulted in violence and human rights abuses from all 
sides. No section of society escaped these abuses.” Because of this, the clear 
distinction between perpetrator and victim was blurred. Any person who had 
committed any act of violence was seen as a perpetrator needing amnesty, 
regardless of their political affiliation.    
 
Although the route of amnesty seemed at the time the best way for reconciliation 
and healing to take place in South Africa, in retrospect, many feel it was unhelpful 
for the victims of Apartheid. Hamber et al. describe their study with twenty women 
who survived political violence during Apartheid and testified at the TRC. These 
women had thought that they were testifying in order for the perpetrators to 
receive punishment.  
 
“The respondent’s main sentiment was that the perpetrators should face jail 
time. There were a few respondents who asked for other forms of 
punishment such as the perpetrators being forced to meet the victims, or 
being forced to tell the truth, but even these requests were coupled with 
calls for traditional retributive justice such as incarceration or 
compensation.  It is clear that for these respondents, the TRC’s limited 
system of justice (public accountability as the price for truth) did not suffice 
for these respondents. The most striking commonality between all of the 
responses is that of the twenty, not one of those interviewed is in any way 




Hamber et al. write that although the TRC may have had a role to play in the 
national process of healing, and that telling their stories may have been cathartic 
for some, “it does not seem to have helped many of the victims cope with their 
tragedies in a convincing manner, or help them deal with the ongoing personal 
and social difficulties created by their victimization” (2000, 39). Although at the 
time of testifying, many survivors felt relieved at the opportunity to be heard by the 
nation, months afterwards Hamber et al. found them frustrated and confused by 
the process. Hamber et al. suggest the possibility that those that testified felt like 
‘pawns’ in a national healing process, where their suffering was used to help the 
nation but they themselves benefited from it very little.  
 
“It is difficult to assess the truth for justice trade in a context where, for the 
majority, truth about their case was not forthcoming.  Yet even for the few 
victims who we interviewed who got the truth, truth was not always enough. 
They still wanted the perpetrators to be punished in some way.  For them, 
truth and possible reconciliation did not equate with justice. The question 
arises: did telling one's story and hearing the truth compound the psychic 
burden of revenge, or did the truth alleviate some of the anger?  Can truth 
alone lead to reconciliation on an individual level?  We speculate, that 
those we interviewed, would say no” (2000, 41).   
 
This is a powerful statement about the limitations of a truth-telling amnesty 
process. A narrative approach to healing and reconciliation would need to 
consider how justice is to be incorporated in such a way that the victims of 
injustice are satisfied. At a later stage, Hamber et al. suggest that financial 
compensation or a sense that the perpetrator fully understands what they have 
done and are prepared to make restitution may help in the process of healing 
where retributive justice is absent (2000, 42). It may be worth noting here that only 
those who applied for amnesty and were prepared to tell the truth were given 
amnesty. Those who did not apply were tried by the usual judicial system. But 
according to Hamber et al. the TRC did not give enough room to the legitimate 




As seriously as we need to take survivors’ anger and pain, a retributive approach 
to justice may be impractical. In the South African context, Tutu argues that all 
South Africans had to continue living alongside one another and could not afford 
to alienate the perpetrators as this had the danger of leading to renewed violence 
(2000, 23). But a retributive approach is also limited in aiding the process of 
healing and reconciliation. A driving force behind South Africa’s choice for a TRC 
was the desire to live out the precepts of the Constitution in the very way justice 
and reconciliation were engaged with (Tutu, 2000, 21). Leaders such as Nelson 
Mandela and Desmond Tutu wanted to build a country on the principles of 
forgiveness and reconciliation, amongst others. Forgiveness played a central role 
in the TRC proceedings, drawing its meaning both from Christianity which is 
practiced by the majority of South Africans as well as from the African concept of 
ubuntu. Graybill writes that in South Africa’s interim constitution was written: 
“’There is a need for understanding but not for revenge, a need for reparation but 
not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization’. Ubuntu derives from 
the Xhosa expression ‘Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye bantu’ (People are people 
through other people)” (2004, 1118). She quotes an example of a testimony at a 
TRC hearing that embodies this concept: 
 
“One of those supporting amnesty was Cynthia Ngeweu, mother of 
Christopher Piet (one of the Giguletu 7 who was assassinated), who 
explained her understanding of ubuntu: ‘This thing called reconciliation…if I 
am understanding it correctly…if it means the perpetrator, the man who 
has killed Christopher Piet, if it means he becomes human again, this man. 
So that I, so  that all of us, get our humanity back…then I agree, then I 
support it all’” (2004, 1119). 
  
Tutu held that all South Africans had been hurt by Apartheid and needed to be 
forgiven and healed, regardless of whether they were perpetrators or victims. “In 
one way or another, as a supporter, a perpetrator, a victim, or one who opposed 
the ghastly system, something happened to our humanity.  All of us South 
Africans are less whole than we would have been without apartheid” (Tutu 1999, 
154). He called on people to forgive regardless of whether remorse was shown, in 
the belief that forgiveness is pivotal if a nation is not to fall into an endless cycle of 




Although this led to very moving and transforming experiences during the TRC 
hearings, the critique has been that white South Africans did not show enough 
remorse, and that the structural violence meted out by the apartheid system was 
not sufficiently acknowledged. Ntsimane writes that during the TRC hearings not 
enough contrition was shown by perpetrators, and that the atmosphere of the 
hearing led victims to feel forced to forgive. Ntsimane suggests that it may have 
been better had the victims, and not the TRC commissioner, been the one to 
decide whether perpetrators received amnesty (2000, 40). Graybill also argues 
that it was rare for victims to meet perpetrators face-to-face and engage in a 
process of forgiveness (2004, 1119). In this way, reconciliation and forgiveness 
have the danger of becoming abstract. As Francois said in his interview, in section 
7.3.6, reconciliation needs to happen between the one who has been hurt and the 
one who has hurt them. Yet this is often not possible, and Tutu stresses in his 
book that there is no alternative, that there will be no future for South Africa or 
other nations in the process of recovering from a violent past, than through 
forgiveness regardless of whether the perpetrators show remorse (2004, 280). 
 
Graybill concludes her critical discussion of the TRC hearings with the words of 
the chancellor of Rhodes university, “notwithstanding the complex divisions and 
differences of various sorts, levels, and intensities, [it] is decidedly not an 
unreconciled nation in the sense of being threatened by imminent disintegration 
and internecine conflict” (2004, 1119). Through the process of the TRC, amongst 
other things, South Africans across the political divide, who had access to large 
amounts of arms, have put down their weapons and have embraced peace. 
Amidst continual racial and political tensions, there has nevertheless been an 
ongoing effort made to abate violence and work towards a united nation. The 
route South Africa has chosen for nation building is unity through diversity.  
 
Desmond Tutu coined the term ‘the rainbow nation’ shortly after the first 
democratic elections in 1994, to capture the idea of unity in the midst of many 
language, culture and race groups. Baines describes how sporting events and the 
media have participated in building this image, from the South African 
Broadcasting Association’s ‘Simunye-we are one’ slogan to the Castle Lager 
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slogan of ‘one beer, one nation’ (1998). Baines argues that although nationalism 
has the danger of becoming exclusivist and tends to emphasize a political 
affiliation over affiliation to a community, multi-level nationalism that incorporates 
national and communal identities creates a public national culture which a 
diversity of people can identify with without losing their own cultural affiliations 
(1998). However, he argues that the ANC’s rhetoric has leaned towards being 
Africanist, even though it still insists on non-racialism. “The ANC's apparent 
ambivalence towards non-racialism is apparent in its varied definitions of 
nationhood. It is both inclusive and qualified” (Baines, 1998). There is a fear that 
black empowerment and the accompanying policies of affirmative action and BEE 
will result in what some inaccurately name ‘reverse-Apartheid’. From a completely 
different angle, there are those that fear identities becoming lost in the ‘rainbow 
nation’. Interestingly, the Afrikaner nation has reidentified themselves as a 
minority group in the new South Africa, an identity that gives a different kind of 
political leverage (Baines, 1998). Baines’ discussion shows the complexity of 
multiculturalism and that, as important as unity in diversity is in order to sustain 
peace, it is a difficult path to forge. 
 
This section has described the TRC in terms of the four elements of healing and 
reconciliation: truth, justice, mercy and peace. The TRC has been critiqued for 
focusing on national, symbolic reconciliation with an emphasis on forgiveness and 
mercy at the expense of victims’ needs for justice and compensation. The most 
powerful impact of the TRC, though, would perhaps be exactly what a narrative 
approach to reconciliation endeavours to achieve, namely, to be challenged and 
changed through hearing the stories of others. Nolte-Schamm describes how the 
well-known South African journalist, Antjie Krog, “through being exposed to, and 
allowing herself to be challenged by, the collective memories of groups other than 
her own, was able to start critiquing her own story; her own story was ‘stretched’” 
(2000, 41). This is the key contribution that a narrative approach makes to 
reconciliation and healing; through the sharing of narratives, our own narrative is 






9.6.2. What is the role of narrative in healing? 
 
This thesis has argued that critically engaging our own and others’ narratives can 
lead to emancipation. But how does sharing narratives lead to healing? During an 
interview with a genocide survivor, her comment was that she had no desire to 
talk about what happened or share her story. “Talking and sharing emotions with 
outsiders is a western way of doing things”, she said. And she quoted a Rwandan 
proverb which says that a family’s problems should remain within the confines of a 
family’s home (Personal interview, Pretoria, March, 2005). Yet for individuals and 
a nation to find healing, sharing the story of what happened seems to be of 
significant importance. It is not only that the act of sharing is cathartic, but that 
through sharing we begin to create shared narratives. It is within these shared 
narratives that we begin to experience healing and reconciliation. 
 
This is only possible, according to Anthony Balcomb, if we share our stories in a 
particular way. A shared story begins to emerge through listening (2000, 54). And 
not just listening to stories, but identifying with them and entering into them in 
such a way  that one’s own story is challenged or even shattered (2000, 56). What 
was hoped for with the four young men who shared their life stories was that by 
being confronted by another’s story their own stories would be challenged. 
However, the setting wasn’t right for deep listening. Kayitaba from MOUCECORE 
shared several instances, though, during their carefully structured reconciliation 
workshops, where hearing the story of another has resulted in a shattering of 
one’s own story. 
 
This is particularly the case when one has painted the other as the enemy, the 
perpetrator or simply the one who is completely other to me. When one is deeply 
embedded in a stereotyped understanding of the other, then it can be challenging 
or shattering to hear the others’ story. In the case of Rwanda, many survivors 
would perhaps be shattered by the stories of Hutus who were violently forced to 
become perpetrators and who then underwent harrowing experiences while 
fleeing the RPF. Some extremist Hutu might have their stories shattered if they 
were to hear of the simple and humble lives lived by many Tutsi on the hills, 
where they had no concept of a sense of superiority or any desire to take over 
power in the country. When we hear the story of the other and allow it to 




Balcomb suggests that a crises takes place when our stories are shattered, and 
the ideas or stereotypes we had are brought into question. But the resolution of 
such a crises allows for the construction of new narratives (2000, 57). He writes 
that we need to identify which narratives are important to a community, which 
narratives aren’t important, and “which stories are looking old and haggard and 
are ready to die” (2000, 60). In the case of Rwanda, part of the work of NURC 
could be to listen to the community as they tell their narratives, rather than having 
the Rwandan government tell communities which narratives they should be telling. 
It may be surprising and even shattering to begin to hear what stories emerge. It 
may lead to crises, but after the crises, space may be created for new, shared 
narratives to emerge. 
 
9.6.3. The context needed for a narrative approach 
 
A narrative approach to healing and reconciliation requires a context that is 
particularly open and safe. This kind of context needs to be created by the 
leadership of a country if a nation is to engage in a healing process. It can also be 
fostered to a lesser degree by organizations, churches or communities. Many 
reconciliation organizations in the country have created the kinds of spaces where 
a narrative approach to healing and reconciliation has taken place. However, the 
process of healing and reconciliation in Rwanda would be greatly helped if, on a 
national level, there was a sense of security, supportive government policy and 
laws, freedom of speech and open and honest dialogue.  
 
Although many policies have been put in place by the government to support 
reconciliation, there are others that leave people feeling fearful and insecure. 
Certain government programs, such as those initiated by NURC strongly support 
reconciliation on a grass roots level. But laws such as these on ethnic divisionism 
law create fear and uncertainty. Some would argue that Rwanda is currently being 
governed in much same way as the monarchy governed prior to colonialism, 
which was also carried over into the two republics. In chapter two it was described 
that Kayibanda ruled Rwanda like a mwami with a remote, authoritarian and 
secretive leadership. Hard work and virtue were valued and people were 
encouraged not to ask too many questions or meddle in politics. Much of the 
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same atmosphere is felt today, with a similar authoritative leadership style, as was 
discussed by the Reconciliation Forum mentioned in section 8.3. For Rwandans 
who mind their own business and work hard, life in Rwanda is pleasant and 
productive. But those who ask questions or are politically minded claim that they 
find themselves side-lined socially and in terms of employment, as Reginald 
described in his interview in chapter 7. 
 
As a result, as was mentioned before, ‘double-speak’ is a common phenomenon 
in Rwandan society. According to several people interviewed, they hold one view 
in private and another in public. Fred, in his interview, described it as being like a 
woman who has been repeatedly abused by a string of men. After such an 
experience, it will be difficult for her to trust again. Similarly, in Rwanda, many 
people feel they have been betrayed by people they believe they trusted; 
neighbours, people they knew and had always lived with, and even family, 
became killers. The trust factor is thus high on the agenda with regards to any 
attempt to encourage people to talk to one another.  
 
The editor of the controversial Rwandan newspaper, Umuvugizi, insists that there 
is little freedom of speech in Rwanda (Personal interview, Kigali, June, 2008). He 
almost paid for this with his life when he was beaten up by people allegedly acting 
on behalf of a politician he mentioned in one of his articles. The Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) intervened on his behalf and continues to support 
independent newspapers such as this one and Umuseso. The lack of free speech 
was confirmed by Reginald, Francois and others informally interviewed, Hutus in 
particular, who spoke of being afraid to speak out and criticize the government or 
its policies.  
 
Premature efforts at reconciliation are doomed, argues Charles Mironko, if some 
of the underlying wounds have not been addressed. He says that “what survivors 
and perpetrators need is a forum for frank dialogue which will lead to a truthful 
rapprochement”. He recommends extended periods of dialogue where survivors 
can begin to make sense of what happened and why, and perpetrators can begin 
to understand the feelings of survivors (2004, 50). Villa-Vicencio speaks of a 
period of ‘reconvivencia’ which describes a period of getting to know one another, 
confronting each others’ worst fears and developing an empathetic understanding 
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of one another (2000, 27; Nolte-Schamm, 2005). Drumtra recommends that 
authorities should seek “opportunities to acknowledge the existence of sensitive 
ethnic problems in an open and constructive manner. The government can more 
effectively defuse the ethnicity issue by helping society discuss it, rather than by 
denying its existence” (1998). 
 
9.6.4. Other narrative approaches to healing  
 
Various narrative approaches to healing and reconciliation have been used by 
NGOs and churches internationally and in Rwanda. This section will discuss a 
number of these, including projects that focus on the healing of memories, the 
Sociotherapy program, the use of ritual and the role of memorials. Exploring these 
approaches will give insight into the significant role that a narrative approach can 
play in healing and reconciliation after violent conflict.  
 
The Institute for the Healing of Memories was started by Fr Michael Lapsley 
during the TRC hearings in order to give more people the opportunity to give voice 
to their experiences. Where the TRC only allowed a small number of people to 
share their story, Lapsley’s workshops were intended to reach a broader 
audience, allowing more South African to take part in the healing and 
reconciliation process. The website describes the objectives of the Institute as 
follows: 
 
“On an individual level, participation in a Healing of Memories workshop 
provides an experiential way to overcome feelings of anger, hatred, 
prejudice and guilt and create a more positive meaning for suffering. It can 
therefore be considered as one step on the journey to psychological, 
emotional and spiritual healing and wholeness. On a communal, national or 
international level, the workshops reveal how the nation’s history and 
resultant socio-political environment have shaped personal emotions and 
views. These processes lead to a growing empathy with the experience of 
others and have the potential to lead to reconciliation, forgiveness, and a 
transformation of the relationships between people of different ethnic 




This relates closely with the discussions throughout this thesis around creating an 
awareness of the role socio-political narratives have played in personal narratives. 
Understanding this role and hearing the stories of others has a powerful impact in 
the healing process. The workshops allow people to explore their personal 
histories and hear the stories of others.  
 
Another organization that does this is the Khulumani support group who facilitate 
healing of memory workshops. Their information brief says that the “narrative 
approach to healing is concerned with people participating together in suffering 
and through the process becoming part of the ability to bring about transformation 
through the re-interpretation of their life stories through meaningful relationships”. 
They say that sharing our stories leads to a deepening of trust as we begin to 
understand and know one another. 
 
 The Sociotherapy project that was implemented in Byumba, Rwanda, similarly 
emphasizes sharing stories as a way of building trust. This project, implemented 
by Cora Dekker who previously worked with traumatized refugees in the 
Netherlands, is a kind of group therapy where participants meet together to share 
their daily life experience (Richters et al. 2005, 13). Richters et al. write that this 
approach focuses less on memories of the past than events happening here-and-
now, although the past and present socio-cultural context is taken into account 
(2005, 14). Participants, normally both Hutu and Tutsi, victim and perpetrator, 
meet together on a regular basis and talk about how they together can negotiate 
their daily experiences. This is particularly pertinent in a context where 
interdependence is a crucial part of how communities operate. In a personal 
communication with Dekker, it was clear that sociotherapy makes no claims of 
forgiveness or reconciliation but does foster a safe environment for togetherness 
which may well lead to healing and reconciliation (Email, 01/02/2007).  
 
Richters et al. describe their skepticism of the potential of gacaca and the TRC to 
foster long term reconciliation and healing as this needs to take place in the 
context of people’s daily lives (2005, 4). Through the sociotherapy approach, new 
narratives are created through engaging differently with daily life. Richters et al. 
quote an ex-prisoner as saying that in the sociotherapy group he was ‘treated as a 
full person of value’ while another said that the group helped him ‘decolonise’ his 
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thoughts, finding freedom from old ways of thinking (2008, 12). Although this 
method differs distinctly from the healing of memories approach, it can again be 
seen that a narrative approach to healing, in its various forms, has a powerful role 
to play in healing and reconciliation.    
 
Apart from workshops that heal memories or dialogue that builds trust, Hay 
suggests that rituals can be helpful in the process of healing. Rituals create 
spaces in which new narratives can emerge. He writes, “Reconciliation will not 
simply happen; there are steps and rituals that are necessary to foster 
reconciliation” (1998,113). Ntsimane critiques the TRC for not having considered 
traditional African ways of reconciliation and mentions a Zulu ritual for 
reconciliation between disputing brothers, called ukuthelelana amanzi (2000, 22). 
In response to this critique, Nolte-schamm has developed a ritual which takes 
both Christian theology and African traditional practice into consideration. The 
question is whether such rituals would be helpful in the Rwandan context. In 
Rwanda, the predominant religion is Christianity, and most particularly 
Catholicism. The RPF leadership originating from Uganda brought with them a 
scepticism for western religion. Yet in many rural parts of Rwanda, traditional 
religions are still practiced, often interwoven with Christianity. This remains largely 
unresearched and unrecorded. The primary traditional religious groups seem to 
be the Nyabingi sect and the Ryangombe sect. Interestingly, members of the 
Nyabingi sect are mentioned in a panel at the Genocide Museum in Kigali for their 
heroism in saving lives regardless of ethnic affinity. 
 
 In section 3.4.3, Taylor’s description of cultural narratives that led to a particular 
kind of violence was mentioned. Taylor argued that there were narratives of 
purification and of blockage and flow that were expressed through particularly 
perverse sexual violence, throwing bodies into cisterns and rivers, the many 
roadblocks and the severing of tendons. Although these violent narratives have 
not been mentioned by many other researchers, it may be relevant to consider 
these in terms of how this related to traditional religions and the possibility of 
healing rituals. According to King, the worship of the ancestor Ryangombe played 
a powerfully unifying role in Rwanda in the past, bringing together Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa (2006, 94). Nyabingi was a woman healer and her role was seen to bring an 
end to oppression and injustice, according to Dashu (2006). However, these sects 
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now exist in secret and members may find themselves penalized for participation 
in these sects by their church communities. 
 
Research into traditional religion and ritual falls outside of the scope of this thesis, 
but further research is recommended into traditional religious narratives that may 
open the way to healing rituals. Ilibagiza writes that “Rwandans are intensely 
private and secretive people who keep their emotions to themselves” (2006, 98). 
In a society where therapeutic sharing and talking about emotions may not come 
naturally, rituals that draw from deeply embedded traditional religious worldviews 
may be helpful in the process of healing. Coupled with this, both King and Dashu 
mention that traditional practices include theatre and dance. Shalom, Educating 
for Peace, is a Rwandan NGO that uses theatre and dance to communicate the 
message of forgiveness and reconciliation. More research needs to be done into 
the role these approaches can play. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that healing remains a miracle. We 
can speak of forgiveness and reconciliation, but for people who have experienced 
unimaginable horror, it is no easy task. In the autobiographical account of her 
ordeal during genocide, Immaculée Ilibagiza describes the intense internal 
struggle she underwent to come to a place of healing. While hiding in a tiny 
bathroom with seven other Tutsi women, she would hear the blood curdling cries 
of the Interehamwe (2006, 90). More horrifying than the images of flashing 
machetes and bodies hacked to pieces was the overpowering sense of the 
presence of evil. Even were it to be possible to blame the overriding political 
system for people’s madness in a general sense, how is it possible to see those 
young men who were once your neighbours and friends, who became killers and 
rapists, as human beings again? Yet her decision to forgive came from the 
realization that if she did not, she would become as inhumane as them.  
 
“The people that had hurt my family had hurt themselves even more, and 
they deserved my pity. There is no doubt that they had to be punished for 
their crimes against humanity and against God. But I prayed for 
compassion as well. I asked God for the forgiveness that would end the 




The following chapter will bring together the issues of history and identity in terms 
of a narrative approach to healing and reconciliation in Rwanda. This approach 
will take into account the complex reality of the Rwandan situation as well as the 
ideals of Lederach’s model of reconciliation, which involves people rediscovering 
and embracing each other as ‘humans-in-relationship’. 
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CHAPTER 10: A NARRATIVE APPROACH TO HEALING 
AND RECONCILIATION  
 
This chapter will draw together various theories with the analyses of the Rwandan 
context to suggest a narrative approach to healing and reconciliation. This 
approach will recommend a national narrative of history and identity that will be 
inclusive, plural and emancipatory, encompassing the complex narratives of the 
past and the multiple identities present in Rwanda today. But it will also consider 
how individuals and communities can be humans-in-relationship, sharing their 
identities and histories, allowing new narratives to emerge amongst themselves, 
regardless of whether national narratives change or not. What is pivotal is for 
individuals and communities to become aware of the impact national historical 
narratives have had on their lives, but also to realize that these do not have to be 
deterministic in terms of the way our narratives unfold. 
 
It will begin by summarizing the challenges in the narratives of history in Rwanda 
so far, assessing these in terms of Strathern and Stewarts’ theory of the ‘narrative 
of the interaction of narratives’. It will look at the issues of truth and memory in 
terms of retelling the narratives of history. It will then summarize the challenges in 
the narratives of identity, assessing these in terms of Jenkins social 
anthropological model of ethnicity, as well as Mamdani and Englund’s theories of 
identity. It will critique the attempt in Rwanda to eliminate identity, showing the 
dangers of such an approach. It will briefly look at the role nationalism has played 
in Rwandan identity. It will then make recommendations for a way forward to 
forging new stories which, in line with Rosenwald and Ochberg’s theory, will be 
emancipatory. This narrative approach to reconciliation will draw from narrative 
theory bringing it together with Lederach’s four elements of reconciliation. It will 
include MOUCECORE’s leader, Michel Kayitaba’s call for us to ‘cry together’ and 
Volf’s concept of embrace. This will hopefully bring to light an approach relevant in 






10.1. Creating new narratives of history 
 
Throughout this thesis, it has been reiterated that much of the conflict in Rwanda 
is based on divisive narratives of history. In chapter two, two distinctly different 
stories for the unfolding of Rwandan history, from pre-history until the genocide 
were described. The Tutsi-ideologue narrative described a peaceful integration 
between the Tutsi arriving from somewhere north with the Hutu and Twa already 
inhabiting the land we now call Rwanda. This narrative spoke of a benevolent 
monarchy who, through complex societal systems, worked together with Hutu and 
Tutsi leadership to ensure a well-functioning society. The arrival of the colonialists 
disturbed this system and resulted in ethnic division leading eventually to 
genocide. The genocide was the result of a carefully planned program to 
eradicate all Tutsi once and for all. The Hutu-ideologue narrative describes a 
series of wars and manipulative practices by the Tutsi who invaded the land 
Rwanda, resulting in the enslavement of the Hutu by a Tutsi minority ruled by a 
cruel monarchy with the help of colonialists until the Belgians assist the Hutu in a 
rightful revolutionary overthrow of the monarchy so that the Hutu majority could 
democratically rule the country. During the two republics, Rwanda was peaceful 
and harmonious and all was well until the Ugandan Rwandans started stirring up 
trouble when they wanted to unjustly return to a country where they were no 
longer welcome.  The genocide was in fact a civil war, predicated by the Ugandan 
Tutsi to take power in Rwanda again, as the Tutsi had prior to 1994. 
 
These are the two narratives that have run through this thesis in various forms. It 
has been described how these narratives supported ethnic stereotyping and a 
pervasive mistrust between ethnic groups. At various stages in Rwanda history, 
these narratives have been used by politicians and military leaders to manipulate 
the population and have led to extreme acts of violence. The worst of these was 
the genocide, but others include the various incidents of violence in 1959 and the 
1970s against Tutsi and in the 1990s between Tutsi and Hutu along the borders of 
Uganda in the build-up to genocide. It has also laid the foundation for continued 
violence in the DRC since 1994 until today.  
 
These divisive narratives continue to influence Rwandan society as it grapples 
with the reconciliation process. As the interviews with the four young men and the 
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seminar with the Reconciliation Forum highlighted, these narratives still lie deep 
within the mindsets of Rwandans today. It has been argued that the Rwandan 
governments’ response to this has been to try to create a new, uniting narrative of 
history that all Rwandans will adopt. But as Johan Pottier, Kenneth Harrow and 
others have argued, there is the danger that this new narrative is merely one more 
construction with a political agenda that will ultimately lead to renewed violence. 
As with previous narratives of history, they have been fed to the population from 
the top down, often playing on deeply embedded fears.  
 
It is clear that neither narrative holds the true or complete story. The Tutsi-
ideologue narrative describes Rwanda prior to the arrival of the colonialists as 
peaceful and harmonious, but evidence shows that there were continued wars 
and fighting between the monarchy and Hutu groups in the north well into the 
colonial period. The Hutu-ideologue narrative would have us believe that Rwanda 
was peaceful and harmonious during the two republics, but evidence shows that 
there was consistent discrimination against Tutsi and that the country was sinking 
into poverty as the population were controlled and manipulated by self-serving 
dictators.  
 
The truth probably lies somewhere in between these two narratives or as Stewart 
and  Strathern suggest, in the interaction between these narratives. As was 
mentioned in section 1.4, Stewart and Strathern see history as existing in ‘the 
interplay between people based on [the interaction of narratives] and in the 
changes of narrative over time’ (2002, 17). They suggest that “In encounters 
between people both sides construct narratives of meanings, and they use these 
to interpret each other, to come to terms, resist, dominate, collaborate, and so on. 
These competing narratives are continually tested in events and are reinforced, 
shattered or remade. As much misunderstanding is involved as understanding, 
and struggles emerge on the basis of these misfits or ‘disjunctures’ as well as 
because of conflicting interests and values” (2002, 16). In the Rwandan context, 
these constantly changing narratives, depicting conflicting interests and values, is 
clearly evident. Rwandan history has been consciously reconstructed so many 
times that Kenneth Harrow describes it as fantasies that turned people into ‘less 
than human’ and that Rwandans have become “immune to the proposition of 
 
226 
intersubjectivity and shared histories”, preventing any possibility of “energic 
relations with others” (2005, 17).  
 
In the interaction between narratives, intersubjectivity, energic relations and 
shared histories can emerge. But as long as there is an insistence on one 
narrative over and above others, rigid, divisive ways of relating become inevitable. 
Instead, Stewart and Strathern suggest that narratives of history need to emerge 
dialectically, in dialogue with one another. ‘Meanings’, they say, need to be 
’constantly subject to negotiation’ (2002, 17). The so-called mythico-histories of 
Rwanda, which stereotype and pit ethnic groups against each other, are 
described as grounds for lethal conflict. 
 
“Often, both sides see themselves as victims and the other side as the 
oppressors; or each sees themselves as a minority faced by a majority … 
Questions of meaning  are therefore paramount, but the meanings 
themselves are contested as a part of the overall contest for legitimacy that 
both lead to and surround acts of violence. Conversely, when narratives of 
events are more closely in agreement, the possibilities for settlements are 
greater. Negotiations between opposing sides in fact often involve a 
struggle to come to a reasonable level of agreement on the history of 
events themselves prior to seeking a settlement” (2002 17).  
 
The struggle to come to a ‘reasonable level of agreement on the history of events’ 
seems a significant part of the process of reconciliation. Without this struggle, only 
one side of the narrative is presented and those whose voices are not heard 
become resentful and may eventually insist on having their voice heard through 
violence. 
 
Stewart and Strathern further argue that narratives of the past do not only 
describe the past but also reflect what is happening in society in the present and 
what is envisioned about the future, making it difficult to differentiate between 
“history as it is scripted and history as it is enacted because scripting takes place 
continuously alongside experience, and looks both backwards and forward” 
(2002, 17, 18). The stories we tell of the past are influenced by the motives we 
have for what we have done and are doing in the present and plan to do in the 
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future. Thus our narratives of history are never value or agenda free, leading 
Herbert and Kanya Adam to argue that “history as an ongoing argument is still 
preferable to the myth-making of official collective memory” (2000, 37).  
 
Part of the process of developing a shared understanding of what happened and 
what needs to happen is through remembering. As was mentioned in section 9.2, 
every April is a month of remembrance in Rwanda where the nation is reminded 
of what happened during the genocide. Villa-Vicencio describes how the sharing 
of memories is a tenuous process. “It is incomplete. Its very incompleteness is 
what cries out to be heard. There is also the testimony of silence. There is body 
language. There is fear, anger and confusion. There is the struggle between 
telling what happened and explaining it away. It takes time to unpack, understand 
and do justice to testimony" (2000, 23). This kind of process cannot take place 
from the top down, with a single narrative imposed on a nation. It takes time and a 
lot of pain and struggle to slowly emerge. 
 
10.2. Creating new narratives of identity 
 
Chapters two and three described the development of ethnic identity in Rwanda. 
The ethnic stereotypes that played such a significant role during genocide were 
still evident as having influence as emerged during the interviews with the four 
men and the informal interviews with Rwandans between 2005 and 2009. It was 
shown how Tutsi were seen to be tall and thin, secretive and cunning, physically 
weak but making up for this with cleverness and wit. Hutu were seen to be shorter 
and of broader build, slow and stupid, physically strong and hard working but 
incapable of taking initiative. These stereotypes further led to the belief that Tutsi 
women were alluring and desirable, which led to inconsistent practices amongst 
genocidaires who both believed in the need to eradicate Tutsi but were also often 
married to or had mistresses who were Tutsi.  
 
In response to this ethnic stereotyping and division, the Rwandan government has 
introduced the policy of a united Rwandan identity, arguing that ethnic identity was 
constructed by the colonialists for their political agenda and that Rwandans need 
to leave that behind, embracing a new, shared, Rwandan identity. However, this 
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has been easier said than done, with ethnicity being a deeply embedded and 
internalized part of people’s individual and collective identities. This was explored 
in terms of Richard Jenkins’ social anthropological model of ethnic identity in 
section 1.5, which highlights that identity is indeed constructed but that this 
construction is ‘extremely resistant to change’ because it is so fundamental to 
ones’ personal integrity (2003, 47). 
 
Apart from ethnic stereotypes, another identity related issue that was brought to 
light was that of perpetrator and victim. Particularly in the light of the refugee 
exodus to the DRC, it was argued that all Hutu were labeled collectively guilty and 
genocidaire. Until today, many Hutu feel themselves to be labeled collectively 
guilty, and Tutsi, such as was apparent in the interview with Fred, often feel that 
all Hutu who were in the country in 1994 are indeed to some extent guilty. But 
perpetrator-victim dynamics have a far reaching history in the Rwandan context, 
with various parties painting themselves as either victim or perpetrator in order to 
solicit sympathy or justify violence. This was the case in 1959, when the alleged 
oppression of the Hutu led to them justifying the violent overthrow of the Tutsi 
leadership. In 1970, the fear of being oppressed again was used as a justification 
for renewed violence against Tutsi. In the 1990s, the plight of the Tutsi refugees in 
countries bordering Rwanda and the refusal of the republics to allow those 
refugees to return home, was justification for the violence of the RPF against the 
government at the time. The violence in the DRC after the genocide was justified 
along the same lines; the Tutsi did not want to be victims of the genocidaires 
again. Today, debate continues as to whether only the genocidaires are 
perpetrators that need to be tried at ICTR and gacaca or that the perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity from the RPF side should also be considered. Some 
would argue that everyone in Rwanda is a victim of political manipulation whereas 
others feel this disallows for individual responsibility and accountability. 
 
In the midst of all of this is a multiplicity of identities, as Rwandans from various 
countries and with various experiences come together. There are the survivors of 
genocide, the perpetrators of genocide, the old case load refugees (Tutsi 
returning from the diaspora) and new case-load refugees (Hutu who have become 
refugees after genocide). The old case load refugees, or Tutsi from the diaspora, 
include Tutsi from Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, the DRC and further abroad, each 
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bringing with them their unique blends of culture, language and identity. There is 
also the north-south divide which some would argue is even more divisive than 
the ethnic divide. Those living in Kigali, who have the greatest level of decision 
making power, are also distinct from those living in the rural areas who are often 
disconnected from a rapidly changing Rwandan society. The pre-colonial lineages 
and clans may also play a role amongst some Rwandans and these ancient 
relations may transcend ethnicity. 
 
Considering all of this, Rosenwald and Ochberg argue that there are ways of 
understanding the self and of telling one’s own narrative that are either helpful and 
lead to emancipation or harmful and create blockages for self or others. A key is 
to help individuals and communities enlarge their narratives, allowing for more 
possibilities and alternatives. The fewer alternatives there are in a narrative, the 
more stunting they will be. A very narrow and confining narrative will lead to 
constrained identity development, both on an individual as well as collective level. 
In the case of Rwanda, it would seem that many Rwandans feel confined within 
the single narrative put forward by the government, which disallows for 
possibilities to develop that would lead to richness and growth. They speak of 
multiple, mutating stories which are evidence of the formation of the narrators’ 
identities and their relationship with society (1992, 8). These stories are not 
necessarily consistent, but they are dynamic and indicative of a continual dialogue 
between an individual and their society.  
 
They argue that the narrator cannot merely create any story but that they are 
constrained by the ‘productions and constructions of others’. There needs to be 
coordination between our stories and that of those around us, although not all the 
stories have to be in unison. “But even in the difference a harmony must be 
audible; the ensemble of voices must add up to a workable whole” (1992, 9). In 
the Rwandan context, there is such discordance between the narratives that it 
becomes difficult for individuals and groups to become part of the harmony of the 
narratives. Instead, some feel their voices are marginalised and silenced, leading 
to a building resentment. When they can find no place for their own narrative 
within the framework of the official narrative, they can no longer feel themselves to 
be part of the vision of the official narrative. Thus, the official narrative moves 
forward, leaving behind large portions of the population who find no resonance 
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with it. Even were it to be the case that the narratives of these silenced voices 
were in fact the result of previous political indoctrinations, they need to be worked 
through by the narrators until they themselves can see the need to shift their 
narratives to something more helpful. But this is a painful and difficult process that 
takes time. 
 
Rosenwald and Ochberg speak of a continual struggle between the need for our 
autonomous interpretations of reality and societal expectations. There is a 
struggle between our own ‘liberative insights’ and ‘cultural and intrapsychic 
resistance’ (1992, 14). The stories we have heard as children and have deeply 
internalised grapple with the stories of our own experience of reality. These 
internal stories grapple with the stories others tell us. In conversation with 
Francois, this struggle was almost tangible, as he grappled with deeply embedded 
stereotypes and fears. The narratives he had grown up with strongly influenced 
his own experiences of reality. Robert’s description of the negative feedback loop 
describes the way embedded narratives inform the way current events are read 
and understood. Everything becomes confirmation of what we already believe 
about reality. It is difficult in these circumstances to begin believing new narratives 
which give an alternative reading on present day events. In the Rwandan context, 
many people have become distrustful of all narratives, even those from their own 
ethnic group or from their own childhoods, making it difficult to know what to hold 
onto, creating a vacuum in which fear and paranoia can run rampant. 
 
Part of embracing narratives for emancipation involves realising our entrapment in 
cultural norms and our own role as actors in and narrators of our narratives. 
Beyond awareness is also the realization that one can change ones’ discourse.  
“Changing cultural values and discourse may open new paths for self-
understanding and action. We see this whenever subjects can appropriate new 
vocabulary to caption – and thus capture – an old but previously elusive species 
of suffering” (Ochberg and Rosenwald, 1992, 15). This takes tremendous courage 
as it means letting go the narratives that define who we are and describe reality 
for us and choosing a new way of seeing and experiencing the past, present and 
future. In a context where there is a very strong official discourse, and a long 
history of politically manipulated narratives, it is difficult to trust a new, 
emancipatory discourse for oneself. Cynicism, doubt, fear and paranoia colour 
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many of the Rwandan narratives. To move beyond this and choose a discourse 
that is empowering and liberating, and yet not blind to the reality of one’s context 
is a challenge beyond the reach of many people. 
 
10.3. A contextualized history and relational identity 
 
In this section, a way forward in terms of the broad socio-political narratives of 
history and identity that impact ordinary people will be explored. It will be 
suggested, along with Mamdani, that Rwandan history needs to be contextualized 
in order to move towards a more dialectical form. It will also argue for an 
understanding of identity that is relational rather than divisive, following the 
arguments of Englund. From here, we will look at the ways in which individuals 
and communities can foster reconciliation through a narrative approach in spite of 
socio-political narratives. 
 
In his concluding chapter, Mamdani recommends that the way forward is 
contextualizing the Rwandan situation in terms of its historical context. He 
suggests several ways of doing this in terms of the historical narratives that were 
described in chapter two. For example, he suggests that instead of insisting that 
Tutsi domination began from when Tutsi first arrived in Rwanda, as the Hutu 
ideologue narrative suggests, or that Tutsi domination is a result only of 
colonialism, as the Tutsi ideologue narrative suggests, tracing the origins of Tutsi 
Power firstly to King Rwabugiri’s reforms at the turn of the century (which resulted 
in the degradation of Hutu and the beginning of Tutsi privilege) and secondly to 
colonial reforms which racialised Tutsi identity and hardened Tutsi privilege. This 
would undercut both the Hutu and Tutsi versions (2002, 269). He also suggests 
that the 1959 revolution be recognised for its historical legitimacy and its historical 
limitations. It is historically legitimate in that it marked the end of Tutsi privilege 
and limited in that it locked Hutu and Tutsi in the ‘claustrophobia of intimate 
differences, blind to bigger possibilities’ (2002, 270). This perspective of history is 
in line with Stewart and Strathern’s interplay between historical narratives, giving 




Mamdani further suggests contextualizing the genocide in terms of the civil war. 
He argues that genocide should not be merged with civil war so that it ceases to 
exist analytically, but neither should it be severed completely from civil war so that 
the killings would be have no motive (2002, 268). The genocide needs to be seen 
as the outcome of defeat in civil war, thus as political violence, an outcome of 
power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites, thereby recognising Hutu and Tutsi 
as political identities and that the primary problem in Rwanda is one of political 
power (2002, 268).  
 
This kind of interplay between differing versions of historical narratives can help 
Rwandans see that shared narratives of the past can give richer and deeper 
meanings to the story of what happened, and mediate a more inclusive way of 
dialoguing about the past. When considering the request from members of the 
Reconciliation Forum to dialogue about the past in order to write a version of 
history that can be taught in schools, Mamdani’s contextualizations are helpful in 
finding where and how that dialogue could begin to take place. Instead of insisting 
on one version that excludes the majority of Rwandans and supports divisive 
political power positions, the ‘narrative of the interaction of narratives’ can allow 
for new, shared spaces to be created. Seeing that the roots of harmful identity 
definitions lie in a combination of factors, from the action of certain kings through 
to the policies of colonialists, can bring an interesting dimension to a school 
history curriculum. Understanding that the roots of conflict are complex and multi-
dimensional rather than having a straightforward, narrow explanation can be 
helpful in developing critical engagement with the past and the present. 
 
This is not only relevant in terms our understanding of history but also in terms of 
how we define our identity. Englund argues for complex, multiple identities rather 
than simple, narrowly defined identities. He argues that in many post-colonial 
African states, a common feature is that each person accommodates multiple 
identities (2004, 9). In Rwanda this is certainly the case.  A person may find their 
identity in being both Ugandan and Rwandan, or East African as well as with their 
ethnic group.  
 
In Western identity politics, there is an insistence that every person needs to be 
rooted in a particular culture, but Englund suggests that in post-colonial societies 
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(as well as postmodern societies in the west) there is an emergence of a 
‘relational aesthetic of recognition’. He argues that every community is a network 
of complex relations. Thus, rather than recognizing or acknowledging distinct 
communities of differences, one would acknowledge the relations that unite those 
groups, and to acknowledge these relations not only as something that is inserted 
between communities after they emerge, but as intrinsic to the very emergence of 
the communities (Englund, 2004, 14).  
 
This alternative relational approach to identity is extremely significant in the 
Rwandan context. In a preliminary interview with Robert, he spoke of how the key 
to reconciliation lay in the mandatory relations that existed between all Rwandans 
for the very purpose of survival. He stressed, as many other Rwandans have 
done as well, how at the heart of Rwandan survival, particularly in rural Rwanda, 
lay an integral interdependence between neighbours and people living on the 
same hill. Rwandans could not afford not to reconcile on the most superficial level 
because of their need to cooperate in order to go about their daily lives.  
 
Englund suggests a shift in emphasis from identity categories (either individual or 
group) to the relations between categories, between communities, between 
individuals and between groups; that more important than the discrete groups is 
the fluid movement between them.  He argues that the danger of seeing groups 
as discrete (separate units from one another) is that it can easily be manipulated 
to ‘foster intolerance, hatred and violence’. “Other groups and communities are 
unreservedly alien, cut off from the fabric of a moral society or, if not 
spontaneously keeping their distance, severed by force” (2004, 11). African 
leaders can then justify suppressing difference (for example, through suppressing 
minority or disadvantaged groups) in the name of national unity.   
 
Englund suggests making relationships and connections the starting point of the 
politics of recognition. But this is difficult in a context where identity politics means 
having a specific, discrete identity and where every person is rooted in a particular 
culture (2004, 12). He argues that an alternative to discrete individuals, groups 
and communities pursuing their own agendas might involve looking at 
contemporary African ways of being such as ”cosmopolitan citizenship, multiple 
post-colonial identities and cosmological ideas about the person and the self” 
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(2004, 13). During the interviews with the four young men, two spoke of their East 
African identities. Many Rwandans hold passports of neighbouring African 
countries or have lived considerable periods of time in neighbouring countries. 
Englund would argue that the complex network of relationships between identities, 
within a person and between people, are intrinsic to the living out of identities in 
the post-colonial African context (2004, 14).  
 
There are two avenues a relational aesthetic of recognition could take, according 
to Englund. One could either emphasise a common citizenship or nationality in 
which everyone finds a sense of unity or one could emphasise the 
‘interconnectedness that transcends national identities; a transnational 
understanding of identity’ (2004, 15). Perhaps there is room for both. In terms of a 
narrative approach to reconciliation, it may be helpful for individuals and 
communities to recognize that ‘interconnectedness that transcends national 
identity’ and that transcends ethnic identity. Being liberated from the confines of a 
particular identity narrative can allow for the multiple possibilities that emerge from 
a relational understanding of identity and identity definitions. 
 
This section has argued for contextualizing the past in order to allow the ‘narrative 
of the interaction of narratives’ to emerge. It has also argued for a relational 
understanding of identity. Both tend towards complexifying history and identity 
and moving away from a single, narrow understanding so as to allow for shared 
understandings to emerge. 
 
10.4. A narrative approach to reconciliation 
 
On the broad socio-political level, this thesis has argued for a contextualization of 
Rwandan history through multiple narratives interacting. It has argued for an 
identity that transcends static divisive categories through an emphasis on the 
relational. Relational identities and interactive histories lead to a broadening of 
possibilities or alternatives in individual and communal narratives as they interact 
with national narratives. A single narrative can become narrow, stunting and 
divisive. A narrative filled with different alternatives is healing and emancipatory 




This is what may be needed on a national level. But Miroslav Volf argues that 
‘rather than reflecting on the kind of society we ought to create in order to 
accommodate individual or communal heterogeneity’ we need to look at ‘what 
kind of selves we need to be in order to live in harmony with others’ (1996, 21). 
We may not be able to change the socio-political conditions that we interact with, 
but we can change how we interact with these broader systems and how we can 
live out new narratives that liberate us and bring reconciliation between ourselves 
and others.   
 
One important way that this can happen is through what MOUCECORE’s director 
Michel Kayitaba described. He spoke of the word for forgiveness, kubabarira, as 
coming from the word urira which means ‘to cry’. As was described in section 9.4 
Kayitaba encourages perpetrators and victims, or all those hurt by the events of 
the past, to cry together for their shared loss of humanity. Crying together for the 
way all Rwandans have been manipulated by politics and power play, crying 
together for the way ethnic stereotypes have divided a nation, crying together for 
the blood that has been shed is a powerful part of sharing narratives. Through 
NURC activities there is room for debate around pertinent issues, which is 
important, but beyond debate, there is a need to share pain and wounds together. 
Part of the process towards crying together may be being angry at one another 
and expressing the bitterness and grief in ones narrative. A narrative approach to 
reconciliation would need to include sharing the deeper emotions embedded in 
our narratives in order for these to be heard and acknowledged by the other. 
 
Both Hay and Lederach in section 9.1 describe reconciliation as essentially about 
restored relationship and restored dignity. As we share our narratives and have 
them heard and acknowledged as legitimate narratives in the Rwandan context, 
we enter into the process of being restored as human beings in valid relationship 
to others with the dignity that comes from being human beings in relationship. As 
long as our narratives are dismissed as being false versions of reality, we feel 
unacknowledged as human beings in relationship to others and become alienated 
from others. A narrative approach to reconciliation would need to acknowledge 




In section 1.5, Jenkins’ social model of ethnic identity was described, where he 
argued that although ethnic differences may not be inherent, they are deeply 
embedded in our self and other concepts. Sandra Wallman, in the same section, 
was quoted as saying that ethnicity happens at the boundary of ‘us’, in contact or 
confrontation with ‘them’. Wallman and Jenkins see the boundary’s between 
groups as pivotal to identity politics. According to this, key to group identity is 
identity boundaries; boundaries that are constantly defined and redefined in terms 
of ‘the other’. It is in the act of defending ones identity boundary that violence can 
occur. This is especially the case when those in power define others against their 
will. But these boundaries change as peoples understandings of themselves or 
the other change. Wallman writes that ethnicity is thus “transactional, shifting and 
essentially impermanent” and ethnic boundaries are always two-sided (2003, 20). 
This allows for the possibility of boundaries to be renegotiated.  
 
Popular writer Henri Nouwen says that “much violence is based on the 
misconception that our lives are our own property to be defended rather than a gift 
to be shared”. A narrative approach to reconciliation suggests that in the sharing 
of our narratives we begin to renegotiate the boundaries between groups. Libby 
and Len Traubman, who facilitate dialogue between Israeli’s and Palestinians, say 
that “an enemy is one whose story we have not heard”. As we begin to share our 
narratives we shift our understandings of self and other, thereby shifting the 
boundaries between ‘them’ and ‘us’ until, perhaps, we can come to a point of a 
shared identity beyond the boundary. 
 
This section has argued that a narrative approach to healing and reconciliation 
takes into account the impact that the broader socio-political narrative has had on 
our personal and interpersonal narratives, often bringing division in its insistence 
on a single, narrow narrative. On the level of individuals and communities, we 
need to acknowledge this but then choose how we will live within the confines of 
that narrative in order to be in harmony with others. It has been suggested that a 
narrative approach to reconciliation would involve sharing our narratives, crying 
together about the deep emotions held within our narratives and acknowledging 
the legitimacy of each others’ narratives. It further suggested that through sharing 
narratives, we would change the way we perceive ourselves and others, thereby 




10.5. Final thoughts 
 
Mamdani suggests that there are three possible ways forward in terms of identity; 
separate political communities (a Hutuland and Tutsiland), a larger union with 
bipolar political identities, or forging a political identity that transcends ethnicity 
(2002, 265). The third option would clearly be the preferred one but the question 
remains how this should be achieved. This thesis has described at various levels 
how narratives of history and identity have been manipulated for political 
purposes. Mamdani suggests that the only way to break the ‘stranglehold’ of Tutsi 
Power and Hutu Power is by ‘breaking stranglehold on history writing and making’ 
(2002, 265). The stranglehold on narratives needs to be broken. 
 
But beyond this, individuals and communities can begin to live out new narrative 
possibilities through an awareness of the impact of broader socio-political 
narratives on their lives, choosing to live out the shared richness of dialectical 
histories and relational identities. Once we begin to realize that who we are has 
been formed and developed for particular reasons and in response to specific 
contexts, we can begin to see the possibility of an identity beyond where we are 
now.  
 
Beatrice Umutesi describes a powerful alternative in her autobiographical account 
of being part of the mass exodus out of Rwanda after the genocide. Again and 
again in her account Umutesi emphasizes how it was never just Tutsi or just Hutu 
escaping or surviving one harrowing situation after another, but that it was always 
a mixture of people, not standing for one ethnic category or another, but standing 
together as survivors.  
 
The leader of the NGO PHARP related the following story that occurred during 
one of their workshops that illustrates the idea of a shared identity as survivors: A 
Tutsi widow shared her suffering as a result of genocide at great length. Breaking 
into her story, a Hutu widow then stood up angrily and started shouting at her, 
asking her if she thought she was the only one who had suffered and arguing that 
her suffering had been no worse than that of many Hutus. The Tutsi widow was 
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humbled by this and apologized, resulting in an awareness that they shared the 
same suffering. We could take this even further and consider the chilling 
statement made by a Rwandan that in Rwanda ‘everyone has blood on their 
hands’.  
 
A narrative approach to reconciliation says that history is dialogical, identity 
relational and that the narrative of every Rwandan is significant in terms of 
creating new narratives all Rwandans can share. As John Lederach writes,  
 
“Relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution … 
Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or 
minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations, but instead is built on 
mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-
in-relationship … Engagement assumes encounter, not only knowing but 
acknowledging others’ stories, telling and listening, and validating stories of 
the past … Similarly, reconciliation is based on the envisioning of a shared 







Life Story Interview Questions 
1. Share your story from when you were born until today, describing where you 
grew up, your family history, your education and significant life events. 
2. When did you become aware of your ethnicity and the existence of ethnic 
groups in Rwanda? 
3. How aware were you, when growing up, of was happening socially and 
politically in Rwanda (and in the country in which you lived) and what impact 
did it have on you and your understanding of your identity? 
4. How were you impacted by the events in Rwanda in 1994? 
5. Is reconciliation happening in Rwanda today and what would need to be in 
place for reconciliation to become a reality? 
6. What does being a Rwandan mean to you? 
 
Formal Interview Questions 
1. How would you describe the reconciliation process in Rwanda so far? 
2. Is it effective and what do you think the outcome of this process might be? 
3. What role does understanding Rwandan history have in this process? 
4. Is Rwanda being forced to accept a politicsed version of Rwandan history?  
5. What are your thoughts about the Rwandan governments’ policy of ‘we are 
all Rwandan’? Is it helpful in the reconciliation process? 
6. What is your understanding of identity in Rwanda? 
7. Is there an openness for dialogue in Rwanda? 
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